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Abstract
This thesis places Francisco de los Cobos at the centre 
of Charles V's imperial project. It therefore discusses his 
role in the context of Spanish administration, society, 
economy and empire. Given the emperor's voracious need for 
finance for his many wars Cobos is shown to be inseparable 
from the whole question of Castilian financial resources. 
The thesis is thematic, beginning by tracing Cobos's rise 
through an analysis of his tactics for securing and 
maintaining political power and social ascent by his use of 
Castile's institutions. This establishes the context of his 
world. It then considers his use of power and his political 
network. From his rise, through his Castilian administrative 
skills, the thesis shows that he was at the centre of wider 
developments — the financing needs of imperial policy and 
the emerging discoveries of precious metals in the New 
World.
The longest chapters relate to his central role in 
broadening the financial basis of Charles's royal domain 
wealth in Castile by, among other things, working with the 
towns to ensure a regular increase in taxes from the town's 
representatives in the Cortes. This solidified his position 
of trust and confidence with the emperor and also provided 
the means by which credit could be obtained through secured 
contracts with the bankers.
The thesis redresses the imbalance of previous 
scholarship where, although Cobos's importance was 
recognised, it was usually in an oblique or subsidiary role
iii
showing him absorbed in the detail of administration and 
patronage. The thesis concludes by examining his purpose and 
success in entailing his wealth and family dynasty.
iv
Preface
Francisco de los Cobos has largely been relegated by 
historians to a role of discreet advisor to Charles V. The 
thesis redresses this modest interpretation of his 
importance and places him at the centre of events, while 
recognising that not all questions have been answered or 
problems solved from the sources consultied.
This thesis is based principally on manuscript and 
early printed sources from an extensive and diverse number 
of archives but also draws widely on existing secondary 
material. I am indebted to scholars who preceded me and did 
much of the spadework in the relevant archives. While 
critical of Keniston's 1958 biography, his solid archival 
work provided many leads to follow. The high standard he set 
is evident by the reluctance or inhibitions of historians to 
raise further questions or re-examine archival sources. 
Partly this is explained by the difficulty of the 
palaeography of Cobos's "hand' and partly by Cobos's 
epistolary discretion. Even such an estimable scholar as 
Ramon Carande has commented on this difficulty. Thus help 
from archivists in translating particularly difficult 
phrases, especially at Simancas and at the Camarasa archive 
in Seville, was crucial in advancing the thesis.
I am also grateful for the help of the staff of the 
Blblioteca Nacional in Madrid where much of my time has been 
spent. Guidance to the archival material at the town hall in 
Ubeda and the private archive of Zabalburu in Madrid was 
also most helpful. I would like to thank Eduardo Anglado
VMonzon of the Biblioteca Nacional for introducing me to 
Aurelio Valladares and Joaquin Montes Bardo of the 
Unlversldad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia in Ubeda. They 
were both helpful in locating manuscripts in Ubeda and in 
interpretating the importance to Cobos of the chapel of El 
Salvador in that town.
I wish also to thank the John Carter Brown Library in 
Providence, Rhode Island and Pepe Amor for granting me the 
Jose Amor y Vazquez Fellowship to study at this remarkable 
library of early printed books and maps. My frequent visits 
there also gave me the opportunity to meet Fellows and 
Invited Scholars and to exchange ideas on our different 
studies. I thank Norman Fiering and Ted Widmer for 
permitting me to return each summer for further study and to 
enjoy the most stimulating of environments. My thanks also 
go to James Muldoon, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University, 
for our long lunches and discussions on medieval 
institutions that continually fired my enthusiasm.
I further wish to thank my supervisors at The Open 
University, Dr. Ole Grell and Dr. David Goodman, for their 
helpful criticism, and valuable advice. Finally, I am 
grateful to my wife, Patricia, for her forbearance in 
accepting my long absences and forgetfulness on many issues, 
and my son, also named Dryden, for proofing and improving 
the style of some of the chapters.
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4Glossary of Spanish Terms
Technical contemporary terms are an inevitable 
encounter in studying Spanish manuscripts and secondary 
Spanish sources. In many cases there is not a suitable 
English counterpart. Thus, I mainly have left the originals, 
in italics, and provide this Glossary as guidance. The 
Glossary does not include every term that may be unfamiliar 
to readers, but only those most commonly encountered. The 
rest should be clear from their contexts.
Adelantado: governor of a province.
Adelantamiento: domain of an adelantado.
Alcabala: Castilian sales-tax.
Alguacll mayor: high constable of an incorporated Spanish
town.
Arbitristas: writers drafting proposals for political or
economic reform.
Arbitrios: ad hoc fiscal expedients devised by arbitristas. 
Asiento: contract, often with bankers.
Audiencia: high court of appeal, often with administrative 
responsibilities for a region.
Ayuntamiento: town hall.
Cabecera or cabeza de partida: centre of administration of a 
group of towns or villages.
Cedula: royal decree.
Comendador Mayor: Grand Commander.
Comuneros: rebels in uprising of some towns in Castile,
1520-1521.
Consejo de Castilla: council in charge of domestic business 
of Castile and Leon.
Consejo de Estado: Privy Council.
Consejo de la Hacienda: Council of the Treasury.
Consejo de la Inquisicion: Council of the Inquisition.
Consejo de las Indias: Council of the Indies.
Consulta: memorandum of advice, prepared by governing
councils for the king.
Contador: treasury comptroller.
Contador Mayor: chief comptroller of accounts.
Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda: royal exchequer.
Converso: a converted Jew or Christian of Jewish descent. 
Corregidor: magistrate appointed by the king to towns.
Cortes: assembly of the representatives of the towns of
Castile. The non-Castilian realms had their own distinctive 
assemblies.
Cruzada: crusade; hence the tax levied by the Crown, by
papal concession, ostensibly to support the cost of crusade 
but in fact often alienated to other purposes.
Diezmo: one tenth; a tax of this proportion such as an
ecclesiastical tithe.
Encabezamiento: the composition of a variable revenue — the 
alcabala and tercia — for a lump sum paid by the towns to 
the Crown.
Encomienda: office of a comendador of a Military Order.
Originally the comendador had to provide arms and men to the 
king; in return he could collect tribute within his 
adelentamiento.
Escribania: office of an escribano.
Escribano: notary attached to the royal secretariat.
Escudo: family shield or coat-of-arms.
Expedientes: sale of assets to raise money.
Fueros: medieval law-code or charter granted by the Crown 
specifying certain traditional freedoms, including freedom 
from taxes.
Fundidor, marcador y ensayador: office of smelting, minting 
and assaying all specie.
Habito: monk/s cloak and insignia of knighthood of one of 
the Military Orders.
Hidalgo: a person with noble status and exemption from
taxation.
Hidalguia: noble status.
Infanta: royal princess.
Infante: royal prince.
Juro: a treasury note (annuity), issued either as a royal 
merced (grant) or in return for a loan, usually secured by a 
specific source of income.
Letrado: lawyer with a university degree, personnel who
operated state and Church bureaucracy.
Licenciado: holder of a graduate degree, usually a lawyer. 
Maravedi: monetary unit for small transactions; the more
valuable ducat was 375 maravedies.
Maestrazgos: land and revenues of the Masterships of the
Military Orders.
Mayorazgo: an entailed estate descending by right of
primogeniture; this restricted alienation and was thought 
necessary for the stability of society.
Merced: grant or privilege from the king.
Oidor: judge in an audiencia.
Pechero: tax-payer, a commoner.
Pleito: lawsuit.
Poder: power of attorney or mandate for procurators in the 
Cortes.
Privado: position of royal favourite.
Pragmatica: royal decree.
Procurador: representative of a municipality in the
Castilian Cortes.
Quinta: the king's 'fifth', or royal tax on precious metals. 
Receptor: notary instructed to collect written testimony in 
a suit pending before an audiencia,
Repartimiento: quota, allocation of tax contribution among 
districts. Also the system of distribution of Indian labour 
among Spanish settlers in the New World.
Residencia: investigation or inquiry into conduct of an
official at the end of his term.
Reyes Catolicos: Ferdinand and Isabel, the Catholic Kings. 
Senorio: lordship of large land-holding: included
jurisdiction and tax collection, and was heritable in 
perpetuity.
Servicio: a renewable triennial grant by the Cortes to the 
king.
Siete Partidas: the great legal code of Alfonso X, dating 
from the 1260s.
Sisa: Universal sales or excise tax on foodstuffs.
Tercias: the two-ninths of the ecclesiastical tithe paid to 
the Crown by papal grant and collected with the alcabalas as 
part of the encabezamiento.
Venera: scallop shell used as a badge or insignia of the
Order of Santiago.
Visita: tour of Inspection by a judge and officials at the 
end of their term of office, to investigate and expose any 
culpability.
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Introduction
So important was Francisco de los Cobos, the subject of 
this thesis, that a distinguished historian has rated him as 
'the real ruler of Spain from the 1520s until his death in 
1547. '* Yet, the only scholarly study is that of Hayward 
Keniston published in 1958, and not translated into Spanish 
until 1980.2 Keniston's work contains a mass of detail and he 
consulted a wealth of fragmentary primary sources. This must 
of necessity be the platform for any new work. The challenge 
of this thesis is to find fresh evidence pointing to Cobos's 
centrality in Charles's Castile.
This is the central thesis: Cobos was not the
peripheral shadowy figure of current scholarship. He was at 
the centre of Castilian administration. In particular, given 
the emperor's dynastic policies and consequent endless 
financial needs, Cobos's role both with the Castilian Cortes 
and the bankers made him indispensable to imperial policy. 
This will be established by interrogating the 'archive' of 
material described below with emphasis on particular themes.
The aims of this thesis are thus: to reveal the salient 
characteristics of Cobos's personality through examining his 
motivations and tactics for securing and . maintaining 
political power and social ascent — Chapters Two and Three; 
to extend our understanding of Cobos's central role in
1 John H. Elliott, review of Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to the 
Emperor Charles V, Bulletin o f  Hispanic Studies 39, no. 3 (1962).
2 Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to Charles V (Pittsburgh, 1958).
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Castile's financial administration (his remodelling of the 
fiscal state) - Chapters Four and Five; and to examine the 
sources of his wealth, not just its extent, and his purpose 
and success in entailing his wealth and family dynasty — an 
objective much dependent on the 'gift' of his emperor — 
Chapter Six.
This thesis is based mainly on manuscript sources. Much 
time has therefore been spent in state, municipal and 
private archives. Of these, the most valuable are: the
Archivo General de Simancasr Valladolid; the Camarasa family 
archive in Seville and of course the Cervantes room in the 
Biblioteca Nacional. Details of these archives, and others, 
are contained in the bibliography. Correspondence with some 
of Cobos's powerful friends has been particularly useful in 
demonstrating his involvement in a broad range of issues and 
how he made use of his network of patronage. Most of the 
correspondence is to Cobos and therefore in the absence of 
his answers inferences must be made from subsequent letters 
from the correspondents. The collection of letters from 
Francisco de Borja compiled by the Society of Jesus was 
especially useful. The papers on Cobos's mayorazgo (Appendix 
Three) contained in the family archive in the Casa de Pilatos 
at Seville are important in understanding the sources of his 
wealth and the methods he used to protect this. Finally, 
transcription of his last will and testament (Appendix Four) 
also found in the family archive gives a clear statement of 
his life's purpose.
While John H. Elliott considers that a "knowledge of 
Cobos's career is important for our understanding of Charles 
V's government in Spain," he believes that Keniston"s work 
is more "chronicle/biography, not an analysis of policies 
and administration," a view which this thesis largely 
shares.3 Keniston"s work represents itself as a study of 
Castile's administration through the career of its premier 
bureaucrat. But Elliott thinks that "the way in which 
Castile was really governed in Charles's reign still remains 
a mystery, requiring a study more along the lines of a 
Carande.'4 J.L. Phelan writes that Keniston "is good on the 
origins of the Spanish bureaucratic state, whose foundation
was laid during Cobos's life. Cobos was the archetype of the
new kind of bureaucrat, industrious, loyal, meticulous, 
orderly, prudent, and somewhat unimaginative, these 
bureaucrats were decisive instruments in the fashioning of 
royal absolutism.'5 This conclusion may seem reasonable, but 
the adjectives he uses for defining the "archetype 
bureaucrat," are a necessary but insufficient description in 
Cobos's case.
Cobos was not a letrado (trained jurist) — he was
different from the bureaucrats who emerged under the 
Catholic Kings. Letrados had degrees in canon or civil law
from the colegios mayores (graduate schools). Derek Lomax,
3 Elliott, p. 195.
4 Ibid., p. 195. This is a reference to: Ramon Carande, Carlos V y  Sus Banqueros, 3 vols 
(Barcelona, 1987).
5 J. L. Phelan, review of Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos: Secretary to the 
Emperor Charles V, Speculum: a Journal o f Medieval Studies 36, no. 1 (1961).
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in his review, also considers Keniston's work as more a 
'biography of a bureaucrat.' He writes that 'there is no 
analysis of the relation between Cobos's policies and the 
effects on national life. The social, political and 
religious events of the age are passed by.'6 The implication 
is that Cobos, and perhaps Keniston, had no interest in 
these issues. As an account of 'events' Keniston's work does 
not illuminate Cobos or the reasons for his importance to 
Charles V and the empire. If the subject matter of history 
is 'human thoughts,' as postulated by Collingwood — an 
arguable proposition — then in the absence of a core body of 
private papers, we will never know Cobos's thoughts. Cobos's 
political ideas or policies do not emerge from Keniston's 
study. Keniston's monograph is an account of 'events' and a 
catalogue of promotions and gifts, whichdo not reveal the 
role of this undoubtedly powerful figure. Cobos's influence 
on Charles V is established as a general principle, but his 
specific authority is not defined, except in relation to 
bureaucracy and financial problems.
So why was Cobos so important to Charles V? The answer
to this question may also help to throw more light on the
shadowy figure of the emperor. The thesis will examine 
evidence of Cobos's actions from, among other things, 
letters, books of account, escrituras of sales and purchases 
of property, records of meetings in the Castilian Cortes and
of course his mayorazgo (perpetual entailment). The thesis
6 Derek W. Lomax, review o f Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to the 
Emperor Charles V, Hispania (Madrid) 23, no. 89 (1963), p. 133.
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will interrogate sources on issues of policy to clarify 
Cobos's role, whether as advisor or follower of Charles's 
actions. It will also examine areas of policy, where Cobos 
and others express views, for evidence of the centrality of 
his role on the issues, which preoccupied the court.
Keniston's book is criticised by Fernando Chueca Goitia 
as 'lacking a personal interpretation regarding Cobos's 
character. It is so detailed that Cobos's human profile is 
lost; we have difficulty distinguishing the talents that 
contributed to so prodigious an ascent.'7 Wallace K. Ferguson 
also wrote that due to the concentration on official papers, 
Keniston 'helps us to see the secretary, but we only dimly 
perceive the man behind the office.' 'The workings of the 
imperial government are somewhat obscured by the mass of 
detail on favours and rewards.'8 Much of what we do know 
about Cobos comes from chroniclers such as Pedro de Mexla 
and letters from his followers, ambassadors and 
contemporaries.9 There are also protocols of notaries in 
Ubeda, Granada, Seville and Valladolid which mainly record 
inventories of his properties, exchanges and sales. Indeed 
the papers of the Camarasas (Cobos's legacy title), held 
within the Fundaclon Ducal de Medinaceli, give a financial 
record of the wealth accumulated during his life. It is 
curious that we are so dependent on these financial
7 Fernando Chueca Goitia, /  Francisco de los Cobos: Politica y Mecenas, ’ Magina-Revista 
Universitaria, Extraordinario ‘Francisco de los Cobos ’ 6 (1998/99), pp. 5-13.
8 Wallace K. Ferguson, review of Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to 
the Emperor Charles V, The Canadian Historical Review 41, no. 4 (1960).
9 Madrid, Biblioteca Nacional, Ms 1926, Pedro de Mexia, ‘Historia del Emperador Carlos 
V.’
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documents — his testament and his mayorazgo (entailment) — 
relating to his possessions. It is as if Cobos is making a 
statement -  'look how much I have achieved, and from whence 
I have come.' He has perhaps, therefore, deliberately 
revealed this much about his patrimony.
Importantly, Cobos was in charge from 1510 of the royal 
register of mercedes (gifts and privileges) for Castile and 
the Indies. He knew the importance of mercedes to his own 
ascent and was an avid collector of mercedes throughout his 
career. As the custodian of privileges he knew the 
background of all the courtiers, and this may have been a 
key to his power and influence. Yet we have little record 
from his private papers of his opinions on these people. We 
are thus largely dependent on other peoples' references to 
Cobos, and possibly background checks made when he took the 
habito of the Order of Santiago. As part of this enquiry the 
thesis will analyse primary sources and unpublished archival 
documents, which are to be found in various regions of 
Spain. These sources will be organised by following various 
themes.
Keniston states that the personal letters of Cobos were 
largely eliminated from the official files; this is 
explained as resulting from the usual unclear distinction 
between public and private papers. It was quite common for 
royal secretaries to take official papers to their homes. 
Cobos's political discretion may have been the reason for 
not preserving documents that made personal references to 
himself, his opinion on others, and on the events of the
day. Antonio Sanchez Gonzalez, a director of the Medinaceli 
Ducal Archive in Seville, has written on the family papers 
of Charles's secretary.10 He explains that before Simancas, 
which was not established until late in Cobos's life, state 
documents were simply passed on from previous secretaries to 
their successors. Thus in 1508, the widow of Fernando's 
secretary, de Gricio, delivered papers to Lope Conchillos, 
whose widow in turn in 1522 passed papers to Cobos. Alfonso 
Valdes, a secretary to Charles V, wrote a clause in his will 
requiring his papers to go to Cobos. These arrangements, of 
course, left much scope for papers to go astray. But 
intriguingly Sanchez Gonzalez suggests that Cobos would have 
considered the register of mercedes and privileges as 
private papers even though written in a 'public function.' 
Therefore, a widespread hunt for archival evidence is 
necessary before accepting Keniston's presumption that 'he 
eliminated from his files all of his personal 
correspondence.'11 Sanchez Gonzalez writes on patrimonial 
sources which 'authenticate the management of Cobos's 
possessions amassed through his life.'12 These documents are 
in the family archives, mainly located at the Medinaceli 
Ducal Archive in Seville. They principally relate to his 
investments and his many mercedes. Keniston has thoroughly 
reviewed this family archive and his work is informative as 
to the size of Cobos's recorded wealth.
10 Antonio Sanchez Gonzalez, ‘La Documentation Patrimonial del Secretario de Carlos V ’ 
in Francisco de los Cobos y  su epoca (Madrid, 1997), pp. 69-79.
11 Keniston, p. 372.
12 Sanchez Gonzalez.
A chronological account of Cobos's life, such as that 
of Keniston, also has the advantage of illustrating the 
importance to Cobos of monetary motivation in his upward 
mobility. The section in the Simancas archives entitled 
Quitaciones de la Corte demonstrates the record of titles 
and rewards for his upward progress.13 But is it reasonable 
to consider Cobos's motives as only those of social prestige 
and wealth, with his career marked by an increase in 
honours? Certainly this theme of riches and prestige 
dominates his life as portrayed by Keniston. But it begs the 
question of how such a man, whom Lomax calls a 'mediocre 
functionary at best,' could rise so high?14 The answer that 
he was affable, loyal and industrious — qualities, which 
Elliott writes, 'were necessary for success in the Castile 
of Charles V' — somehow is inadequate to explain 'the most 
powerful man of his epoch.'15 He probably was a pragmatist, 
not an ideologue, but he is defined by Keniston a:s an 
accountant, with many references to his lack of culture; 
thus his career moves and mercedes look planned and 
predictable. We follow him from his early investiture into 
the Order of Santiago; his strategic marriage with Maria de 
Mendoza, daughter of the Count of Rivadavia, linking him to 
one of the most powerful families. This marriage illustrates 
the possibility of class movement between the new 
bureaucracy and old nobility. This is also shown by his
13 AGS, QC, leg. 16.
14 Lomax, p. 134.
15 Elliott, p. 196.
17
building of palaces in Valladolid and Ubeda; his purchase of 
senorios (feudal domains) from the Order of Calatrava at 
Sabiote in 1537, near his home town; his mayorazgo for his 
descendants; and his monumental sacred chapel of El 
Salvador. In Chueca's felicitous phrase, Cobos was 'creador 
de una Villa Ducal, sin ser duque' (creator of a ducal town, 
without being a duke).16 The ultimate ducal title was not to 
be his.
But perhaps his crowning glory was receiving the 
Adelantamiento of Cazorla. This was an ecclesiastical
senorio on the Castilian frontier, conquered from the Moors 
by the archbishop of Toledo in the 13th century, and
therefore within the gift of these archbishops. Given 
Cobos's birth he could not expect ennoblement but, knowing 
Cazorla and its wooded mountains near his home, he may have 
considered the Adelantamiento as the ultimate in prestige. 
Although Charles V granted nobility to Diego de los Cobos, 
Francisco's son, on his marriage into nobility with the
title of Marques de Camarasa, Diego was to lose the
Adelantamiento of Cazorla through prolonged litigation. Thus 
the accountant, Cobos, could not successfully plan, as he 
thought, beyond the grave.
Turning to Cobos's relationship with the emperor, Ramon 
Carande uses a review of Keniston's book to place different 
emphases on Cobos's importance and the reasons why 'Charles 
V placed so much weight on him for the financial
16 Chueca, p. 6.
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administration of the country.'17 He considers Charles's 
'Secret Instruction' of 1543 written in Palamos, on 6 May
1543, for his son Philip, the Prince Regent, to be a good
• • 18 •measure of Charles's opinion on Cobos. It represented his
last wish and testament in case of misfortune on his Italian
campaign. The confidential text gives a portrait of various
advisors close to the prince, and confirms Charles's 
astuteness.
The 'Instruction' reads that Cobos was a faithful 
servant, and Charles did not think that he took important 
'gifts.' He was experienced and well-informed, capable in 
government, principally in finance, and 'if necessary he 
would be as good a reformer as anyone else.' Carande writes 
that, as usual, Charles is sparse in praise and 'pone junto 
a la luz la sombra' (places darkness next to light) by
saying that Cobos was old and in pain, and less hard 
working; his wife Maria was greedy and gave Cobos an unfair 
reputation. The prince should not give Cobos unlimited 
authority but must instead share power with Juan de Zuniga:
Do not listen to Cobos's enemies and don't forget that 
Cobos was friendly with women, and, if he sees that you 
wish to go with them, he will help you. Therefore, in 
what concerns virtue and the governing of your person 
Zuniga will be an antidote to Cobos.19
17 Ramon Carande, ‘El Atrayente y Ambicioso Francisco de los Cobos,’ Real Academia
de Historia Boletln, 149, no. 2 (1961).
18 rCorpus Documental de Carlos V, ed. by Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, 5 vols (Salamanca,
1975), II, pp. 104-118.
19 CDCV, II, p. 110.
19
Charles was aware of Zuniga's dislike of Cobos and 
followed his policy of placing people of opposed views as 
counterweights for their respective natures. Nevertheless, 
Cobos seems to have been his preferred advisor as 
illustrated in another quotation from the 'Instruction' from 
Palamos of 6 May 1543 to the prince:
You see the confidence I have in Cobos and the
knowledge he has of my business, he is the most 
• » 20 informed of our people so take his advice.
Carande writes that no one appears as often in the text 
of this 'Instruction' as Cobos. 'The presence of Cobos 
relegates others, with the exception of Zuniga, to second 
rank.'21 Charles's earlier 'Instruction' of 1539 to the 
regent Tavera reveals the same preference. There is much in 
these 'Instructions' that is revealing on Cobos. It would 
indeed be useful if we had a similar letter revealing
Cobos's views on Charles. Others, such as the chronicler 
Sandoval also thought that Cobos deserved his rise, and 
wrote that:
Fueron muchos los bienes que tuvo este fiel ministro de 
Su Majestad, pero no todos los que pudo, como han 
tenido otros con menores sevicios en pocos dias (This 
faithful minister had many goods, but not everything he 
could have had, like others less-deserving. 22
Although Cobos was by now pre-eminent, Carande believes 
that his rise was gradual. He seems to have become a
20 Ibid.
21 Carande, p. 246.
22 BN, Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles, Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, Historia del
Emperador Carlos V, 3 vols (Madrid, 1956), II, p. 634.
favourite of the Grand Chamberlain, M. Chievres, Guillermo 
de Croy, when he joined Charles's new administration in 
Flanders in 1516 with a letter of introduction from the 
regent Cisneros. Cobos had worked in various posts in the 
administration of Castile for some 15 years and therefore 
was well qualified to advise the Grand Chamberlain on
Charles's new dominions. Carande, quoting from Cedillo's 
book on Cisneros, believes that Cobos only occupied minor 
positions while in Flanders.23 He therefore finds it
difficult to accept Keniston's view that when he returned to 
Spain with Charles 'he was in effect already the first 
secretary.'24 What is certain is that his move to Flanders
showed ambition and his judgment to be close to the centre 
of power in a fluid situation. This step probably helped his 
relationship with Charles for the rest of his career, as he 
was identified as an early loyal retainer. He was named 
secretary to the Council of the Indies in 1523 on the death 
of Conchillos. This was to be the source of much of his 
wealth. Yet, he was not named Secretary of State until 24 
October 1529, and only appointed to the Royal Council in
that year with the fall of Secretary Juan Aleman (Lallemand) 
— a Burgundian from Franche-Comte who had worked there with 
the Grand Chancellor, Gattinara — accused of venality and 
passing secrets to the French.25 Cobos received the Order of 
Santiago's Comendador Mayor de Leon in 1527. He had taken
23 Ibid., p. 247.
24 Keniston, p. 38.
25 Ibid., p. 111-114.
the habito of that Order in 1519, and this was now the 
highest position within the Order. Meanwhile, Charles kept 
him happy with mercedes, but not the prestigious title that 
he craved — un hijodalgo (a knight of pedigree). Keniston 
postulates that honours and social prestige were more 
important to Cobos than money, and he was never ennobled or 
given the Order of the Golden Fleece — although a Comendador 
Mayor of a Military Order was precluded from simultaneously 
holding the Order of the Golden Fleece. This raises the 
question of Charles's motivation, which will be discussed in 
later chapters. Charles also granted Cobos the position of 
‘ fundidor, ensayador, y marcador' (smelter, weigher and 
stamper) of specie from the Indies in 1519, whereby he 
received one-per-cent of the assayed value of bullion. This 
would not be profitable until extended to the conquests on 
the mainland.
On Cobos's meteoric rise to power, Keniston quotes 
widespread, favourable contemporary opinion. Pedro de Mexia 
wrote in 1524 that 'the emperor was placing great trust in 
Cobos ... and most of the public business passed through his 
hands.,26 Foreign ambassadors and even Bartolome de las 
Casas, Sepulveda, and the chronicler of voyages, Francisco 
de Oviedo, wrote favourably. Keniston writes that Lopez de 
Gomara, in his Anales y Cronica de la Nueva Espana, believed 
that Cobos was 'diligente y reservado, optimas dotes de todo 
secretario, pero con excesiva aficion a las faldas y a los
26 Pedro de Mexia, Historia del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid, 1945), p. 352. [Published 
from BN Ms 1926].
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naipes' (diligent and secretive, the perfect gifts of all 
secretaries, but with an excessive interest in cards and 
skirts). 27 The discreet and reticent Cobos perhaps has 
deprived us of further knowledge on these subjects by the 
lack of his personal correspondence. But the raffish 
language in Diego Hurtado de Mendoza's letters to Cobos with 
their ribald tone describing some of their Italian 
adventures, and suggesting Cobos return soon, illustrates 
his apparent contrasting characteristics, and hints at a 
more frivolous side to his nature. This will be developed in 
Chapter Three. Gonzalez Palencia in his Vida y Obras de Don
Diego Hurtado de Mendoza writes similarly about the
28adventures of Cobos and Hurtado de Mendoza. Charles 
referred to this aspect of Cobos's character in his 
'Instruction' of 1543 to his son, Philip.
Keniston devotes some space to contemporary views on 
Cobos's venality.29 Carande considers that Charles was too 
indulgent with Cobos and too harsh on his wife Maria. 
Charles blamed Maria for Cobos's reputation, 'unos presentes 
pequehos que hacen a su mujer, le infaman' (gifts to his
• 30 • •wife give him a bad reputation). His 'Instruction' of 1543 
to the prince also showed an awareness of this issue, but
27 Keniston, p. 359. From Lopez de Gomara, Anales del Emperador Carlos V. BN, Ms 
1751.
28 BN, Ms 10459, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Cartas al Rey y otros sujetos, 1554; 
Gonzalez Palencia, Vida y  Obras de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 2 vols (Madrid, 
1932), I.
29 Keniston, pp. 358-367.
30 CDCV, II, p. 110.
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. 31Charles "didn't believe that he took anything important.' 
This was before the accusations made by the Treasurer of the 
Council of the Indies in 1546, at the end of Cobos's life. 
The charge was that his 'assay fee' on New World specie was 
levied before the royal quinta. Chroniclers such as Lopez de 
Gomara and Santa Cruz also referred to his abuse of power. 
Francis I gave him a present of 1,200 ducats after peace 
negotiations in 1538. Ten years earlier, secretary Aleman 
had been dismissed for similar conflicts of interest, 
although there is no suggestion of divided loyalties by 
Cobos. Cobos had refused gifts of money and annuities from 
Martin de Salinas, Charles's brother's ambassador, when he 
believed there would be a conflict of interest. Yet his 
continuous involvement in raising funds for the imperial 
policy, and his role in negotiating on different fronts 
would have attracted commissions for Cobos from bankers and 
foreign powers.
An example of his dual interests was his negotiation of 
the papal bull to dispossess the Military Orders, with their 
property to be sold to the highest bidder. Cobos was a 
bidder for the senorio of Sabiote with its castle and lands. 
This will be explored in Chapter Four. Venality was 
universal among courtiers of the time and has to be 
considered as part of the dadiva culture — an exchange of 
obligations — 'cosa que se da graciosamente'(something that 
is given graciously). Marcel Mauss's essay on the gift
31 Ibid.
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explains gift-giving in the early modern period as more 
about defining the status of the gift-giver — a way for the 
powerful to show their munificence and magnificence.32 Cobos 
may have seen gifts not as payment for his favours, but as a 
test of the magnanimity of the giver. But it also 
represented a series of exchanges founded on gift and 
counter-gift. Natalie Davis takes an anthropological 
approach, relating gift-giving to networks and kinship. She 
writes that "the gift that nourished friendship was broader 
than enrichment in the patrimonial sense.'33 It is probable 
that Cobos would have agreed with this view. His 
reciprocity, however, was probably limited to placements and 
mercedes, which cost him little. Keniston shows that the 
only significant gift from him was to Cortes, the Marques 
del Valle de Oaxaca — a suit of armour for the Algerian 
campaign. Yet he was in a position to realise substantial 
sums from gifts to obtain influence at court and he probably 
used this position to further enrich himself. But why was he 
not called to account earlier, as was his predecessor Lope 
Conchillos; his colleague secretary Aleman; and Eraso, 
Cobos's successor, who was convicted in 1560 of massive 
corruption on government contracts negotiated during Charles 
V's reign?
Keniston shows that Cobos made himself indispensable by 
always being available at the emperor's side, from 1517
32 Marcel Mauss, The Gift: Forms and Functions o f Exchange in Archaic Societies 
(London, 1969).
33 Natalie Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (Oxford, 2000).
until 1543. The exception was 1539-41, when Charles was in 
Italy and Germany and Cobos remained in Spain, at first 
working with the regent Tavera, and later advising the 
Prince Regent. Keniston skilfully describes Cobos's 
relationship with Charles.34 During most of this time Cobos 
was responsible for Castile, Portugal, Italy, and the 
Indies, and responsible also for the various financiers from 
whom funds would be drawn to finance the emperors' 
campaigns. However, as opposed to Carande, the thesis will 
demonstrate that Keniston's description does not give us a 
glimpse of Cobos's role in the 'days of Spain's universal 
influence.' Carande considers that Keniston's book unites 
the qualities of the best biographies writing that, 'we 
approach the character without removing him from his time 
and without redesigning the mould.'35 He does wish, however, 
for more evidence on statements like 'Cobos had little 
sympathy with the emperor's imperial interest ... for him,
O / '
Charles was King of Spain before being emperor.' It may be 
a reasonable deduction from contemporary opinion that 
Castile suffered from imperial exactions and longed for the 
Reyes Catolicos (Ferdinand and Isabel). Cobos may have been 
nostalgic for this tradition and he knew more than most the 
cost of imperial policy, from the initial purchase of the 
imperial crown to the financing of the numerous wars. But
34 Keniston, pp. 332-355.
35 Carande, p. 249.
36 Keniston, pp. 333.
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there are very few examples of him expressing such a view. 
Dominguez Ortiz writes with his usual perception that:
La actidud de Cobos puede considerarse tipica de las 
reacciones del hombre medio espanol ... esceptico en 
cuanto a los grandes designios y las costosas aventuras 
que drenaba los tesoros de Espana (Cobos's attitude can 
be considered typical of the reaction of the ordinary 
Spaniard ... sceptical about great projects _and costly 
adventures which drained the national treasure).37
Carande quotes a letter from Cobos to the emperor of 4 
November 1544 in which he writes:
una estado de penuria de la hacienda de muy mayor, sin 
comparacion de lo que Vuestra Majestad se puede 
significar(a state of the greatest penury afflicts the 
national treasury, without comparison from what Your
• • • 38Majesty can imagine).
Cobos, unlike Gattinara, did not send prolix consultas 
to the emperor. When he expressed concern, he was usually
brief and discussed the growing difficulties of obtaining 
money. Keniston's general statements, such as: 'Cobos was
stoutly opposed to the imperial ventures and on every 
occasion urged Charles to stay at home in Spain and rule his 
people in peace and prosperity,' do not cite specific
• • 39sources and sound anachronistic. Cobos rarely seems to have 
expressed general criticism on policy. He was a loyal 
servant first and last. Carande states that 'he was a
secretary, and high policy was not his field.'40 He was also
37 A. Dominguez Ortiz, El Antiguo Regimen: Los Reyes Catdlicos y  Los Austrias (Madrid, 
1967), p. 253.
38 Ramon Carande, Carlos V y Sus Banqueros, 3 vols (Barcelona, 1987) III, p. 369.
39 Keniston, p. 178.
40 Carande, ‘El Atrayente y Ambicioso Francisco de los Cobos,’ Real Academia de la 
Historia 149, pp. 245-252 (249).
astute enough to realise that Charles did not want his 
advice on policy. Chievres and Gattinara had this role when 
Charles was young and unformed in his views. Gattinara had 
been ignored by the emperor — to Cobos's great benefit — 
and, on his death in 1530, his post as Grand Chancellor was 
not filled. Cobos's manner was to be discreet and not to 
impose his opinions. His advice to Prince Philip may have 
caused the latter to write more forcibly to the emperor on 
the financial condition of Spain, which will be discussed 
later in the chapters on finance. This indirect route would 
have been more Cobos's style. That is why it is so difficult 
to know the man. Carande suggests that Cobos and Charles V 
had a 'paternal relationship': Cobos as a father observing
his son's fantasy views of a universal empire and not daring 
to awaken him. Cobos had great practical sense, but still 
admired knights-errant.41 This is an interesting 
psychological view, based on what we know of Charles's 
upbringing, but Charles was not alone in considering 
universal empire the only way to unite Christendom and face 
the Turk.
Charles's appreciation of Cobos's discretion is also 
apparent from personal assignments for the secretary to 
inform Charles on Philip's progress. Keniston reproduces a 
copy of a letter from Cobos to Charles written in May 1543.42 
An 18th century copy (with the essential caution that this 
implies) of this letter exists in Madrid's Biblioteca
41 Ibid.
42 Keniston, pp. 269-271.
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Nacional.43 No other advisor had such a role, except for Juan 
de Zuniga when he acted as Philip's tutor and wrote many 
letters to Charles on the progress of his protege.44 
Charles's other counsellors, such as his confessor, Garcia 
Loaysa, would remind Charles of the sin of gluttony and the 
disorder in his life, causing Charles to send him away from 
court to Rome as ambassador. Tavera, Charles wrote in his 
Palamos 'Instruction,'
Would enter with humility and saintliness, he believes 
in virtuous things and advises me to conduct business 
well and without passion. Was it necessary to tell me 
this?45
He was clearly irritated and these advisors did not
learn the lesson of Gattinara.
Charles treated Cobos as an old friend for whom he felt 
affection. Carande writes an imaginative description of 
Cobos's appearance from medals and portraits, which may or 
may not be authentic. The one apparently authentic painting 
we do have is in the J. Paul Getty Museum at Malibu,
California. This is a full-face view of the Comendador Mayor 
wearing his habito of Santiago and chain of office to which
is appended a large jewel. It might be imprudent to draw
conclusions as to his character from one painting, tempting 
though it is to do so. Keniston frequently refers to Cobos's 
'scarce scholarly and literary culture,' and apparent
43 BN, Ms 10300, ‘Copia de una carta que Francisco de los Cobos grandemente estimado 
del Senor Emperador Carlos V y su secretario del estado, escribio a S. M. Cesarea, 
respondiendo a otra que tuvo de dicho Senor Emperador,’ 1543.
44 J. M. March, Ninez y  Juventud de Felipe II, 2 vols (Madrid, 1941).
45 Carande, p. 250.
indifference to the intellectual questions of the age.46 His 
letters do not touch on any of the great cultural issues of 
the period. 'Friends', comments Lomax, 'write to him from 
Italy about women, not poetry. For him Valdes is an 
‘oficinista’ (clerk) and Garcilaso a postman.'47 This would 
differentiate him from Granvelle and the Valdes brothers — 
Erasmists and scholars — and of course Gattinara, who 
ceaselessly discussed the empire and the papacy. Keniston 
alleges that the only books Cobos possessed, despite being 
surrounded by friends who were authors, were those dedicated 
to himself. His correspondence, Keniston concludes, seems to 
indicate that he never read literature or poetry. Elliott 
repeats these views: 'a complete lack of intellectual
interests, ... knew no Latin, and never seems to have read a 
book. He did patronise the arts, but almost certainly for 
social rather than aesthetic reasons.'48 Cobos may not have 
been an intellectual in this sense, but in these judgments 
by historians, there is a hint of looking down on self-made 
men. Keniston did not find Cobos's personal correspondence, 
and it is therefore difficult to substantiate his 
conclusion, which historians have largely repeated. The 
thesis will attempt to provide context for Cobos's world­
view, which included the need to patronise the arts, perhaps 
not solely for Elliott's 'aesthetic reasons,' but as part of 
his endowment of a legacy, which was typical of his age.
46 Keniston, pp. 360-372.
47 Lomax, p. 133.
48 Elliott, p. 195.
30
Cobos's visits to Italy in the 1530s would have taught 
him something about the arts. We know he assembled artists, 
sculptors and architects for his grand projects in
Valladolid and Ubeda. His church of El Salvador in Ubeda is
one of the glories of Renaissance Spain. Joaquin Montes 
Bardo credits Dean Fernando Ortega for much of the
humanistic allegories and iconography in the stone-work.49 
The dean's testament, available in the Archivo Historico de 
Ubeda, states, 'digo que yo he tenido cargo de administrar 
la hacienda de la Capilla del Comendador Mayor' (I had 
charge of administering the property of the Chapel of the 
Comendador Mayor). Fernando Chueca also writes that Dean 
Ortega 'worked closely with his friend Cobos as mentor on 
artistic issues.'50 Indeed most of the recent historiography 
on Cobos has . discussed his patronage of the arts, for
example, the special issue of the review Magina for 1998/99, 
as footnoted below.
Carande argues that Cobos formed himself through his 
official writing without having time to read. Reading for 
leisure did not interest him, states Carande, and his 
foreign travels did not influence him intellectually.51 But 
Carande does accept that the plastic arts interested him: he 
patronised architecture in Valladolid and Osuna, and he 
imported famous works from Italy. Ferrante Gonzaga of Mantua
49 Joaquin Montes Bardo, ‘Alegoria Eucaristica en la Capilla Funeraria de Don Francisco 
de los Cobos,’ Mdgina-Revista Universitaria, Extraordinario ‘Francisco de los Cobos’ 6 
(1998/99), pp. 43-57.
50 Chueca, p. 11.
51 Carande, p. 251.
was a close friend and gifted him a painting by Sebastian 
del Piombo called 'La Piedad' meant for Cobos's chapel, El 
Salvador, in Ubeda. According to Diego Angulo, Gonzaga wrote 
to Piombo that it should be a religious painting of a dead 
Christ 'porque los espanoles, como Cobos, para parecer 
buenos cristianos y devotos suelen gustar de estos cosas 
piadosas' (because Spaniards, like Cobos, to seem good and 
devoted Christians usually like pious things).52 The painting 
is now on display in the Prado .Museum and contains this 
attribution. Angulo also relates in the same article how 
Gonzaga negotiated the purchase of this painting, intended 
as a present for Cobos. Sebastian del Piombo said that Cobos 
'estimara el regalo en proporcion del precio que pague el 
donante' (he will judge the value of the gift in relation to 
the price paid).53 Gonzaga turned this around by saying that 
Cobos preferred a bargain. So, Cobos had a reputation of 
both liking expensive gifts but also appreciating value for 
money.
Cobos introduced Titian to Charles V, through the Duke 
of Ferrara, in 1533. He was also involved in redesigning the 
castle at Simancas to accommodate the public records. Diego 
Angulo describes Cobos's journeys in Italy, credits him with 
good taste, and also describes his adventures with women. 
Thus it seems reasonable to challenge the assumption that 
Cobos was a man without culture. Cobos's mayorazgo shows his
52 Diego Angulo, 'Pinturas del siglo XVI en Toledo y Cuenca,' Archivo Espanol de Arte, 
(1956), vol. 113, pp. 43-48.
53 Ibid.
32
taste and liking for fine things, including tapestries, and 
cloth of gold wall-hangings 'of such fine design'.54 He 
obtained a privilege from the pope to build a university at 
Ubeda. This was not started in his lifetime, but his widow 
continued to pay for teachers of Latin and rhetoric, as 
provided for in Cobos's testament.
Carande considers Keniston is strongest on Castile's 
public administration and the social life of the time. But 
as Elliott writes, Keniston does not study Castilian 
administration and the way in which Castile was governed.55 
We learn more about the functionaries and their acquisition 
of titles and honours. Patronage, clientage, kinship and 
friendship are of central importance in any discussion of 
sixteenth-century Spain, and have been well researched by 
historians. Cobos's political power was based on all of 
these social links. Keniston highlights the importance of 
the network of friends and associates that Cobos built up 
around himself, and which eventually gave him a monopoly of 
the Castilian administration and means of patronage. But to 
claim that his most important contribution to administration 
was the formation of a group of capable functionaries to 
manage the secretariat of Castile is putting the cart before 
the horse. This group was primarily loyal to Cobos and the 
source of much of his power. The key to promotion was 
neither noble rank nor the Latin education of the letrados, 
but instead loyalty, family and friendship, with Cobos as
54 Keniston, p. 244.
55 Elliott, p. 195.
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the patron of this group. This was the clientage system 
expertly described by Martinez Millan.56 They were at the
service of the emperor from whom they obtained mercedes, but 
it was a symbiotic relationship of personal interests and 
service to the crown. Royal privileges, or mercedes, were a 
way to minimise or control the level of corruption. There is 
some surviving correspondence with Cobos's clientage and 
with popes and foreign potentates. Various scattered 
archives and the correspondence of some of these 
contemporaries will be examined to establish how he made use 
of this network of patronage. Unfortunately, there is 
nothing like the wonderfully insightful collection of Peter 
Martyr's Opus Epistolarumr who was at the courts of the
Catholic Kings and Charles V, and set the example of 
publishing his letters to his connexions; but this was not 
the discreet way of Cobos.57
Keniston, writes Carande, inevitably touches on finance 
and 'omissions here are to be expected and could only be
58supplied by some specialist'. Carande, as one of the
greatest of such specialists, is probably being modest. But 
this is central to the criticism of Keniston's work. Cobos 
is inseparable from the whole question of Castilian 
financial resources. As Carande implies, Keniston is indeed 
weak on the financial issues. His detailing of the
56 Jose Martinez Millan, Instituciones y  Elites de Poder en la Monarqula Hispana durante 
el Siglo XVI (Madrid, 1992).
57 Peter Martyr Anghiera, Cartas sobre el Nuevo Mundo, trans. Latin, selected letters from 
Opus Epistolarum (Madrid, 1990). -
58 Carande, pp. 251-252.
34
mayorazgo's assets and the testament is mere book-keeping. 
There is little attempt to examine the particular assets, 
their source and relative importance. Keniston quotes Lopez 
de Gomara, a contemporary chronicler, who wrote in his 
Anales that 'Cobos won the favour of the Emperor so 
completely that for many years all public affairs, of Italy 
as well as of the Indies and Spain, passed through his 
hands'.59 It should therefore be possible to examine more 
fully the nature and his handling of these 'public affairs'. 
How did Cobos, in his role at the Council of Finance, manage 
to obtain the funds needed by his emperor? Chapters Four and 
Five will consider this issue. Describing the context for 
Cobos's establishing a mayorazgo would also have been 
useful. Keniston lists the contents of Cobos's mayorazgo but 
does not examine the sources of this wealth, which is where 
we can see Cobos in action. This question will be discussed 
in Chapter Six. Keniston does not cover these matters and 
the thesis will examine the material available with a view 
to tracing the relative importance of the forms of wealth- 
creation for both the empire and Cobos himself.
Carande concludes that Keniston's work shows Cobos's 
'extraordinary role in an era of increasing international 
trade-flows and merchant financiers, which changed economic 
and social life'.60 Although Cobos rose through his Castilian 
administrative skills, he was at the centre of wider 
developments — the financing needs of imperial policy and
59 Keniston, p. 348.
60 Carande, p. 252.
the emerging discoveries of precious metals in the New 
World. Carande is perhaps being too generous here. 
Keniston's portrayal is much too absorbed in the detail of 
Cobos's life. We do not get a sense of the extraordinary 
events unfolding and Cobos's role in them. Keniston does not 
touch on the research of Chaunu and Carande on the effects 
of the doubling in price levels during Charles V's reign. 
This would have affected much of Cobos's activities, from 
his arranging provisions for the armies to the cost of 
financing. Even the relationship with the Fuggers is only 
touched upon, whereas it had major consequences for how 
Charles's wars were fought and the outcomes. The archival 
record will be scrutinised in order to uncover some of these 
neglected issues. For Cobos there were great rewards from 
his elevation, but for Castile's economy one could not say 
the same. We therefore need to question whether what was 
good for Cobos was also good for Spain. Keniston certainly 
shows us that Cobos was well aware of his own interests and 
acted accordingly. 'Honour and profit', linking material 
fortune with social prestige seems to have been his purpose, 
according to Keniston.
In another review of Keniston's book, Joseph Perez 
writes that 'in financial matters Cobos seems to have had no 
original ideas. He used the same expedients: asking the
Cortes for servicios, issuing juros, and borrowing from 
foreign bankers. Rather than a Minister of Finance, Cobos
was in essence an accountant to Charles V'.61 But this was 
many generations before Colbert, and Cobos operated within 
the limits set by his time and his emperor. Perez writes 
that we find Cobos "at each step on Charles V's journey, but 
his personality is well disguised". He praises Keniston for 
his archival work, which "while not producing revelations, 
is crowded with information of all kinds'. Perez is saying 
that the book is conceived as a strictly chronological work 
enlightening us on many details of Charles's imperial reign. 
But he denies that Keniston reveals more about Cobos than 
the chronology of his career. He was a man who "had an acute 
sense of opportunity and recognised the strong man of the 
moment to whom he attached himself: Hernando Zafra at the
beginning, then Lope Conchillos and finally Chievres in 
Flanders'.62 This seems a reasonable critique. Cobos's move 
to Flanders shows him as a risk-taker — leaving the 
certainty of a good position with Cisneros and Conchillos 
for the uncertainty of the Burgundian court of Charles. 
Conchillos was to lose his position and be accused of 
venality, a fate perhaps Cobos would have shared if he had 
remained. Conchillos was reappointed when he travelled to 
Flanders and the court; Cisneros, by not being present, was 
overruled by the influence of Conchillos's friends.
Perez repeats the fact that Cobos was without a 
university education and did not read Latin. He was not,
61 Joseph Perez, review of Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary o f the 
Emperor Charles V3 Bulletin Hispanique 64 (1962), p. 280.
62 Perez, p. 275.
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therefore, a letrado. This is important. Cobos is frequently- 
referred to as a letrado from Ubeda, with the implication 
that he was from nowhere. The Spanish phrase los cerros de 
Ubeda still means "going around in circles and getting 
nowhere" or losing the thread in a discussion. But the 
nature of his rise is even more surprising if he was not 
even a letrado. In her work on the Mendoza family, Helen 
Nader drew a clear distinction between the old nobility, as 
represented by the Mendozas of Guadalajara, and the emerging 
letrados or secretaries who were being appointed by the
63Catholic Kings to counter the power of the court nobility.
It has been thought that Cobos was part of this 
secretarial revolution, but there was no such a clear 
distinction. Cobos made his own power-base, indicating some 
flexibility in the social system. He was not a privado to 
Charles V, in the sense Ruy Gomez da Silva was to Philip 
II.64 His strength was in surrounding himself with colleagues 
who were neither of noble birth nor letrados. His first 
boss, Hernando de Zafra, Fernando's secretary of Castile, 
made him an escribano through a royal cedula of 1503.65 The 
exact wording, which Keniston has translated, is to be found 
in the Simancas archives in the Reglstro del Sello de Corte. 
This was an indispensable title for further advancement. In 
many ways it was the key to his future power. Knowledge of 
the form and hierarchy of documents in Castile represented
63 Helen Nader, The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance, 1350-1550 (Camden, 
N.J., 1979).
64 James M. Boyden, The Courtier and the King (London, 1995).
65 Keniston, p. 8.
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an understanding of the essence of the state. Impatient 
visionaries like Charles had no time to delve into such 
documents and relied on his secretaries before appending his 
signature and royal seal, sometimes adding a marginal 
comment. In effect secretaries, who prepared the Council's 
agenda, supplanted the role of the Royal Council.
Antonio Ruiz Fajardo states that Charles circumvented 
the councils and dealt directly with the secretaries in 
order to maintain his personal authority free from the 
restrictions of the members of the Royal Council.66 
Secretaries could thus draft royal decrees without the 
control of the. Royal Council. This also undid much of the 
reforms of the Catholic Kings who had created bureaucratic 
councils, consisting largely of letrados, to apply royal 
policy. This of course opened the door to a powerful 
Secretary of State like Cobos to control the agenda and 
develop a network of influence and patronage, with council 
appointments of people who were not letrados. Keniston 
describes how Cobos worked, opening dispatches and preparing 
a resume of key points with suggestions for the emperor's 
replies.67 We know from manuscripts of Charles's letters that 
he wrote marginal notes, which would have to be incorporated 
into the body of the reply.
On Zafra's death in 1508, Cobos was named contador 
mayor of Granada and became the protege of Lope Conchillos.
66 Angel Ruiz Fajardo, ed., ‘La Figura Politica de Don Francisco de los Cobos in 
Francisco de los Cobos y  su epoca (Madrid, 1997), pp. 13-23.
67 Keniston, pp. 341-343.
The latter, in 1510, gave him the post of the registrar of 
mercedes responsible for royal privileges, payments and 
debts. Cobos was therefore the first to know of vacant 
positions and the income attached. And so Conchillos and 
Cobos were in control of the flow of entitlements, and could 
thus surround themselves with relatives and friends. 
Cardinal Cisneros, who became regent in 1516 on the death of 
Ferdinand, soon tried, without success, to impose controls 
on the formation of such a court network of kith and kin. He 
complained about the "dishonestly-acquired, scandalous 
fortunes of high functionaries".68 Count Tendilla, Adelantado 
of Granada during the pacification of the Moors, also 
complained bitterly about their activities. Keniston writes 
that Conchillos bore the brunt of the accusations of 
corruption, and Cobos was relatively unscathed.69 The 
Tendilla archives in Toledo have letters blaming Cobos and 
Conchillos.70 It is probable that Cobos also benefited from 
large payments over and above his salary, expenses and 
special privileges. Keniston adeptly describes the system of 
exchange and sale of offices and Cobos's role in working the 
system to his benefit and that of his family and followers. 
Indeed, this is important for the explanation of the rise of 
Cobos — surrounding himself, through his control of royal 
privilege, with trusted followers and expanding this network 
throughout his working life. The register of privileges
68 Ibid., p. 12.
69 Ibid., p. 14.
70 Nader, p. 176.
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would be his working document, his "little black book", to 
keep a record on reciprocities due.
Perez traces Cobos's rise from 1516, as a protege of M. 
Chievres, Guillaume de Croy, Charles's Grand Chamberlain, to 
his role in the administrative reorganisation of 1523, as 
secretary of the new Council of Finance — from which 
Gattinara, the Grand Chancellor, was excluded. In this post 
he had the power of countersigning all payment orders and 
receipts and all financial papers. This was an extension of 
his earlier powers as detailed in Charles's letter to 
Cisneros stating Cobos's duties 'to take and keep the record 
of our income and finances and what is paid out and 
consigned to our treasurers and other persons'.71 But Cobos 
would develop his post in the Council of Finance into a 
means for placing him at the centre of increasingly crucial 
financial policy. Keniston has not analysed the importance 
and growing influence of the Council of Finance. This will 
be part of this enquiry.
Chueca believes that Cobos's early acceptance by 
Chievres was the key to his future elevation. Many of his 
contemporaries believed the same. Chueca considers that 
Cisneros had recommended Cobos to Chievres, and his position 
was then reinforced by his expertise in all the intricacies 
of Castilian finances, and by the already large group of 
friends at court.72 Chueca writes that Cobos was adept in
71 Geronimo Lopez de Ayala , Conde de Cedillo, El Cardenal Cisneros, Gobemador del 
Reino, 2 vols (Madrid, 1921-1922), I, pp. 656-659.
72 Chueca, p. 8.
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"the arts of seduction'. He gained confidences by supporting 
opinions of the powerful to gain their sympathy. He had good 
negotiating skills, but combined these with "friendliness, 
wisdom and strength'.73 This seems a good assessment, to 
which one might add that he had a non-threatening 
appearance, as seen in the Getty portrait — a portrait that 
suggests a skill for listening, thoughtfulness and caution: 
an expression in keeping with what we know of him. He was 
not haughty and domineering in physiognomy, like the 
appearance of the Duke of Alba's bust at the Frick Museum in 
New York.
Cobos's rise in the 1520s was matched by the declining 
influence of Gattinara, the Grand Chancellor, so well 
described by John Headley.74 By 1525 Cobos was reading the 
royal address to the Cortes of Toledo. After Juan Aleman's 
downfall and the death of Gattinara in 1530, Charles 
entrusted to Cobos and Granvelle imperial diplomacy under 
Charles's overall direction, and Cobos was named a member of 
the Council of the Realm. Keniston shows that this 
arrangement was usually harmonious, with a division of 
labour — Granvelle running diplomacy and imperial business, 
and Cobos largely content with finance, Castile, the Italian 
states and papal affairs.75 This thesis will not venture 
beyond Keniston in describing the relationship between Cobos 
and Granvelle. Finance became more critical for Cobos's
73 Ibid., p. 9.
John M. Headley, The Emperor and his Chancellor: A Study o f  the Imperial Chancellery 
under Gattinara (Cambridge, 1989).
75 Keniston, pp. 206-207.
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attention and in .1539, for the first time, he did not 
accompany Charles on his journey to Flanders. Cobos had 
recourse to the Spanish nobility for loans and the creation 
of new positions to be sold. But Charles's financial 
difficulties were reaching a crisis with little security 
left for the bankers' loans. The crisis was to intensify 
with the new wars with France of 1542. This will be 
developed in Chapters Four and Five on Cobos and finance.
The historiography on Cobos is heavily reliant on 
Keniston's research. It may be difficult to produce new 
evidence to verify or qualify all of his conclusions. 
Nevertheless, a different perspective or interpretation 
should facilitate a deeper understanding of the importance 
of Cobos's role in Charles V's empire, and so perhaps throw 
some new light on Charles himself, through the mutuality of 
their relationship. The discussion will follow various 
themes determined by revelations from the archival records 
and the assessment of their importance.
The thesis will create a better foundation in order to 
reveal (to the extent that this is possible) Cobos's 
character. It is necessary to understand his thirst for 
prestige and social advancement. Was it just the normal 
craving of his contemporaries for property rights — the need 
to create estates, senorlos, and mayorazgos (perpetual 
entailments) to ensure immortality? The thesis will provide 
context by examining Cobos's relationship with some of these 
important institutions and their medieval origins. Attaining 
the title of Comendador Mayor in the Military Order of
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Santiago was an important step for Cobos. L. P. Wright's 
unpublished thesis of 1970, and many other scholars, have
nf
provided original research on these medieval Orders. This 
thesis, in Chapter Two, will only discuss the Military 
Order's social and political importance in order to provide 
context for Cobos's rise. Similarly, Chapter Two will cover 
the roles of mayorazgos, and the significance of senorlos 
for Cobos's purpose. Cobos's struggle to acquire the 
Adelantamiento of Cazorla, a feudal senorlo near Ubeda, was 
of particular importance to his founding of a dynasty. On 
the surface, Cobos's entire life seems to have been based on 
achieving all of these goals.
Scholars refer to Cobos obliquely, recognising his 
importance, but seeming to defer to the one scholarly work 
of Keniston. This remains the case at the time of writing. 
In a recent review of a book on the Erasmist Juan Valdes - 
referring to Valdes and Cobos, for whom Valdes worked - the 
writer notes with surprise that there is only one fifty year 
old biography on Cobos and that 'his extraordinary career 
demands better. '77
76 L. P. Wright, ‘The Military Orders in Habsburg Spain,’ PhD, Cambridge, 1970.
77 R. Mackay, review o f D. Crews, Twilight and the Renaissance, Sixteenth Century 
Journal XL, (2009), pp. 769-779.
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Social Ascent and Political Power
Francisco de los Cobos controlled an immense pyramid of 
honours and privileges as evidenced by the flow of 
solicitous requests one can view in the rich fund of 
manuscripts at the Biblioteca Nacional in Madrid and in the 
archives at Simancas on Mercedes y Privilegios. Although 
such 'privileges' belonged to the emperor, part of Cobos's 
skill was to make them appear to be within his 'gift'. 
Keniston, his only biographer, has said that:
By 1510 Cobos had charge of recording all royal grants 
and favours ... in 1516 Chievres, the Grand Chancellor to 
Charles V, extended Cobos's responsibility to the task 
of keeping the record of all royal receipts and
78expenditures.
The Contadurla Mayor de Hacienda was not set-up until 
1554, so until then there was no established means to 
resolve disputes in the administration concerning the 
collection and payment of royal taxes. Thus there was no 
institutional 'checks and balances' on Cobos's power.
In examining his political career this thesis will seek 
to explain how he transformed the trust and confidence of 
Charles V into political power. To understand his ascent one 
must examine the importance and enduring nature of the 
medieval seignorial institutions — land and vassals — which 
lay beneath the social fabric. These were the foundations on
78 Keniston, p. 332.
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which political power was based. Early attempts by Charles 
to share the spoils of this system among his Burgundian 
followers ran into the hostility of the Spanish nobility and 
the revolt of the towns — the comuneros. The diverse power- 
centres in Spain had to be accommodated if their loyalty was 
to be assured.
There was little if any discontinuity between medieval 
and early modern institutions. Continuity of institutional 
structures and thinking about institutions seems to have 
been unremitting with an inter-play between ideas of one 
time and those of another. Nobles enjoyed considerable 
economic benefits in terms of patrimony and incomes 
associated with their privileged juridical status. New 
entrants to the seignorage, through royal grants — or 
increasingly through sales of alienated property during 
Charles V's reign — reinforced the socio-economic power of 
this institution. Participation in the administration and 
high councils of government — often as rewards for their 
services to the king — further strengthened the powers of 
the nobility. Thus privileged status and political power 
reinforced their wealth. Co-mingling of public and private 
persona was the norm of the period.
Cobos strove to be a part of these structures and was 
possibly more interested in these continuities than the 
social, religious, and intellectual debates of the times. 
This is what his critics miss when they accuse him of a lack 
of intellectual interest. His interests were in the ancient 
institutions of senorlos (feudal domains), Military Orders,
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and Adelantados (governors or margraves) of the frontier 
regions of Reconquest as a source of political power. These 
structures represented the means for upward mobility for 
hidalgos (nobles) like Cobos. He sought as a first requisite 
a title in the Military Order of Santiago, then a sehorial 
town and territory, and finally a mayorazgo (entailment) to 
contain his wealth for his future lineage. These were his 
aspirations.
His lineage was only incorporated into the gran nobleza 
through his son and daughter: the ultimate crowning of his 
career. The clauses in his many mercedes y privilegios 
(gifts and rewards) — literally an 'act of royal grace' 
received from the emperor — provided dominio 'para vuestros 
herederos y sucesores' (domain for your heirs and 
successors). Thus the nature of his ambition was to found
and to finance a perpetual lineage. For this he had to 
operate within these ancient institutions, and sometimes 
help to transform or selectively adapt them if this could be 
used to advance his interests, and those of family and
friends. At the same time they had to be used to finance his 
emperor's dynastic policies and reward supporters.
But Cobos would have seen no conflict between the
interests of his master and his own. Although typical of the 
'hombres criados de la pluma' (powerful servants of the pen) 
needed to administer the growing bureaucracy, he was unique 
in his understanding of his royal master. The Venetian
Ambassador, Bernardo Navagero, wrote in 1546 that Cobos:
47
Knows the nature of Caesar and the time to obtain 
everything from him; he never refuses anything he asks 
for. When he is with the emperor, everything goes 
through his hands, and when the emperor is absent, in 
all important matters he is the ruler through the
• • 79Council and his own judgment.
He shared Charles V's views in dealing with the
sehorial institutions. When it was in Charles's patrimonial 
and dynastic interest, and Cobos's family interest, for
reasons of legitimacy they both proceeded through canon law.
For example, papal sanction or bulls were issued for the 
appropriation of the lands of the Military Orders and for 
Cobos's acquisition of the Cazorla Adelantamiento (frontier 
territory) from the archbishopric of Toledo.
Cobos's advancement came through his understanding and 
use of the institutional forces of continuity. He used the 
reward system embedded in these institutions as a means to 
increase his power and personal enrichment, with the money 
serving to support his status and to maintain the titles. He 
may have modelled his reach for special status on Columbus's 
Capltulaciones, contract and title, with the Catholic Kings, 
which gave perpetual and hereditary rights for all 
discoveries. But Cobos had complex and conflicting goals. 
His paradox was to serve the power of the Crown while 
balancing the forces of "exemption, privilege and fuero,' 
which had led to multiple centres of power — with 
administration being "franchised" to territories.
79 E. Alberi, Relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al Senato, 14 vols (Florence, 1839-1855), 
I, pp. 344-345.
48
Charles was monarch of a 'composite state,' an amalgam 
of separate polities — each with its own laws and
institutions — that owed allegiance to a single ruler,
■ 80 •loosely held together by dynastic arrangements. The empire
encompassed many competing identities, both local and 
regional. Such a structure inhibited the ideas of the Grand 
Chancellor, Gattinara, for a strong, centralised, unitary 
state. Cobos's genius was in understanding how a centralised 
royal bureaucracy could co-exist with so many local and 
provincial identities and institutions. Cobos encouraged 
patronage of such separate centres of power, although this 
inevitably weakened Charles V's resources for warfare and 
thus his dynastic ambitions. It is unlikely that Cobos saw 
this as a contradiction, but he may have represented a 
nemesis of the system through his exuberant use of its 
inherent contradictions — expanding alienation of Crown 
lands, which the Catholic Kings had so laboriously tried to 
retrieve in their reforms of the 1480s.
This chapter examines his use of the Military Orders as 
a first step to achieve the necessary hidalgula for his 
career advancement. Rewards would be given in proportion to 
the importance of one's lineage, so Cobos had to build a 
secure foundation of status to ensure a flow of mercedes and 
privileges. He moved from an habito (monk's cloak worn as an 
insignia) in the Order of Santiago in 1519 — which the
Catholic Kings had decreed could only be conceded to
80 John H. Elliott, ‘Composite States,’ Past and Present, 137 (1992), pp. 48-71.
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"personas que sean hijosdalgo y prendan caballos'(people who 
are sons of importance and own horses) — to Comendador Mayor 
in 1530, the highest rank in the Order.81 In the process of 
advancing in the Order of Santiago, Cobos expropriated the 
patrimony of the Orders to finance Charles's wars and repay 
bankers' loans, which had purchased the imperial throne.
The nature of the inquiry into ancestry, prior to 
obtaining an habito, was at this time less rigorous than the 
later need for inquiry into generations of bloodline. Prior 
to "incorporation" into the monarchy, the Maestro (master), 
as supreme head of the Order, could grant an habito on his 
own without reference to the Council of the Order and 
without "proofs." In addition, in Cobos"s time there was no 
parish register of births and marriages. Thus fabrication of 
genealogies could transform conversos into Old Christians of 
impeccable ancestry.
Although already well studied by historians, some 
description of the sehorial system will be necessary to 
establish how Cobos used the system to achieve some 
independent jurisdiction. This will lead to an analysis of 
the circumstances of his ultimate prize: obtaining a papal 
bull to allow him to acquire the Adelantamiento of Cazorla 
from the archbishopric of Toledo. This involved him and his 
family in a long battle with the Church, which is well 
documented in the archival records of the cathedral chapter 
in Toledo.
81 Juan Fernandez de la Gama, Copilacion de los establecimientos dela orden dela  
cavalleria de Santiago del espada, (Seville, 1503).
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The thesis will demonstrate the chronological steps by 
which Cobos progressed, with reference to the archives on 
these different institutions, showing that each move 
mutually reinforced his political and social stature. This 
is different from Keniston's approach. His biography shows 
Cobos at the centre of a network of wealth and patronage, 
with no contextual reference to the uses of power, the 
events of the time, or the nature of his relationship with 
Charles V. Keniston depicts Cobos as uninterested in events 
and policies and only concerned with his privileges and 
network of patronage. The thesis will build the case for 
Cobos's involvement in policy and his exercise of power 
through society's traditional institutions.
Cobos and the Military Orders
The Spanish Military Orders of Santiago, Calatrava and 
Alcantara had been founded in the twelfth century to aid in 
the struggles with the Moors. They also acted as colonizers 
of newly acquired territories and were awarded 
jurisdictional rights in these lands, which encompassed huge 
frontier areas in New Castile, including the maestrazgos or 
fiefdoms of the masters of each Order. A papal bull of 1523, 
issued by Adrian VI — previously a tutor to Charles — 
incorporated the Military Orders in the Crown and 
established a Council of the Orders as a department of 
state. They continued to be attractive to the nobility as a 
source of income, patronage and prestige.
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When Charles was in Italy in 1529 to receive from the 
pope the imperial Crown, further bulls were issued by 
Clement VII to provide, by apostolic authority, a legal 
basis for the disentitlement of the property, vassals and
0 9 ,
incomes of the Military Orders. The Orders received juros — 
a form of annuity or bond — secured against royal revenues 
in compensation, a procedure, which will be examined in the 
chapters on finance. This cleared the way for a gradual 
sell-off to finance the emperor's wars. The process was 
measured, responding to the emperor's needs and the various 
wars with Francis I .
Prior to sale, Cobos sent out questionnaires to value 
the estates, based on acreage, number of vassals, and rights 
and income of the senor. Documents in Simancas show reports 
on numerous estates of the Military Orders and an enquiry
83 •into potential buyers to establish possible values. This 
large bundle of documents tells us much about Cobos's 
involvement in the details. Various inventories of 
manuscripts in Simancas, such as serie 389, Mercedes y 
Prlvileglos, de la Escribanla de rentas, help to define the 
nature of Cobos's monumental task. The process created 
numerous disputes on title, legality of incomes, territorial 
limits, and extent of powers over vassals. These reports 
were later broadened by Philip II into every village, county 
and estate in Spain according to tenure by senorlos, value
82 Madrid, Archivo Historico National, legs. 4365, 24581, 32311, no. 2, memorial, f. 13, 
Ordenes Militares y Consejos Suprimidos.
83 AGS, Div. Cast. Legs. 47, 31.
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and resources. This formed a Spanish version of William's 
Domesday Book, surveying England in the 11th century.
Some properties were acquired by old nobility, such as 
the Mendoza's purchase of the Order of Calatrava's ancient 
rights in Alcarria, (Guadalajara province), in part to
round-out and extend existing estates. Many seized the 
opportunity to buy property contiguous to their estates. Ruy 
Gomez da Silva, Prince Philip's favourite, was also a
beneficiary from the sales of Calatrava property, 
particulary the town of Pastrana, also in Guadalajara. 
Others were sold to Genoese and German bankers, rising
letrados and, particularly, to secretaries and councillors 
of the administration. Documents at Simancas show how Cobos 
was the prime force behind the disentitlement and also a
• 84 • • •major beneficiary. Evidence of this is also available m  
the Archivo General de Andalucia.85 For example, in his home 
province of Jaen he bought land, towns and vassals, which 
formerly belonged to the Order of Calatrava. He became senor 
de Sabiote from such a purchase and converted the castle of 
Sabiote, near Ubeda, into a Renaissance palace. Charles V's 
military engineers strengthened the fortifications with the 
interior designed by Andres de Vandelvira and sculptures by 
a Frenchman, Esteban Jamete — who also worked on Cobos's 
magnificent chapel of El Salvador in Ubeda. A visitor to
Sabiote would see that in the maincourt there is a large 
coat-of-arms of Cobos and his wife Maria de Molina,
84 AGS, E leg. 24, f. 5.
or
Archivo General de Andalucia, microfilm no. 463.093-104.
entwining the Mendoza crest with Cobos's heraldry on the 
left.86 The castle was abandoned by the Camarasas — Cobos's 
descendants. From the mid-twentieth century it formed part 
of the patrimony of the Casa Ducal de Medinaceli — through 
marriage with a Camarasa. For Cobos, as for other of the 
rising secretaries, disentitlement and purchase of sehorios 
represented an opportunity of social advancement based on 
ancient sehorial domain and the possession of towns, vassals 
and castles belonging to such domain. With rising land 
values it also represented a source of enrichment. For 
Cobos, Sabiote gave him title and rights, vassals and income 
independent of the emperor.
In his unpublished doctoral thesis, L. P. Wright has 
shown that the Military Orders adapted after disentitlement. 
They served, through their process of inquiry on new 
members' origins, as a means to 'authenticate noble 
ancestry' and thus they reinforced concepts of honour and 
chivalry tied to the habito.*1 Wright calls them 
'anachronistic institutions, embodying social concepts and 
the society which they mirrored which were equally 
anachronistic.'88 But the 'social concepts' were a reality of 
the time and Cobos needed their 'authentication' and the 
resulting status to legitimise his social position. As a 
first step Cobos received his habito of the Order of 
Santiago in 1519 and became a Comendador Mayor in 1530.
861 visited Sabiote in the winter o f 2006.
87 L. P. Wright, ‘The Military Orders in Habsburg Spain,’ PhD, Cambridge, 1970.
88 Ibid, p. 326.
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Wright's research, partially published in 1969, showed a 
sudden increase in the number of habitos sold for loans to
■ • • 89the treasury during this time. Perhaps Cobos was widening 
his network of reciprocal obligations and had found new ways 
to finance his master's ambitions and war needs. He was 
following in the tradition of previous royal secretaries, 
such as Juan Pacheco, who inflated honours to meet his 
master's needs in the early 15th century — Pacheco was also a 
master of the Order of Santiago, although descended from a 
well-known converso family.
Cobos's need for verification of hidalguia may have 
been no more than that of other aspiring administrators who 
had a thirst for prestige and social acceptance. But his 
particular need may relate to a possible converso or 'New 
Christian' background, which could explain his motivation 
and secretiveness. Keniston states that Cobos was welcome in 
the new Flemish court of Charles because he was not a 
converso.90 But the distinguished French historian, Marcel 
Bataillon, wrote, in a review of a book on the converso 
Doctor Andres Laguna's travels and writings on botanic 
medicines, that:
Laguna en 1535 soit aller chercher fortune aupres du 
puissant ministre Francisco de los Cobos, cristiano 
nuevo, quand Charles V sejournait en Italie (Laguna in 
1535, when the emperor was in Italy, sought his fortune
89 L. P. Wright, ‘The Military Orders in Sixteenth and Seventeenth Century Spanish 
Society,’ Past and Present, 43 (1969), pp. 34-70. Wright states figures on p. 55 derived 
from AHN, Vignau and Uhagon, Caballeros de Santiago.
90 Keniston, p. 25.
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alongside the powerful minister, Francisco de los 
Cobos, a 'new Christian').91
He also ties Laguna to Gonzalo Perez and Cobos as 
fellow conversos. We know that Perez worked with Cobos and 
from ecclesiastical lists in Segovia we know that Perez was 
a converso. All this is circumstantial and neither Keniston 
nor Bataillon source their evidence. Unfortunately, Cobos's 
expediente of proofs for membership of the Order of Santiago 
is missing from the National Archives. This is a serious 
omission as we cannot follow the 'proofs' of his lineage in 
an authenticated document. Vignau writes that:
no extranara a nadie la falta o desaparacion de algunos 
procesos correspondientes a personas que figuren en el 
Indice (no one should be surprised by the disappearance 
or absence of some procedures for individuals who
92appear m  the Index).
Time and events have destroyed many documents.
The genealogical references to the Cobos family connect 
him to the Molinas in the conquest of Ubeda in 1234 and the 
subsequent repartimlento (sharing) of lands and captives 
among the hijosdalgo. The protocols in the town hall at 
Ubeda mention Lope Rodriguez de los Cobos as Alferez del 
pendon (Sheriff of the pendant) in one of the battles for 
Ubeda. Later Leonor Gonzalez de los Cobos married into the 
Molina family, so merging the family trees. Juan Vazquez de
91 M. Bataillon, ‘Les Nouveaux Chretiens de Segovie en 1510,’ Bulletin Hispanique 
(1956), pp. 207-216.
92 Vicente Vignau y Francisco de Uhagon, Indice de pruebas de los caballeros que han 
vestido el habito de Santiago desde 1501 hasta la fecha (Madrid, 1901), p. 25.
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Molina, nephew and ally to Francisco de los Cobos, was of 
this line as well as being secretary to Charles V. Catalina 
de Molina was Francisco's mother. The Molinas were 
invariably the more important family in Ubeda. Cobos may 
have aspired to emulate them and raise his family pedigree. 
His ancestors' lineage did not contain a senorlof but a 
small solar (landholding) near Burgos, as vassals of another 
family. Such families in the 13th century intermarried and, 
according to Dominguez Ortiz, formed cofradias militares 
(military brotherhoods) to keep themselves separate from the
• • • • • 93conquered populations and maintain their noble lineage. 
This was possibly the origin of 'blood tests.' The Cobos- 
Molina connection is shown in Cobos's Family Tree in 
Appendix One.
Argote de Molina, a native of Jaen province, which 
includes Ubeda, was, in the 1560s, given special access by 
Philip II to family records held by municipalities, most of 
which no longer exist. Juan Vazquez de Molina, a relative, 
signed the royal permissions for this research. Argote de 
Molina's resulting Nobleza de Andalucia is a history of the 
families of Jaen.94 The genealogy of the Molina and Cobos 
families is traced back to the conquest of Ubeda. Argote de 
Molina names some of Cobos's ancestors and writes that they 
were among the 'principal linajes de Ubeda' (lineages). 
Charles V's chronicler, Sandoval, says:
93 Antonio Dominguez Ortiz, La Clase Social de los Conversos en Castilla en la Edad 
Moderna (Granada, 1991), p. 53.
94 Gonzalo Argote de Molina, Nobleza de Andalucia (Jaen, 1991), pp. 580-581.
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fue Don Francisco de los Cobos de familia noble y 
antigua en Ubeda, donde hay un barrio que Hainan de los 
Cobos (Francisco de los Cobos was from an old and noble 
family in Ubeda, where a locality is called los 
Cobos) .95
Thus, although knowledge of Cobos's bloodline is 
important in the context of the period, it may fall into the 
category of "known unknowns," and will never be clarified.
Senorios (feudal domain or private lordship)
Apart from the Military Orders, Cobos had to deal with 
multiple centres of power deriving from other medieval 
institutional traditions, which involved different 
jurisdictions and territories. This contrasted with England, 
where the legal system had largely centralised royal powers, 
with the English kings having their own courts, which could 
confirm legitimate possession of land. Charles V may have 
had aspirations to centralise his dynastic ambitions through 
promotion of concepts of "empire," which has been widely 
written about, and which was to some extent supported by 
international canon law. But his power was based on a legacy 
of decentralised medieval institutions creating an 
agglomeration of dynastic territories beyond Castile and a 
web of jurisdictional differences within Castile. All this 
served to delay proceedings in the royal courts, through 
what today's. US Federal legal system calls "forum shopping. " 
Plaintiffs called for special treatment or exemption from 
prosecution in royal courts. An historian has called Castile
95 Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, Historia de Carlos V (Madrid, 1922), vol. 1, libro 16, p. 
892.
58
a "Cretan labyrinth" of conflicting fueros and privileges 
and competing jurisdictions.96 Customary or regional fueros 
existed and conflicted with the growing power of royal 
audiencias (tribunals).
Jurisdictional confusion was further amplified by
separate legal procedures for the Military Orders and the
ecclesiastical courts. The senorial system had been 
important in the repopulation of Castile during the various 
phases of Reconquest as a system of reward for the 
territorial conquest and the consequent holding of land and 
vassals. But it developed into a form of what Valdeavellano 
calls "dominios serioriales como distritos autonomos del
territorio del Estado"(senorial lands as autonomous and
separate from the kings" jurisdiction).97 There were 
different types of senorlos, depending on the "plenitud de 
jurisdiccion y competencia" (fullness of jurisdiction and
competence) granted by the king. But over time, with the 
success of the Reconquest and need to encourage 
repopulation, more powers and jurisdictional autonomy were
granted, thus restricting royal powers.
The senorio effectively acted in his lands with full
royal powers, which could only be protested to the kings" 
courts by vassals for exceptional cause. The early 
Trastamara kings, especially Enrique II (1369-1379), had
given rights of final appeal to senorlos in a derogation or
96 I. A. A. Thompson, War and Government in Habsburg Spain, 1560-1620 (London, 
1976), p. 39.
97 Luis G. de Valdeavellano, Curso de Historia de las Instituciones Espaiiolas, de los 
orlgenes al final de la Edad Media (Madrid, 1970), p. 518.
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dangerous dispersal of royal justice. This diminished the 
royal power and patrimony and strengthened the economic and 
political power of the nobility. Subsequent kings (Enrique 
IV) did the same to retain the support of the nobility in 
dynastic wars.
These so-called jurisdictional senorlos, were important 
centres of power with separate jurisdictions, both civil and 
criminal — designated from the Roman glossaries as merum et 
mixtum Imperium. This phrase, used in the Partidas (laws of 
jurisprudence) of Alfonso X, referred to the power of 
magistrates to punish for due cause. They could raise 
revenues and taxes over many forms of economic activity, and 
were often granted these powers in hereditary and perpetual 
form. They could appoint officials, judges and mayors and 
demand military service from their populations for their own 
as well as the king's hosts. They could also carry their own 
pendon (banner) in battle, something that Lope Rodriguez de 
los Cobos had done at the conquest of Baeza. Special rights 
or fueros had been given to encourage reconquest and 
repopulation of captured lands. Thus, by granting 
immunities, the kings had created 'autonomous and separate 
territories within their domains', whereby the senor ruled 
directly, not in the name of the king.98 The higher nobility 
thus consolidated their economic and social power through 
the senorlos from which they received incomes from 
administering justice, from a multitude of transactional and
98 Ibid.
6°
property taxes, and rentals due them as owners of the
senorlos.
It was not until the Catholic Kings that an effort was 
made to reduce these separate powers and to reincorporate 
some in the Crown. A corpus of royal laws, Leyes de Toro, 
regarding property and inheritance was issued by the 
Catholic Kings in 1505, and in 1503 the powers of the
ecclesiastical courts were restricted by the Libro de las 
Bulas y Pragmatlcas." At the petition of the Cortes of
Toledo, 1480, many of Enrique IV's territorial grants were, 
reviewed and some annulled if insufficient service to the
Crown could be proved. Further, many fewer mercedes were 
granted alienating Crown property. But the power of the 
local fueros and customs meant that Castile was still not a 
unified legal entity, thus imposing a limit on royal 
authority.
The Maestrazgos, or Masterships of the Military Orders, 
were also incorporated in the Crown under the Catholic 
Kings. The Maestrazgos of the Military Orders held vast 
territories in the areas of Reconquest. They had been 
granted encomiendas (territories) to protect and defend the
i
conquered areas. But such concessions to a Comendador were 
temporary — they were senores vitalicios (lifetime lords) of 
their encomiendas. Cobos as a Comendador Mayor of the 
Military Order of Santiago received fees for his theoretical
99 Los codigos espanoles concordados y  anotados (CECA), 12 vols. (Madrid, 1872-84), VI, 
pp. 567-581. Earlier text of Siete Partidas or uniform code of laws of Alfonso X are 
included in vols II-IV.
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protection of his territory, but with the 'incorporation' of 
the Maestrazgos in the Crown he did not have jurisdictional 
domain over land and vassals. The Council of the Orders had 
to submit most decisions, including naming of Comendadores 
to the king. By contrast holders of senorlos had 
jurisdiction of their own, received as a fief from the 
emperor. Thus for Cobos, acquiring a lay senorio became 
important to his goal of establishing a lineage.
Although Charles V's aim on ascending the throne of 
Castile had been to increase the power of the royal 
tribunals to ensure his control of his new inheritance, the 
revolt of the comuneros required him to meet certain of 
their concerns about "customary' local justice. Tavera, 
President of the Council of Castile, and Cobos were 
appointed to key administrative posts replacing the hated 
Flemish. This, as seen in their exchange of letters, was to 
become a close working-partnership until Tavera's death.100 
Tavera became head of the Royal Council and archbishop of 
Toledo and, therefore, inevitably a rival to Cobos.
Meanwhile, the medieval legacy of the senorial, or 
system of feudal domain, was further strengthened with the 
disentitlement of the properties of the Church and of the 
Military Orders with many territories sold to lay lords. The 
new senorlos maintained the characteristics and traditional 
feudal rights of the senorial system, and indeed 
strengthened the system by their new political and economic
100 BN, Ms 1778.
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power. Of particular interest, given Cobos's involvement, 
was the disentitlement of the property of Cazorla from the 
rich and powerful archbishopric of Toledo — the primacy of 
Spain. This will be discussed below.
The resulting increase in the numbers of senorlos was 
used strategically by Cobos to reward his followers and 
provide the emperor with monies from their sale. Initially 
Cobos tried to withhold alcabalas (sales taxes) and royal 
tercias from the sales, but this reduced their value to 
potential buyers and was soon forgotten. The offset for all 
these sales was growth in the issuance of compensatory juros 
(bonds) against various sources of royal revenues, such as 
alcabalas. There is some doubt, given the costs and delays 
in the process, that disentitlement was an effective source 
of funding. It was a short-term expedient with major 
political consequences for the Crown's control of its realm. 
In this sense Cobos was almost a revolutionary in the 
redistribution of Castile's wealth. Disentitlement as a 
source of finance will be examined in Chapter Four on 
finances.
Many new senorlos held important positions as 
secretaries and ministers in the administration, including 
Cobos. The Marques de Saltillo writes about purchases by 
these secretaries and the expansion by established nobility 
of their existing senorlos, seizing the opportunity of the
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disentitlement.101 Salvador de Moxo has estimated a forty per 
cent expansion in senorial territories in the 16th century,
mainly from the sale of lands of the Military Orders and the
102lands of the archbishopric of Toledo. Cobos and the emperor 
had worked with the pope on the legality of this measure to 
obtain the legal sanction of canon law through a papal bull. 
The financial consequences of imperial dynastic policies 
were pressing even at this early date in Charles's reign. 
Rising land values with population growth in this period 
made such a massive transfer of property possible and an 
important source of finance for Charles's dynastic wars and 
imperial Crown. The privileges of transfer were most 
specific on the stated judicial and administrative powers 
over the territories and villages concerned.
A sample of the formulas used in the granting of 
senorlos was examined in various archives as referenced 
below. The clauses in the escrituras of sale were relatively 
unchanged over the centuries. The privilegio of 1369 by 
Enrique II to Garcia Alvarez de Toledo over the senorlo of 
Oropesa is similar to that of the Reyes Catolicos in 1492 to 
Diego Lopez Pacheco, Marques de Villena. Another example of 
a privilegio with similar clauses is contained in the Carta
■ • 103 *de Privilegio of Prince Philip to Pedro de Zuniga. Dominio 
was included in the escritura de venta resulting from forced
101 Marques de Saltillo, Historia Nobiliario Espanola (Madrid, 1951), pp. 189-90, 205-06, 
272-95.
102 Salvador de Moxo, Feudalismo, senorio y  nobleza en la Castilla medieval (Madrid, 
2000), pp. 212-214.
103 AHN, Consejos, leg. 34621; AHN, Consejos, leg. 34378; AHN Consejos, leg. 27935, 
num. 4, ff. 25-28.
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sale of lands and villages in the encomiendas of the Order 
of Santiago. The prince issued a Carta de Privilegio and
confirmed the carta de venta by virtue of his full powers of 
Majesty and the authority of the papal bulls and breves 
regarding the disentitlement of property of the Military 
Orders. The new owner became:
senor y propietario desde la hoja del monte hasta la 
piedra del rio, y desde la piedra del rio hasta la hoja 
del monte (senor and owner from the leaf of the 
mountain forest to the stone of the river, and from the 
stone of the river to the leaf of the mountain).104
As such he had full legal privileges, which would pass 
to his heirs and successors in perpetuity, with civil and
criminal jurisdiction over all the vassals, rents and
taxation rights. Although some of the new owners in these 
transfers were mere rentistas and absentees, with the 
senorio only a 'prerrogativa de vanidad' (prerogative of 
vanity), many exercised full domain.105
A final example of the form of transfer is shown in the 
sale clauses of an encomienda of the Order of Santiago.106 
This is particularly detailed as it was subject to
litigation between the state and the Duke of Medinaceli in
1825 on the reincorporation to the Crown of senorlos. The
memorial of incorporation contains similar clauses on the
reversion of jurisdiction — civil and criminal — for taxes 
and income on all property in the territory, including
104 AHN, leg. 27935, no. 4, ff. 25-28.
5 Salvador de Moxo, 'Los Senorids,’ Hispania, 94 (1964), p. 236 and in documentary 
appendix pp. 399-430.
106 AHN, Consejos, leg. 32311, f. 2.
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castles. When Philip became king, he accelerated the process 
of disentitlement of ecclesiastical property, particularly 
of the primacy of Toledo. He, like Charles V, ensured that 
he proceeded with papal support, and the various popes were 
obliging, citing Charles and Philip's contribution to 
Christianity. This process was long and costly, and Toledo 
litigated fiercely, as we shall see below in connection with 
the Camarasa versus Toledo suit.
Thus obtaining such a senorlo was an important step for 
Cobos. His objective was to ensure that he held a senorlo 
patrimonial de su linaje (a hereditable senorlo for his 
family) following the form set out in Prince Philip's Carta 
de Privilegio mentioned above. After the rights of senorlo 
had been confirmed, sometimes carta-pueblas would be entered 
into between the senor and his vassals to encourage further 
repopulation of the towns under his jurisdiction, which 
could increase the value of the senorlo, often determined by 
the number of inhabitants providing additional taxes and 
labour services. Sometimes cedulas (royal documents) would 
be issued by the kings granting jurisdiction and 'rights', 
with much detail. Prior to the Catholic Kings such cedulas 
even derogated the kings' powers of final appeal, 'en la 
manera que Nos Mismo los pudieramos hacer y poner' (in the 
manner that We Ourselves could establish).107 It was not until 
the Cortes of Cadiz in 1811 that such jurisdictional 
senorlos were abolished. Such independent power-centres
107 AHN, Consejos, leg. 34621.
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fragmented and dispersed royal powers of justice and 
revenues and would be a continual problem for Charles V and 
Cobos. The expansion of this system of lordship increased 
the economic power of the nobility and made it difficult for 
the various audiencias (royal courts) through visitas 
(official investigations) to challenge the jurisdictional 
and tax raising powers of these senorlos.
Although Cobos was keen to enjoy the revenues and 
jurisdiction of his senorlo (exencion, privilegio y  fuero) 
this conflicted with the need to strengthen royal power — 
though not in the sense of nation-state powers — to meet the 
financial needs for the patrimonial and dynastic priorities 
of Charles V. Cobos was a servant of Charles but had to 
balance the different regions and different powers within 
Spain, as Charles did within his many different kingdoms — 
an early example of 'composite monarchies.' Also Charles, 
while rewarding a 'faithful servant,' was aware of the 
possibility of a senorlo for Cobos making him too 
independent. Thus he was always balancing rewards with 
strings — while upwardly mobile, Cobos would never gain a 
title of grand nobility. The research on Cobos shows that 
Charles was much more calculating in his approach to people 
and administration than his faith-based ideology would 
suggest.
Adelantamiento de Cazorla
There is substantial archival material in Toledo — in 
the Repertorio del Archivo Capitular de Toledo, which lists
the contents of the archive on the Adelantamlento of Cazorla 
— and Madrid on the subject of litigation between Cobos's 
heirs and the archbishops of Toledo — Camarasa versus 
Toledo. We are thus able to follow how Cobos used such 
institutions and the people involved to advance his status. 
The Adelantado of Cazorla was important to Cobos, not just 
for the magisterial powers and income granted, but because 
of the associated patrimonial privileges such as right to 
erect castles, exemption from taxes and transmission of the 
office to his heirs. Litigation was a catalyst for record 
keeping with written documents and 'proofs' required for 
justice as a fundamental part of the process.
The struggle for control of the Adelantamiento of 
Cazorla is one of few areas relating to Cobos that is rich 
in documentary sources. Apart from Toledo cathedral, 
material was consulted at Simancas, the Archivo Historico 
Nacional, the Biblioteca Nacional, the Camarasa archive at 
the Hospital de Tavera in Toledo, the municipal protocol 
archives in Ubeda, (which have consolidated the local 
archives from Cobos's townships within Cazorla), and the 
Granada Chancery archives at the Audiencia of Granada which 
had jurisdiction over litigation on Cazorla. A former 
'canon-archivist' of the Toledo cathedral archives has used 
some of these papers to narrate a history of Cazorla, both 
as a region and as the institution — Adelantamiento of 
Cazorla. This work was particularly helpful in demonstrating
68
the interpretative potential of these archives. 108 In 
addition, local histories documented in some of the
municipal archives of the towns of Cazorla (especially Ubeda 
and Quesada) were consulted. The local histories in the 
Diccionario bibliografico-historico also provided useful 
insights.109
The insistence by the Partidas of Alfonso X for written 
procedures from a demanda (citation) to a sentencla
(decision) of the judges provides a permanent legal record 
of every stage of a legal dispute in early-modern Castile.110 
Thus litigation records provide a treasure-trove of
information. Richard Kagan began the process of studying 
legal records many years ago with his_ monograph on Castile 
as a litigating society.111 He helpfully suggested that the 
records in the Audlencla of Granada had not yet been fully 
researched. So these were part of the inquiry as was the 
Archivo de Protocolos de Granada. Testimonials of witnesses 
and notarised "proofs' to support claims filed before a 
magistrate to obtain judgment are some of the valuable 
documents available in archives. They demonstrate the 
dispute settlement process, and indirectly inform us about 
context and the personalities and institutions involved. 
Litigation documents name occupations, background of 
litigants and case histories. Finally, after a lawsuit was
108 J. F. Rivera Recio, El Adelantamiento de Cazorla (Toledo, 1948).
109 Diccionario-bibliografico-historico de los antiguos reinos, provincias, villas y  iglesias 
de Espaha, eds. Munoz y Romero (Madrid, 1858.)
110 CECA, Siete Partidas de Alfonso X, (Madrid, 1872-84), vols II-IV.
Richard Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castile, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1981).
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concluded, more often through an out-of-court settlement — 
as happens today — a carta ejecutoria (executive writ) was 
issued with a history and summary of the case. The carta 
ejecutoria of Camarasa versus Toledo, among other documents, 
has been consulted for the following observations.
Cazorla was a senorlo jurisdiccional (feudal
jurisdiction) but had belonged for centuries to the
archbishopric of Toledo, the primate of Spain* This made it 
a singular, episcopal, feudal state. The episcopal archives 
in Toledo document its history and conflicts of ownership. 
Litigation occurred frequently and involved the 
interpretation, and application of canon law in the medieval
period — which had been systematised by the monk Gratian in
the 12th century — with the training of judges, advocates and 
notaries at the universities and the need to apply regular 
papal judgments. Conflict between canon law and the 
developing civil law of Castile in the early-modern period 
made for more work for the law schools of the universities. 
Although there was a tradition — from Justinian's 
codification (the Digest of legal precedent) of the heritage 
of Roman law — of time limits on proceedings 'to prevent 
lawsuits becoming almost immortal and exceeding the term of 
human life,' this was 'honoured more in the breach.' Even 
though canon law and 'apostolic letters' resolved 
territorial borders between the towns of Cazorla this still 
required the intervention of the king to interpose his 
authority on behalf of the pope.
Within the archives of Toledo cathedral is a record of 
the particularly sharp dispute between the archbishopric and 
Cobos's inheritors — the Margueses de Camarasa, The final 
settlement was documented in the Memorial of 422 folios by 
archbishop Sandoval y Rojas in 1604. The dispute required 
the gathering and copying of papers from the towns of 
Cazorla to provide evidence of the parties' respective
rights. In the case of Toledo this resulted in the archiving
112of the essential proofs m  the cathedral. Manuscript 915 
contains enormous bundles of documents whose purpose was to 
demonstrate the uninterrupted prerogatives since the 13th 
century of the archbishops of Toledo as titleholders of this 
sehorio. Some show the exercise of jurisdictional powers by 
the Adelantados de Cazorla in their capacity as 
representatives of the Archbishops of Toledo, exercising 
jurisdiction in his name. Others show royal intervention to 
defend the property of the church when the see of Toledo was 
vacant. Apostolic and public notaries had to examine these 
documents to authenticate the grants based on the original 
escrituras issued by the papal curia. These escrituras form 
part of manuscript 915. Similar documents also exist in the 
Archivo Historico Nacional in the section on Consejos 
Suprimidos. The Camarasa archive in the Archivo Nobiliario 
at the Hospital de Tavera in Toledo is much sparser on 
evidence for the Cobos family claim. It seems that with
112 Archivo Catedral de Toledo, Ms 915, Section Obra y Fabrica,.
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Cobos's death, his successors did not have the same stamina 
for a fight as the archbishops.
Given the extensive documentation, the dispute is 
possibly the most important information we have in 
illuminating Cobos's character: in the way he acquired the
AdelantamientOf its importance to him and what it says about 
his relationship with Charles V. An Adelantado is defined by 
the Diccionario de Autoridades as:
Aquel que esta en lugar del rey para ejercer las altas 
funciones de justicia con caracter permanente (He who 
stands in place of the king to permanently carry out 
the highest functions of justice).
Alfonso X in his Siete Partidas, Leyes para los 
Adelantados, had ruled that when the exercise of judicial 
power could not be heard by the king:
It was suitable to put another in his place. And that 
official is called the Adelantado of the court because 
the king places him before, in his stead, to listen to 
complaints and to exercise the highest functions of 
justice ... in the exercise of his position he is above 
the rest and only recognises the king as his superior ... 
It is necessary that he be of great lineage and very
• 113loyal and wise.
Thus for Cobos and Charles, the former was receiving 
recognition of linaje (lineage) and Charles was confirming 
his 'loyal servant.' Furthermore, Charles was willing to 
upset the most powerful ecclesiastical force in the land, 
the archbishopric of Toledo, in confirming Cobos as 
Adelantado. All previous Adelantados had been 
representatives of the archbishops of Toledo and Cobos was
113 CECA, Siete Partidas, vols II-IV.
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inserting himself and his family (en perpetuo) into a 
territory that had belonged to Toledo since 1231. This would 
indeed prove to be overreaching hubris.
Cazorla was conquered after the battle of Las Navas de 
Tolosa, and Fernando el Santo (1217-1252) granted a 
privileglo in 1231 to Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada, archbishop of 
Toledo and generallsimo de Castilla. The nature of this 
document defined the subsequent conflict between Cobos and 
Toledo and therefore bears an abbreviated recital.
This privilege is perpetual to Rodrigo the archbishop 
of Toledo. To him and his successors I give the towns 
of Quesada and Toya and all the villages, mountains, 
springs, pastures, vines and fertile and infertile 
land. You and your successors have this irrevocably and 
this my escritura will be valid for all time. If anyone 
tries to infringe or diminish this document he will 
incur the full wrath of an omnipotent God and pay to 
the royal treasury a penalty of a thousand pieces of 
gold.114
The document is signed by Fernando, the royal infantes, 
prelados, y caballeros of the curia real. Armed with this 
document of privilege Rodrigo conquered Cazorla and the 
named towns. Toledo had held Cazorla ever since until 
Cobos's assault. He and, by association, Charles V were 
going against the expressed edict of the revered Fernando el 
Santo.
Documentary evidence seems to indicate that this was 
part of Charles and Cobos's strategy to alienate 
ecclesiastical property. Cobos was a willing beneficiary as 
part of Charles's campaign to centralise power in the royal
114 Archivo Catedral de Toledo, X, 9.1.2.
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courts and to raise finance for his many dynastic ambitions. 
It certainly does not appear that Charles was simply 
rewarding a loyal servant.
Although Cobos was not a letrado — in the sense of
having formally studied law and Latin at the universities — 
he probably had a good understanding of the procedures and 
legal reasoning of civil and canon law to be prepared to 
litigate. Letrados, although rising in power in the 
administration, were low in social status — often
disparagingly referred to as senores togados (robed lords)
by the higher nobility. Lineage was considered as more 
important than ambition and merit in the king's service. 
Letrados were, therefore, not a category for the socially 
ambitious Cobos.
On the death of Archbishop Fonseca, in 1534, the 
emperor seems to have begun his campaign against Toledo's
prerogatives. He issued cedulas to the administrators of the 
Adelantamiento for them to continue in their posts during 
the interregnum of archbishops and 'to act in our name to 
administer justice and guard the fortresses until we decide 
otherwise.' This breached the prerogative of the Cabildo
(governing body) of Toledo in the absence of an archbishop. 
However, this right to appoint and sell offices was to 
become an important part of royal revenues and Cobos 
probably orchestrated Charles's action.
The emperor contended that granting general
jurisdiction over a senorio to a new lord did not give the
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lord power to create and grant offices.115 The right to 
appoint officers in the senorlo was increasingly separated 
and dependent on the issuance of a carta de privllegio. 
Tavera, President of the Royal Council, 1524-39, was also 
named archbishop of Toledo, 1534-45. It is probable that he 
was part of the strategy to secularize ecclesiastical 
properties. Although acquiescing in the emperor's wishes to 
nominate Cobos to Cazorla — Cobos had also supported him for 
the primacy — there is some doubt about his complicity in 
the papal bull granting perpetual rights to Cobos's lineage. 
Some sources indicate that he never saw the final bull. It 
is also stated that the Cabildo de Toledo, which was in 
charge of the Adel ant amiento during an interregnum on the 
death of Tavera in 1545, was uninformed.
Charles's and Cobos's policy both rewarded supporters 
and provided finance for Charles's dynastic wars, much like 
Henry VIII of England's 'stripping of the altars.' Henry's 
break with Rome included the closing of faculties of canon 
law at Oxford and Cambridge as well as the dissolution of 
monasteries. But Charles, unlike Henry, was able to use 
canon law — the first international law — to achieve and 
legitimise his financial aims and to weaken Toledo's control 
of lands and revenues. The various popes issued bulls 
endorsing his policies on secularisation of church property. 
They continued to do this for Philip II. Cobos, through his 
papal diplomacy, was more effective in this instance than
115 J. M. March, Ninez y  Juventud de Felipe II, 2 vols (Madrid, 1942), II, pp. 68-79.
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Henry's henchman, Thomas Cromwell. Cobos and Cromwell offer 
interesting comparisons and contrasts for further study.
Tavera was named archbishop of Toledo in 1534 with 
Cobos's strong support. The documents in Toledo and 
correspondence between Cobos and Talavera indicate that this 
was conditional on Tavera/s agreement to naming Cobos the 
new Adelantado.116 The papers in the Toledo archive show 
Tavera naming Cobos in 1534 as Adelantado de Cazorla:
La concesion hecha sin restricciones de ningun genero, 
tanto en lo que al aprovechamiento de frutos y rentas, 
como la administracion de justicia (granted without any 
restrictions, in as much as benefiting from incomes, as 
well as the administration of justice).
Charles V confirmed and Pope Paul III issued a bull.117 
The emperor also notified all officials in Cazorla of the 
archbishop's nomination of Cobos and asked them to give up 
their staffs of justice to Cobos. Cobos immediately began 
placing his people and family in the Adelantamlento — for 
example the former mayor of Ubeda, Rivas. This was of course 
his style of administration and loyalty and patronage to 
family came before the needs of the towns in Cazorla. It was 
also the way he used such institutions for enrichment, 
status and power. Tavera and the archbishopric may have seen 
it otherwise. Cobos then insisted with Tavera that his son, 
Diego, be named Adelantado. Tavera protested, but agreed in 
February 1535, and Pope Paul III issued a bull in May. The 
emperor confirmed Diego's appointment by a cedula dated 28
116 Archivo Catedral de Toledo, Obra y Fabrica, Ms 915; BN, Ms 1778.
117 ibid.
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May 1535.118 Tavera may have been afraid of Cobos's power with 
the emperor and possible retribution for trying to thwart 
Cobos's objective.
Tavera and Cobos had been together on the Royal Council 
since 1522, when they were appointed by Charles after the 
revolt of the comuneros to replace the hated Flemish 
advisors. Correspondence between Tavera and Cobos shows 
friendly relations. Tavera gave news on Cobos's family while 
on a visit to Ubeda, and congratulated him on his Comendador 
Mayor in 1529. Cobos was friendly in return.119 Then in 1543 
Cobos turns against Tavera in his letter to Charles:
El cardenal presidente Tavera solicita apoderarse de
todo el amor de el Rey mi senor poniendo para ello 
medios que no son mui honrados (The cardinal president 
Tavera wishes to take all the love of the king my
master, by using methods that are not very honourable).
He implies that Tavera is working for private gain. He 
does this after Tavera has delivered Cazorla to him and when 
perhaps he is no longer useful.120
Another area of conflict was caused by Charles 
delegating the work of royal patronage to Tavera, as 
president of the Royal Council, to prepare short-lists of
candidates or consultas de oficios for the emperor's 
decision. Cobos had advanced in honours and dignity and more 
importantly was Adelantado of a province with judicial
powers, civil and criminal. Perhaps, he thought, that there
118 RAH, Salazar y Castro, M-189, 347-351.
119 BN, Ms 1778.
120 BN, Ms 10300.
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finally would be some independence from his emperor. Perhaps 
he had looked at the Capitulaciohes of Santa Fe documenting 
the agreement reached between Columbus and the Catholic 
Kings in 1492 stating the rewards and title to be received: 
Almirante y Adelantado Mayor de las Indlas. The immunities 
and privileges were of a breath-taking scale that Cobos 
would admire.121 Cobos then tried to get the title declared 
perpetual, as with the original grant to Columbus by 
Fernando. As this accorded with royal policy to acquire 
Church property Charles endorsed the request and wrote to 
his ambassador in Rome, 25 July 1537, to seek papal 
agreement to:
Concesion, asignacion, extension, y ampliacion del 
dicho oficio del Adelantado de Cazorla con todos sus 
derechos, rentas, jurisdiccion, y preeminencias para 
los dichos Don Francisco y Don Diego de los Cobos, su 
hijo y sus herederos y descendientes perpetuamente 
(Concession, assignment and extension of the said title 
of Adelantado of Cazorla with all its rights, revenues, 
and jurisdiction, for the said Francisco de los Cobos
and Diego de los Cobos, his son and his heirs and
122descendants perpetually).
Thus Charles was following the form of the original 
privilegio as closely as possible, perhaps to avoid 
anticipated challenges from the church, as he acknowledges, 
'si bien la provision del adelantado correspondia al 
arzobispo de Toledo' (although the provision of the 
Adelantado is within the gift of the archbishop of Toledo). 
The pope initially granted a tltulo de infeudacion perpetua
121 Cristobal Colon, Derechos de Descubrimiento, Apelacion Final de Cristobal Colon al 
Rey Fernando (John Carter Brown Library’s Spanish Codex 1 (1505).
122 Archivo Catedral de Toledo, Memorial, leg. 226-227.
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(perpetual feudal title), with the archbishop of Toledo to 
receive a payment each year as the "feudal overlord." But by 
a bull of December 1539 the pope amended the preceding bull 
to declare it free of a feudal obligation to Toledo; it 
became a gracia bajo censo (a grace free of rent). This was 
given force of a privilegio and gracia real by the emperor 
on 25 January 1541. Charles and Cobos had succeeded in 
removing juridical power from a powerful episcopal senorio.
On Tavera's death in 1545, Prince Philip, as regent, 
was pressed by Cobos to inform the Cabildo of Toledo that 
the Adelantado de Cazorla did not belong to Toledo as a 
papal bull had given it to the Comendador Mayor and his son. 
Perhaps Tavera had not made this clear to his diocese, but 
Charles then felt it necessary to write to the pope 
(possibly at Cobos"s request) recommending Cobos"s petition 
to clarify certain aspects of the previous bulls to perfect 
the title.123 A new bull was therefore issued on 9 June 1546. 
Its purpose was to remove "defects of form,'(as possibly 
Tavera had not been informed of the perpetual nature of the 
title) and to ensure the whole see of Toledo was informed 
that the Adelantado was now a donacion regia (royal gift). 
The care over "form" was very characteristic of Cobos"s 
style. The emperor"s close involvement, as shown by the 
documents, indicates the importance of the issue as part of 
his strategy to weaken the Church's patrimonial domain.124
1/3 Ibid., leg. 223.
124 Ibid., legs. 44-53.
The pope may seem to have been issuing these bulls to 
resolve a dispute between the Church and a secular 
authority. Often this was done by reference to the sacred 
authority of canon law, taking Innocent IV's (1243-1254) 
commentary on the decretals as the basis for interpretation, 
as recorded by the monk Gratian. But it is clear that in the 
case of Cazorla he was responding to the political situation 
and Charles V's overwhelming secular power. Previous bulls 
also indicate a pope's wish — in this case Clement VII — to 
accommodate 'Nuestro amado hijo Francisco de los Cobos' (Our 
beloved son, Francisco de los Cobos). His breve of 8 January 
1530, issued during Charles V's coronation at Bologna, had 
given Cobos and a large named-list of friends and relatives
• 125special indulgences, privileges and honours. Cazorla was a 
singular, feudal state, even at this late stage. Its 
prerogatives, powers and rights had been subject to legal 
battles for centuries.
Documents in the Archivo Catedral de Toledo show the 
importance of canon law in medieval litigation over this
1 ty/T
feudal territory. Often disputes were resolved by 
'apostolic letters,' with borders confirmed by the pope and 
accepted by litigants. This is the background to the titanic 
feud between Cobos, his heirs and Juan Martinez Sillceo, 
Archbishop of Toledo, 1546-57. The nature of this feud is so 
important that quotations will be used extensively from some 
of these documents.
125 BN, Ms. 1570, f. 41.
126 Archivo de la Catedral de Toledo, Obra y Fabrica, Ms 915.
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Sillceo, who became archbishop in 1546, had been tutor 
and then Cape 11 an Mayor (chaplain) to Prince Philip and was 
often consulted by Charles on the progress of his son.127 In 
his hew position as primate of Spain, he seems to have felt 
he could influence the emperor. Almost immediately on his 
elevation, at sixty years of age, he tackled the issue of 
Cazorla, determined to vindicate the 'rights' of the Church. 
He also imposed a 'statute' of limpieza on the Cabildo of 
Toledo in the same year, as he felt that too many conversos 
held posts in the cathedral. This 'statute' was confirmed by 
Pope Paul IV and some chaplains had to leave the country. J. 
M. March researched Toledo's archives for his book Ninez y 
Juventud de Felipe II, including Siliceo's papers. He 
believed 'it is undeniable that Siliceo had great 
intellectual gifts' and lists the abstracts of his books on 
philosophy and arithmetic.128 His character:
Was always fundamentally good, although severe and 
rigid in his forms ... once invested with the dignity of 
the Primacy he was imbued with great authority, jealous 
of the rights of the Church, as he understood them. He 
showed tenacity and strength in defending the rigorous
• 129statute of purity of blood.
In dealing with what he saw as the injustice, 'contra 
los derechos de la iglesia de Toledo' (against the rights of 
the Church of Toledo) based on false information given to 
the previous Pope Paul III, Sillceo first had to consider
127 J. M. March, Ninez y  Juventud de Felipe II, 2 vols (Madrid, 1942), II, pp. 68-79.
128 Ibid., II, pp. 58-61.
129 March, II, pp. 58-59.
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Cobos's complaints to the emperor. Cobos had said that 
Siliceo was:
Stubborn and keen on innovations and departed from what 
had already been determined by apostolic and imperial 
decisions and also approved by his own Cabildo
• 130(Toledo/s governing body).
Charles followed this line in a letter to Siliceo 
saying:
Although some complaints have been written to me about 
you and your innovations, my satisfaction with you is 
so much that I do not believe that your rivalry will be 
motivated by vengeance. You will do me service by not 
bothering the marquis (Cobos's heir) or the Comendador 
Mayor over Cazorla. Leave things alone as they remain
131and I advise you that I am pleased about it.
Charles also alleged that the Cabildo de Toledo, who 
acted as administrator of the Adelantamiento when the 
episcopal seat was vacant, had seen the papal bulls and 
obeyed them. Siliceo's replies to Charles V in 1547, setting 
out his case and giving a history of the church's possession 
of Cazorla, were therefore a daring defiance of the emperor. 
The documents relating to the long legal suit by Toledo 
against the Camarasa family are contained in a memorial del 
pleito (document of legal suit) of 422 folios in the 
archives of the cathedral diocese of Toledo. Siliceo's 
letters to the emperor are included in this document and are 
so important that they are extensively quoted in this
130 Ibid., p. 63.
131 Ibid.
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chapter.132 Much of this documentation is in Latin, but there 
are also separate manuscripts of the correspondence in
• • • • * 133Spanish in the Biblioteca Nacional. The letters of 1547 
refuse to give consent to the perpetual grant required by 
Gobos. He does not repeat the old formula of obedezco pero 
no cumplo (I obey but do not comply), which implied a 
monarch did not have full knowledge of the facts and it 
would be better to await more information before insisting 
on the royal command.134 But he was following this traditional 
formula by which fulfilment of royal decrees was 
conditional. He insists that the emperor and pope should 
study all the material to correct an injustice to Nuestra 
Senora. The emperor:
Only saw the case through the views of Cobos and his 
supporters. He, Siliceo, has studied the case with 
famous letrados and they concur that it would be a 
mortal sin to consent to this perpetuity.
The letter is laden with irony against Cobos. It also 
reveals something of Cobos's operating style. When Siliceo 
was able to convince Prince Philip of the need for the papal 
bulls to be reviewed by the Royal Council, Cobos tried to 
head off the discussion by inviting members to his home, one 
by one, and telling them how he wanted them to vote. The 
prince, as regent, then signed letters drafted by Cobos, 
telling the Cabildo to obey the papal bulls. Sillceo then
132 Archivo Catedral de Toledo, Mem. 169-176 v., no. 23.
133 BN, Ms 9175, ff. 177-184; Ms 1751, ff. 437-450.
134 J. M. Fernandez Hevla, ‘El ejercicio de la formula “ obedecer y no cumplir” por parte 
del Principado durante el siglo XVI,’ Boletin del Real Instituto de Estudios Asturianos 
(Oviedo), num. 157 (2001), pp. 123-150.
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calls on the 'virtue' of justice and for the emperor to 
allow him to proceed against Cobos in a ' pie it o' (suit) for 
damages against the Church; to follow the process of justice 
until a judgement is given. Until then neither Cobos nor his 
son is Adelantado, as:
I have not given consent and therefore Your Majesty 
should sequester all rents and towns until this is 
resolved. If Cobos thinks his cause is just, why does 
he not show his case to letrados? I am sure that Tavera 
would only have given the Adelantamiento for life, not 
perpetuity.
He is saying that Cazorla does not belong to a person, 
as it is an institution. Giving it to a person in perpetuity 
exceeds the limits of its faculty and power.
It is probable that Siliceo had in mind the earlier 
confiscations of Church property in 1533. Cobos had received 
the royal cedula confirming for himself and Diego the title
• 135 ■of Adelantado de Cazorla m  1535. Siliceo saw this as a 
continuation of a process of sequestration of church land. 
This letter is a reply to the emperor's wish that Sillceo 
agree to Cobos having Cazorla in perpetuity. But it is a 
puzzle why Charles did not over-rule the process of 
litigation begun by Siliceo. We know from the emperor's 
comments to his son in the 'Secret Instruction' of 6 May 
1543, written when Siliceo was still Archbishop of 
Cartagena, that Charles harboured doubts. He writes:
We know and everyone knows that although a good man he 
has not been the most suitable of men for you to study.
135 RAH, Salazar y Castro, leg. 59646, ff. 347-351.
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He has desired to please you too much; you may have 
problems with him in the future.136
Well, he was not trying to please his emperor and seems 
to have changed since becoming the Primate of all Spain. The 
tone of Siliceo's letter to Charles indicates a willingness 
to challenge Charles, but it was also a challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the royal courts. 1546 was the year of the 
Algerian expedition, and the emperor had written to Siliceo 
on his appointment to the archbishopric in February 1546, 
asking for money. Siliceo's second letter indicates his 
awareness of the emperor's need for the Church's riches and 
writes in a threatening manner, ceteris paribus:
Much damage will come to Your Majesty, because it is 
clear that the Spanish Church is rich and gives Your 
Majesty a large subsidy every year, which it could not 
if its possessions and revenues were lost; and thus I 
am obliged not to give consent to the perpetuity to 
which the Comendador Mayor aspires. Thus I continue to 
be obliged to procure that Your Majesty, together with 
His Holiness who has issued all the bulls relating to 
this perpetuity, must have them revoked. 137
Financial needs were often the basis for the emperor's 
actions and Charles had to be careful to ensure that the 
Church provided the needed funds. He seemingly had finally 
met a formidable adversary and Cobos was not at court — ill 
and shortly to die in Ubeda. The emperor's letter of 20 
March 1547 sets out his concerns in reply to Cobos's letter 
of 25 January 1547 describing his illness ('I have been on
136 'Corpus Documental de Carlos V, ed. Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, 5 vols (Salamanca, 
1975), II, p. 114.
137 BN, Ms 1751, ff. 437-450.
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the point of death several times and cannot rise from 
bed').138 Cobos's final legacy was being thwarted: his life 
from humble beginnings through a steady climb to near 
absolute power and then this devastating prospective defeat 
are the ingredients of classical tragedy. Siliceo's letter 
to Charles bluntly refused to accept a perpetual Adelantado 
for Cobos, and referred to the latter's enmity due to his 
(Siliceo's) withdrawing a merced of the staff of alguacil 
mayor (governor with civil and criminal jurisdiction) in 
Talavera:
A sum of little consequence to Cobos ... I replaced this 
position without payment, saving the 70,000 maravedies 
paid to Cobos ... It is against the law and justice to, 1 3 9
give pensions to judges.
This was an attack on Cobos's greed and lack of 
principle, portraying him as a money-grubber. It also would 
reflect Charles's stated belief in his 'Instruction' to his 
son of 4 May 1543:
To order every magistrate to administer justice 
honestly and not to allow himself to be corrupted by 
gifts ... or to accept bribes.140
Cobos had written to Charles, 4 February 1544, 
referring scathingly to Siliceo's pursuit of a cardinal's 
mitre.141 This letter by Cobos — in which he admits 'con quien 
concurren algunas vezes' (with whom I had various
138 CDCV, II, pp. 512-515, 518-526.
139 BN, Ms 1751.
140 CDCV, II, p. 93.
141 BN, Osuna Collection, Ms 10300, ff. 126-127.
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differences) — is in the Osuna collection in the Biblloteca 
Nacional and is an 18th century copy from the original. 
Caution therefore has to be used in drawing definitive 
conclusions from copies rather than original documents. The 
letter also comments on other counsellors of the emperor. 
Siliceo continues in his letter to the emperor that 'it is 
well known that Cobos has been against me for a long time.'142 
Siliceo would also know that Cobos had been active in trying 
to remove ecclesiastics from the Royal Council. He notes 
with irony the engano (deceit) practised on the Church by 
Cobos over the value offered for Cazorla of 300 ducats and 
one white horse per year:
Any alienation of Church property should improve the 
condition of the Church ... and I don't know what 
betterment accrues to Toledo in giving a perpetual 
mayorazgo to the Comendador Mayor. It is said that 300 
ducats and a white horse is a betterment; I call it 
damage to the Church as Cazorla is worth more than 
15,000 ducats in annual rent, and this only represents 
the diezmos, not including the value of vassals and 
fortresses ... Clearly this deceit is not the reason Your 
Majesty has given his consent — also a thousand horses 
of any other colour would be more useful than one white 
horse — almost any other form of perpetual feudo would 
be worth more ... If Your Majesty believes Cobos so 
worthy why does Nuestra Senora have to pay the price of 
his rewards; he has done nothing for the Church of 
Toledo.
He then warns the emperor that he is creating a servant 
who by obtaining the perpetual right to Cazorla will become 
the most powerful in the realm:
And will he be as responsive to the emperor's needs as 
Toledo in time of war? ... if he feels himself to be more 
than your senor? ... All this will encourage Cobos to ask
142 BN, Ms 1751.
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for even more and greater encomienda ... To please one, 
why harm so many. If the Church is to lose its property 
this way, who in future will give to the Church? While 
the Church is rich and powerful it gives large 
subsidies to Your Majesty, it cannot do this if it 
loses its property and rents.
Siliceo is skilfully covering all the isues to which
Charles was sensitive.
He again attacks Cobos by saying he never would have 
believed that:
Your Majesty would have so much love for the Comendador
Mayor until I saw the rigour of the letter You wrote
me. And although I have nothing against kings loving 
their inferiors and criados (servants), I think it much 
better wisdom to love in accordance with merit. Two 
other things for you to judge, which is better, so you 
can better judge the deceit. The first is that the
mercedes that Your Majesty has received from Nuestra 
Senora weigh more than all the services of the 
Comendador Mayor. The second, the mercedes of Nuestra 
Senora can never be paid as they have no price. Knowing 
that Your Majesty loves Nuestra Senora more than the 
Comendador Mayor can only be shown by deeds. If, 
although owing nothing to the Comendador Mayor you give 
him the Adel ant amiento that belongs to Nuestra Senora, 
it is clear that you continue to be deceived in your 
understanding. That you love the less-deserving more is 
due to false reasons acting to persuade Your Majesty to 
dismember the Adel ant amiento and give it in perpetuity 
to the Comendador Mayor and his successors.
Sillceo then appealed to the new pope, Paul IV, to 
annul the unjust concessions, which had been granted by Pope 
Paul III due to 'false information.' He gathered original 
escrituras, copies were made, and the apostolic notary 
verified their authenticity. A manuscript was then formed 
and the apostolic notary from the papal curia verified the 
signatures. All the relevant original documents — on 
boundary disputes, judicial powers, privileges and tax
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exemptions for populating and defending this frontier area 
from the original grant from Fernando el Santo to the 
archbisop of Toledo, Rodrigo Jimenez de Rada, and pope 
Gregory IX's acknowledgement of 1243 — were assembled from 
the towns of the Adel ant amiento and copies made and 
notarised. The purpose was to demonstrate the prerogatives 
of the archbishops of Toledo as holders of title to the 
sehorio with proofs of the exercise of jurisdictional powers
• 143over the centuries.
The pope supported him — as he was becoming concerned 
at the alienation of Church property — and issued a bull on 
18 May 1556, declaring null the concession of Cazorla by 
Tavera to Cobos and his successors, and ordering Diego de 
los Cobos to restore the "fruits' wrongly acquired.144 Siliceo 
thus confirmed his power "that all the bulls ... regarding 
this perpetuity should be revoked.' By now Cobos was dead 
(1547) and Diego de los Cobos, the Marques de Camarasa, had 
to defend his title to Cazorla. The case was passed on 
appeal to the Audiencia de Granada. But Siliceo took the 
pope's bull as sufficient and assigned Cazorla to Ruy Gomez 
de Silva, Philip II's privado — a shrewd move. Diego 
protested that the pope did not have competence over the 
king's jurisdiction and the matter had to be settled by the 
Audiencia and the Royal Council.
So the litigation continued before the Chancery of 
Granada. This became a test of secular civil law against the
143 Archivo Catedral de Toledo, Obray Fabrica, Ms 915.
144 BN, Ms 2440, ff. 14-17.
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pope's claims of universal jurisdiction through papal 
tribunals. The pope issued another bull in 1559 confirming 
his previous decision. Owing to the new archbishop of 
Toledo's — Carranza — trial by the Inquisition, the papal 
bull could not be enforced and the case did not proceed 
until his death in 1576. The Marques de Camarasa y Conde de 
Ricla (Cobos's grandson) managed to delay the Royal 
Council's decision and insisted that officials, who Toledo 
had nominated, could not be appointed to Cazorla until the 
Audiencia had pronounced. Camarasa successfully delayed a 
decision, and hence continued to receive rents and benefits, 
until archbisop Sandoval y Rojas gathered all the documents 
of proof of rights in the memorial del pleito, which is in 
Toledo's cathedral archives.
The Church was much better at documenting their case. 
The Castilian pleito had developed the need for disputants 
to submit formal proofs to support their claims and for the 
judges to consider only those proofs in rendering a 
decision. The weight of evidence finally convinced Camarasa, 
in 1604, to agree a settlement prior to an official 
judgment. Camarasa agreed to give up rights to Cazorla, its 
towns and its castles, and all fruits and emoluments for 
himself and successors. In return, the archbishop of Toledo 
agreed for him and his successors to pay to Camarasa and his 
successors a perpetual annual rent of 7,000 ducats. This 
commitment was pledged against the property of the 
Adelantamiento and its income and diezmos (tithes). Cazorla 
was thus finally restored to Toledo and the agreement
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confirmed by the pope in 1606, in return for a perpetual 
annual payment to Cobos's successors.145
So, in the end, both the emperor and Cobos lost this 
battle for Church property. Cobos's urge to pass on his 
patrimony and status by endowing his family with the most 
powerful seignorage in Spain was thwarted — initially by the 
tenaciousness of Siliceo. It was, in the phrase of the 
anthropologist Natalie Davis, 'a gift gone wrong.'146 We also 
learn something about the character of all three men. Where 
a humanist, like the Grand Chancellor, Gattinara, could not 
influence Charles by reason and argument, the primate of 
Toledo could browbeat him by appealing to Nuestra Senora and 
the power of his faith. Charles's letters and famous 
'Instructions' also indicate that he did not think in terms 
that made him susceptible to humanist ideas of reform. 
Charles was profoundly a man of 'faith' and the intellectual 
currents of humanism and 'the new learning' in the end did 
not touch him. Although he did accept Erasmus's tenet of 
'power tempered by natural justice,' but perhaps even here 
only when challenged by the revolt of the comuneros, which 
will be discussed in Chapter Four.
145 RAH, Salazar y Castro, f. 59.650.
146 Natalie Davis, The Gift in Sixteenth-Century France (Oxford, 2000), p. 67.
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Chapter Three 
Securing Power and its Consolidation.
In analysing the texts of early manuscripts of Cobos 
and his circle one must try to distinguish the underlying 
motivation from mere rhetoric. There is much language of 
friendship, loyalty, and dependence but this involved subtle 
shades of meaning and motivations may have been different; 
language may not have expressed meaning or thoughts, but 
merely socio-political convention. But all were bound by the 
common link — the social network of patronage. The deudo 
(mutual obligation) traditions of the nobility bound patrons 
and clients together over generations.147 Cobos used this 
tradition in creating his own network. His political skills 
were such that he rarely reveals himself. He made no 
personal statements on his ideology or political strategy, 
so his ideals and political practice need to be tested by 
the documentary fragments and perhaps by the legacy of his 
buildings. His emperor had a 'theological mission to protect 
the Church' but his actions were often pragmatic, being 
driven by the overarching need to preserve and expand the 
Habsburg dynasty — his patrimony.148 In choosing Cobos as his 
servant, Charles V had selected a practical man, but one who
147 J. M. Millan, ‘Las elites de poder en el reinado de Carlos V,’Hispania (Madrid), 48, pp. 
103-167; H. G. Koenigsberger, ‘Patronage and bribery during the reign o f Charles V ,’ 
Standen en Landen 22, (1961), pp. 165-175.
148 W. Blockmans, ‘Charles V ’s Ideals, Pragmatism and Strategy: an impossibile mission,’ 
in Carlos V y la quiebra del humanismo politico en Europa (1530-1558), ed. J. M. Millan, 
6 vols (Madrid, 2000), II, p. 179.
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also may have been influenced by religious ideas of moral 
utopia in the after-life.
Cobos's Good Works
f ter carefully interrogating as much evidence as 
possible, the thesis concludes that Cobos was nothing less 
than the principal architect of Castile's government during 
his years working for the emperor: no-one was more powerful 
than Cobos in the areas of his competence. In Cobos's 
provision for immortality, perhaps his legacy, we may get a 
better sense of his aspirations, following his ascent to 
power as described in the previous chapter. Before analysing 
how he secured and consolidated power — how he handled the 
competition and used that power — the thesis will examine 
the care he took in providing for 'post-mortem' 'good 
works.' This pact with immortality would clear the way for 
his actions in this life. The Dlalogos de la preparacion de 
la muerte by Bishop Pedro de Navarra, published in c.1560 
after Cobos's death, is a caricature of Cobos's 
'preparations' and his life of 'greed and ambition,' by one 
of Cobos's few declared enemies.149 Such 'dialogues' were 
common and written in Erasmian style, such as the Dialogo de 
los grados de perfeccion que ha de . tener el cortesano 
eclesiastlco que pretende ser cardenal (Dialogue of the 
levels of perfection that an ecclesiastical courtier must 
attain to become a cardinal).150 A painting by Sebastian de
149 BN, Pedro de Navarra, 'Dialogo de la preparacion de la muerte,' 1560.
150 El dialogo en el Renacimiento espahol (Madrid, 1988), p. 225.
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Piombo (1485-1547) in the Prado shows the triumph of Christ 
over death. An anonymous script is written in one corner 
saying: 'a gift to Cobos: a devotional painting we know he
will like.' Cobos commissioned an enormous sculpture of 
Christ from Piombo but this has not survived. Piombo also 
had a connection to Pope Clement VII. He sealed the papal 
documents and, therefore, perhaps Cobos had other reasons to 
forge this connection. Power over the papacy was important 
to Cobos because of his designs on Cazorla, which was 
discussed in the previous chapter. His negotiations with 
Pope Clement VII will be discussed in Chapter Four.
The evidence of Cobos's concern for immortality is 
available through manuscripts of contracts between him and 
his family, architects and friends, and the formidable array 
of buildings he had commissioned whose architecture provides 
"concrete' evidence of his aspirations. He saw himself doing 
honour to God in the most ostensible possible way. In this 
he was acting like kings in previous centuries — England's 
Henry VI in the mid-f ifteenth century had begun work on 
King's College Chapel Cambridge, as an architect for 
posterity memorialising himself in glass and stone. Cobos's 
testament also refers to some of these contracts and the 
need for completion according to his wishes.151 Again, there 
may have been a distinction between the ' good works' 
themselves and the motives, which inspired them. However, 
this evidence also provides some insight into the thought
151 Francisco de los Cobos, 'Testamento de Francisco de los Cobos,' 1547, Seville, Archivo 
Ducal de Medinaceli, Sabiote, leg. 1, pieza 17.
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and mentality of the age: an age where intense visual
displays were seen as moral as well as aesthetic virtues.
Ubeda, his native town, where he was born and died, is 
a good place to examine these issues. Among the most 
important buildings are the Hospital de Santiago, his family 
home the Palacio Francisco de los Cobos — a severe Castilian 
pre-Renaissance building — and the Sacra Capilla de El 
Salvador. The buildings themselves may well reveal, in part 
through their iconography, something of his religious 
thoughts. The saints and apostles of Spanish Catholicism are 
nowhere to be found — instead the emphasis is on classical 
imagery. El Salvador is pure Renaissance and modelled on 
Machuco's masterpiece, the cathedral in Granada, Spain's 
only Renaissance cathedral.
The contracts for the construction of these buildings, 
found in the notarial archives of Ubeda, show the detail of 
Cobos's planning for their completion and endowment after 
his death. El Salvador represented Cobos's vision and its 
completion was essential to defining himself. The contracts 
with Andres de Vandelvira, the architect, include items such 
as ... 'condiciones para realizar el pulpito de la iglesia de 
El Salvador' (design and form to complete the pulpit), 
commitments that the tracery in the sacristy and around the 
principal doors would all conform to that agreed in the
■ ■ 152original drawings by Dean Ortega. Other manuscripts m  the 
notarial archives of Ubeda — of particular interest in the
152 rArchivo Historico de Ubeda, Andres de Vandelvira, ’Contratos para la Iglesia de El 
Salvador,’1536.
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detail of the arrangements for the completion of this 
Renaissance masterpiece — include the Obra Pia del Dean 
which includes the Dean, Fernando Ortega's Testamento, his 
'Memoria inventario de los bienes de la iglesia de El 
Salvador' (inventory of the furnishing of El Salvador) and 
his 'Estatutos del Hospital de Santiago': all works paid for
153by Cobos and executed by Ortega, his faithful servant. The 
'Visita de moribus de dona Maria de Mendoza, 1568,' also 
indicates attention to the post-mortem wishes of her husband 
with a requirement for regular inspection of the furnishings 
and fabric of El Salvador.154 The 'Estatutos de la Sacra 
Capilla de El Salvador,' drawn up in 1544, three years 
before Cobos's death, show, among other items, provisions 
for chaplains, which include the necessity of pruebas de 
limpieza (proofs of bloodline).155
El Salvador is essentially a funerary pantheon for 
Cobos and his wife, Maria. The imagery is Erasmist, pure 
Renaissance humanism. There are no saints or scholastic 
pairings of scenes from the Old and New Testaments. 
Classical Greek images dominate the interior of the chapel. 
Perhaps the imagery had to conform to new imperatives of 
Erasmian thinking: but this was already being reassessed in 
a more orthodox Spain. Huizinga writes that Erasmus 
internalised his religious passions and did not require
153 Ibid. Dean Ortega, 'Estatutos del Hospital de Santiago. Obra Pia del Dean, libro 995,' 
1544.
154 Ibid. Dean Ortega, 'Visita de moribus de dona Maria de Mendoza. Obra Pia del Dean,' 
1568.
155 RAH, Ms 198, Francisco de los Cobos, Estatutos de la Sacra Capilla de El Salvador 
1544, Salazar y Castro.
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external images. Its architect, Vandelvira, and sculptor, 
Jamete, chose motifs mixing pagan (classical) with religious 
mysteries: the transfiguration of Christ on the external
main fagade and the classical sibyls and labours of Hercules 
inside the magnificent sacristy form a dramatic narrative 
with a sequence of scenes outlining Greek legends. They 
reflect the prevailing Renaissance humanism of the time and, 
given Cobos's attention to detail, perhaps represent his 
view of the world, although probably in partnership with 
Dean Ortega. Depicting classical figures was also a way to 
show intellectual interest, a refined aesthetic sense, and 
wealth and status. It somehow identified the patron with the 
unprecedented contributions to thought, literature and fine 
arts by Periclean Greece.
Cobos also ensured that the chapel was embellished with 
heraldic devices as the emblem of his power and 'perpetual 
dynasty.' Cobos's family is depicted, high up on the ceiling 
sculpted by Jamete, with the Mendozas (Maria's family), 
represented by the counts of Ribadavia, on their left. What 
is clear is that Cobos wished his mortal remains to rest in 
Ubeda within his 'good work' of El Salvador, to await 
resurrection at the end of time or escape from purgatory — 
it was his act . of piety. Thus the monument had to be 
enduring. Curiously, the slab covering his grave before the 
high altar does not have his name, which is everywhere else 
in the chapel, including about forty Cobos family escudo 
(coat-of-arms). Dean Ortega was Cobos's instrument, a 
humanist in the Erasmian mould. Erasmus's Enchiridion was
widely read in Spain and El Salvador shows the resting place 
of a Christian knight in the age of humanism, before the 
Counter-Reformation. Classical and Hebrew motifs are 
everywhere within, but the greatest icon is the 
Transfiguration of Christ over the main entrance, showing 
the supremacy of the New Testament. Does this make Cobos an 
'Erasmist,' in the sense of a classical humanist? This idea 
has been discussed with the distinguished art historian, 
Joaquin Montes Bardo, who elaborates on the theme in his 
book on El Salvador.156 Many of Cobos/s friends were Erasmist, 
but there is no evidence to support this theory other than 
the Renaissance buildings he commissioned. At least he was 
more aware of cultural and religious conflicts than Keniston 
surmises.
Cobos also ensured that the iconography of power was 
carved on many of Ubeda's buildings in the form of his 
family escudo. He had learned the importance of symbolism 
from Charles V, who had extensively developed the visual 
imagery of power. His nephew, Juan Vazquez de Molina, 
continued the family symbolism by having his own palace (now 
the Ayuntamiento) also designed by Vandelvira and ensuring 
that Cobos's escudo (coat-of-arms) alternated with his own, 
representing the marital link of both families — Cobos's 
brother having taken the Vazquez de Molina name from his 
wife. This was common practice in Castile, perhaps 
signifying the greater importance of the Vazquez de Molina
156 Joaquin Montes Bardo, La Sacra Capilla de El Salvador: Arte, Mentalidad, y  Culto 
(Ubeda, 2002).
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name in Ubeda prior to Cobos. The extensive imagery in El 
Salvador does not necessarily show that Cobos was a 
"Pelagian, ' believing that man was responsible for his own 
salvation by his efforts — "good works" — in life, separate 
from turning from chaos by receiving Divine Grace. After 
all, through his influence on the papacy, he acquired all 
the "indulgences" for himself, family and friends that he
157needed to purchase salvation. But Cobos may, in this, 
simply have been hedging his bets — always a practical man — 
by purchasing salvation from purgatory by "good works," 
completed after death. The getting and keeping of power 
certainly showed a man who believed in this world.
Framework of Power
Cobos's motives for each action were not isolated events, 
but part of a connected whole and must be understood in that 
context. His rise to power through the institutions, as has 
been explained in the previous chapter, had to be 
consolidated and he faced competition from more senior 
advisors to the emperor. I. A. A. Thompson has described 
"The Institutional Background to the Rise of the Minister-
158 •Favourite." He considered four "interrelated features" that 
defined the "favourite" in the early 17th century, including 
their political and institutional functions. However, 
neither Charles nor his son Philip delivered themselves into
157 BN, Archivo Osuna, Mss 8446 & 8447, leg. 4039, 1 & 2, Breve expedido por S. S. El 
Papa Clemente VII a Don Francisco de los Cobos, 1530.
158 I. A. A. Thompson, The Institutional Background to the Rise of the Minister-Favourite,1 
in The World o f the Favourite, ed. J. H. Elliott (New Haven, 1999).
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the hands of a ' favourite.' There was always a sense of a 
balance of power in the struggle between factions. Indeed 
Charles V in his 'Secret Instruction' to Philip, on 6 May 
1543, clearly warns his son not to delegate too much 
authority to one person, writing, 'conduct your business 
with many advisors'159 There is some evidence about Cobos' s 
role in drafting some of Charles ' s '  Instructions' to the 
various regents before he left on campaign.160 Whether they 
were policy announcements or 'dynastic commands' they 
provide us with an insight into Charles's and Cobos's policy 
framework. Cobos's policy successes, at this stage in his 
rise, are mainly measured by his attainment and 
consolidation of power, not by the furtherance of the 
interests of the realm. Thus it was about his winning out 
over rivals. To this extent perhaps his focus was on process 
rather than policy substance.
Nevertheless, it is useful to compare and contrast 
Cobos's status with Thompson's defining characteristics of 
'minister favourites.' First, they operated in the council 
and court, with power and patronage, and were predominant 
but not monopolists in both areas. Second, they operated 
independently of established institutional channels, often 
without formal secretarial status, diverting, through
159 Corpus Documental de Carlos V, ed. by Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, 5 vols (Salamanca, 
1975), II, pp. 108-109.
160 BN, Ms 10300, Francisco de los Cobos, copia de una carta que Francisco de los Cobos, 
grandemente estimado del senor emperador Carlos V y su secretario de estado, escribio a 
S. M. Cesarea, respondiendo a otra que tube de dicho senor emperador, 1543. (Copy o f a 
letter from Cobos, greatly valued by his lord emperor Charles V, and his secretary of state, 
written to H. M. Caesar, replying to another he had from said lord emperor).
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themselves, the normal flow of access and information to the 
king. Third, they were at the centre of a national network 
of clientage, not restricted to court. Fourth, they were 
political, using influence for a political rather than for a 
private purpose. They were promoting policy, such as reforms 
or fiscal arrangements designed to reinforce the authority 
of the state. Certainly Cobos was active in many councils 
and at court, but he did not have a monopoly of power or 
patronage. He shared or continuously competed for influence 
with other faction leaders or close advisors to Charles V, 
such as Gattinara, the Grand Chancellor, Cardinal Tavera, 
President of the Royal Council and occasional regent, and of 
course the Duke of Alba — all powerful in military matters.
Curiously, he had an apparently amicable non­
competitive relationship with Nicholas Perrinot, the Marquis 
of Granvelle, who was the emperor's confidant on foreign 
policy after the death of Gattinara in 1530. Granvelle's 
Spanish was not fluent and he did not know the intricacies 
of Castilian administration needed for a secretarlo; in this 
sense he could never be a threat to Cobos. But together they 
shared the emperor's confidence and managed much of his 
business — Cobos for Spain and the Mediterranean, and 
Granvelle for Flanders and Germany. Charles was always
conscious of the need to divide his favours.
Cobos was not a privado in the sense of Alvaro de la
Luna in the 15th century or Conde-Duque Olivares and Lerma in
the early 17th century. He could not pretend to alienate
royal authority; his counsel was valued by the emperor but
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limited by the terms which Charles set. His impact on policy 
therefore was totally dependant on his maintaining the 
confidence of the emperor. His successes can therefore be 
inferred from the evidence of that confidence. As for 
Thompson's second criterion, Cobos did not become secretary 
of state until October 1529.161
The Quitaciones de Corte in the royal archives at 
Simancas is a good record of dates of titles and positions 
granted by Charles. Prior to this date he could, therefore, 
to some extent operate independently of a particular 
function, enjoying the ambiguity and advising Charles V on a 
broad range of subjects, as secretary on several important 
councils. He understood that, 'the key to permanent power 
lay not in holding office oneself but in managing the 
system. This required manipulation of institutions and 
networks.'162 Cobos developed his network of secretaries 
primarily through relatives — the Ubeda secretaries — and 
friends with reciprocal obligations. His nephew, Vazquez de 
Molina, was of particular importance and kept Cobos informed 
when he travelled with the emperor. Cobos manipulated to the 
advantage of the Crown and himself a system of social 
relationships connected by family, and personal loyalties. 
This extended from court to the towns of Castile and 
governors of provinces as well as various ambassadorial 
positions throughout the empire. This was helped by a strong
161 Francisco de los Cobos, AGS, Quitaciones de Corte, leg. 16, 1529.
162 F. Fernandez-Armesto, Amerigo: The man who gave his name to America (New York, 
2007), p. 25.
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sense in society of the hierarchy and majesty of authority: 
the 'firm expectation of being obeyed. '163 Cobos needed the 
help of those who possessed power and influence of their 
own: nobles, princes of the Church, and lay or
ecclesiastical groups like the Military Orders. That is 
why, on his ascent to power, he had striven to become part 
of the establishment. His position at court was also at the 
centre of 'gift-giving' that enabled him to develop a 
network of reciprocal obligation across his clientage.
The fourth characteristic suggested by Thompson: using 
influence for public policy rather than private purpose does 
not fit Cobos because he operated in both areas. Enrichment 
of self, family and friends was clearly his primary 
motivation, recognised and accepted by Charles V — he was 
venal, but limited his venality 'creo que no toma el cosa de 
importancia; basta que unos presentes pequehos que hacen a 
su mujer le infamen. Yo le he avisado dello, ' said the 
emperor in his 1543 'Instruction' to his son (I believe he 
takes nothing of importance; some small presents that his 
wife makes him take, which affects his reputation. I have 
warned him of this).164 His acceptance of 'gifts' does not 
seem to have conflicted with the emperor's needs. It was 
generally accepted in the social and financial system of the 
time that an official would naturally make the most of the 
financial and social opportunities that the possession of
1 H. G. Koenigsberger, 'Patronage and bribery during the reign of Charles V,' Standen en 
Landen 22 (1961) p. 166. 
w  CDCV, II, p. 110.
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pffice offered him. But the emperor, with the power of 
gracia, merced y patronazgo (grace, privilege and 
patronage), kept close personal control over patronage, 
because on this depended the loyalty and cooperation of his 
servants at court and in council. For example, his governor 
of the Low Countries, his aunt Margaret of Austria, vainly 
protested that she could not govern without controlling 
patronage. Public honour and privilege depended on mercedes 
from the prince. By attaching themselves to Cobos his
followers expected advancement and profit, which derived 
from their master's closeness to the emperor.
Cobos's genius was in refining the top-down
relationships through an extensive pyramidal system in which 
power flowed from the top. He did this by granting 
discretionary power to the people immediately around him; 
they in turn granted discretionary power to much larger
numbers directly below them. This process expanded as it 
worked its way down to the bottom of the pyramid. The system 
held together because each official was beholden to the
person directly above him. But everyone knew that Cobos was 
the patron. That was the source of his political power and 
that was how Cobos governed. Patronage was an essential part 
of such a pyramidal power structure based on discretion. He 
also ensured that his supporters were well-positioned around 
the various regents when Charles left the country. This was 
particularly the case with the empress's court, where 
Cobos's nephew Vazquez de Molina held sway. The regents were 
therefore cut-off from real power. Tavera seems to have been
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aware of this and, when acting as President of the Council, 
used the opportunity to place his own people in positions of 
power.
Administrative Machinery and the Framework of Policy
The means by which Cobos made himself indispensable to 
Charles had already been apparent from the outset when he 
first joined the court at Ghent in 1516. He accompanied 
Charles when the court moved to Spain in 1517. Pedro Mexia, 
the chronicler, referring to Charles's followers, writes
'por su secretario venia Francisco de los Cobos, que despues
fue gran privado suyo y tuvo la principal mano en la
governacion' (for his secretary came Cobos, who was later 
his great favourite, and was the main hand in government).165 
But the evidence I have presented disputes the definition of 
Cobos's role as a privado, yet it is interesting that a 
chronicler of the time would so describe him. He had, 
through early apprenticeship as an escribano with Hernando 
Zafra, secretary of Castile for King Fernando, and later 
with Lope Conchillos, acquired a detailed knowledge of the 
form and order of documents required to administer Castile.
Charles liked to deal directly with the secretaries,
circumventing the Royal Council, which was a cause of 
conflict with Gattinara and later with Cardinal Tavera as 
president of the Royal Council. This maintained his personal 
authority and freedom from restrictions of powerful members 
of the Royal Council. Yet it did have the consequence of
165 BN, Ms 1926, Pedro Mexia, 'Historia del Emperador Carlos V'.
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promoting the influence on policy of secretaries such as 
Cobos. Charles believed that secretaries were more his 
hechuras (henchmen) — more compliant to his will. Cobos 
would, therefore, prepare the Royal Council's agenda and 
summaries of decisions for the emperor to agree or 
occasionally make marginal comments. As Cobos was secretary 
to most of the departments of state he was eventually able 
to control policy over a large area. Gattinara had 
complained about 'secretaries' acting beyond their 
authority, but was ignored by Charles. Gattinara had been 
excluded from the new Council of Finance during the reforms 
of 1523. And thus began the conflict for power between Cobos 
and Gattinara.
On the death of Chievres, Grand Chancellor and patron 
to Cobos, Gattinara became Grand Chancellor as recommended 
by Charles's aunt, Margaret of Austria, whom he had served 
in Burgundian Franche-Comte. Gattinara tried to reorganise 
the Council of State in order to broaden the emperor's pool 
of advice by bringing in men of different skills and 
experience. Gattinara, as head of the Council of State, 
controlled the flow of paper, content and agenda, to the 
emperor. He also held the royal seals while travelling with 
Charles. However, from 1518 Cobos authenticated most 
documents relating to Castile.
Cobos knew how to use form to create substance: the
form of the royal documents was the process of controlling 
the levers of power and the machinery of state. Analysis of 
the diplomatics of some of the documents in the Simancas
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archive and the Archivo Municipal de Valladolid shows the 
importance of the different types and forms of presenting 
documents and illustrates the role of functionaries such as 
Cobos in their issue and validation.
Authentication of documents, the refrendata, was 
critical for the administration: it gave greater legal
certainty and legitimacy to their validity — dando fe de el. 
Without the relevant signatures the papers and their 
dispositions were ineffective. Each royal cedula or carta de 
privilegio had to follow a distinct form of invocacion 
(calling on the unity of the Trinity, an all-powerful God 
and the apostles), intitulacion (the monarch's titles and 
dominions, references to divine rights and command to 
further establish the monarch's legitimacy, including 
apostolic authority) and notificacion. This was just a 
preamble before the actual text, and a clause indicating 
either a petition or a disposition. Finally, came the 
relevant rubrics of secretaries and/or notaries who 
authenticated the document. This could sometimes amount to 
several columns of signatures all identified by their 
specific function, and all required to authenticate the 
document. This process is illustrated in a treatise by a 
Secretary of State for War, Alonso Carnero. It is found in 
manuscript 10932, folios 182-224 in the Biblioteca Nacional: 
el formulario de lo que debe observar un Secretario que lo 
fuere de Estado para formar las consultas y despachos, por 
Don Alonso Carnero (the procedure which a Secretary of State 
must observe for his advice and office). These formulas pre-
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dated the Catholic Kings and to some extent continued into 
General Franco's times — he also called upon divine 
authority. Spain is to this day enamoured with documents. 
Justificantes, registration and endorsements are required 
for many transactions, and all requisitos must be fulfilled, 
as with a carta de privilegio or cedula real of Cobos's
times.
The Spanish historian, Escudero, has written 
extensively on the secretaries.166 Another aspect of 
documentation was the requirement to verify the amount of 
payment and the basis for granting mercedes y privilegios 
prior to signature, 'que tome razon d'esta' (that
1 cn
authenticates). Thus above the signature the document would 
say, tomada razon. Not only had all the functionaries to
correctly sign the documents; without the tomador razon it 
would not be valid. The carta de privilegio would then be 
registered in books of account and finally lead seals 
attached. These seals were kept in the audiencias of
Valladolid and Granada, and the beneficiary had to take the 
documents there for the attachment of the seals. The 
beneficiary would finally receive his document of merced, as 
his justificante, which he had to retain carefully in case 
of future changes in his title.
In fact, Cobos was appointed to the office of tomar 
razon de las mercedes by a royal cedula in 1516, setting out
166 J. A. Escudero, Los secretarios del estado y  del despacho (Madrid, 1969).
167 Ibid., ‘Notas sobre los secretarios de estado entre los siglos XV-XIX,’ Hispania 
(Madrid) 128 (1974), pp. 609-625.
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the appointment and salary, and signed by Cisneros, 'por 
mandado de la Reyna e del Rey su hijo Nuestros Senores, el 
governador en su nombre' (by order of the queen and her son
1 / 'O
the king, the ruler in her name). The diplomatics 
illustrate the care taken to place the queen's title first. 
Subsequent to Charles's elevation to emperor the order 
changed. The Contador Mayor had to record the merced and 
arrange for payment. As Cobos also signed many of these 
papers this was no check on his powers. He also was named a 
Contador Mayor and thus had control of the entire process. 
Each office, of course, carried a stipend and Cobos 
voraciously accumulated such posts on his road to great 
wealth. He could also add to his fees by appointing deputies 
and sharing the annual salary, as he did for the carta de 
poder de Cobos nombrando lugarteniente de Contador Mayor 
Francisco de Almaguer, con fecha 10 December de 1543 (power 
of attorney naming Almaguer as deputy controller, dated 10 
December 1543). 169
Prior to the creation of this office, the king had to 
ask for an extract from the official books. Charles 
preferred to rely on his trust in his tomador, Cobos, to 
confirm the correctness of the asiento (contract of 
privilege). The carta de privilegio would assign specific 
royal revenues, such as alcabalas (transactional taxes) from 
a specific royal town, to meet payment against a juro — a 
fixed interest bond assigned on royal revenues. When
168 AGS, QC, leg. 16, Francisco de los Cobos.
169 AGS, QC, leg. 15, Francisco de los Cobos.
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discussing Cobos and financing, in Chapters Four and Five, 
the importance of royal juros will be developed. The 
Quitaciones de Corte y Mercedes y Privilegios at Simancas is 
a rich source of these documents, bearing Cobos's 
signatures. He writes por mandado de Su Majestad to the 
Contador Mayor (i.e. himself), to make payment to named 
individuals. The collection in Simancas of such documents 
gives an insight into the bureaucratic workings of Castile 
at this time.
When Charles first arrived in Spain, the Cortes of 1518 
decided that ' si en algun tiempo diese Dios salud a la 
Reina, D. Carlos desistiria de la gobernacion y gobernaria 
sola Dna Juana y en que todas las cartas y despachos reales 
que viviendo la Reina se pusiese primera el nombre Doha 
Juana y despues el de D. Carlos' (if God grants good health 
to the queen, Don Carlos will no longer govern and only Doha 
Juana will govern and all royal despatches and letters will
• 170put her name first and afterwards that of Don Carlos). It 
was not until he was declared emperor in 1519 that it was 
agreed that his name would precede Doha Juana. Thus it is 
not surprising that, to ensure his power and legitimacy, he 
imported his own people from Flanders and sought to avoid 
or, at least, to control meetings of the Cortes through his 
loyal councillors, such as Cobos. If a letter was written in 
the emperor's hand the secretary could not authenticate such 
letters, but this was rare. After the secretary's
170 Ibid., leg. 37.
110
authentication, the royal seal had to be added to give 
absolute validity to the instrument.
Gattinara as Grand Chancellor controlled . these seals, 
but delegated their use to the secretaries, particularly 
when he was travelling. Cobos was able to avoid the seals by 
developing his own unique style of rubric and he would 
refrendar the emperor's correspondence when travelling with 
him. The rubrics were a highly individualised flourish at 
the end of his signature and were a legal requirement 
similar to a seal or official stamp. Cobos's mastery of the 
documentation, unique to Castile, made him essential to 
Charles. Gattinara dealt with grand strategy, but that was 
Charles's role, and Gattinara's flurry of memoranda on 
policy was largely ignored. Cobos's power came through 
controlling the agenda of items for the emperor, by 
summarising issues and suggesting responses. Thus people 
knew that to reach Charles it was expedient to go through 
Cobos, or at least copy him on their correspondence.
Secretarios de Estado carried out their functions in 
council, as all could not travel with the emperor. This may 
be one reason why Cobos delayed taking up this position. It 
was more important for him to be with the emperor. If a 
Secretario de Estado accompanied Charles V, a substitute 
would be appointed to the council. After 1530 Cobos was able 
to alternate with his nephew Juan Vazquez de Molina. He had 
to choose his substitute carefully and avoid ambitious new 
men accompanying the emperor. Juan Aleman as Secretary of
I l l
State, travelling with the emperor and serving under 
Gattinara, was a threat in this regard.
By 1522 Cobos was secretary to most of the ministries 
of state. He became Secretario de las Indias in 1522, on the 
death of Conchillos, and Secretario del Hacienda in 1523, 
thus getting closer to controlling the machinery of 
government. As we saw, he was issuing refrendas of cedulas 
reales. When travelling with the emperor, which he 
increasingly did from 1520 to 1522, he would delegate the 
refrendata to Juan de Samano and his nephew Juan Vazquez de 
Molina. He had to be sure of those he left in charge, hence 
many came to be called 'the Ubeda secretaries.'
The thesis will not research the detail of the conflict 
with Gattinara because this has been thoroughly covered by 
both Keniston and John Headley.171 The conflict developed from 
1521 — perhaps generated by Gattinara's memoria of 1521
advising the emperor on reorganising government by spreading 
power over several secretaries. By this time Cobos had 
placed his 'clients' in many of the key administrative 
posts. It was a standard putsch to control the machinery of 
government at every level and to ensure that policy met his 
and the emperor's agendas. For Charles the administration of 
Castile, as the empire's main source of wealth, was more 
important even than the grand strategy of imperial reform
171 Hayward Keniston, Francisco de los Cobos, Secretary to Charles V (Pittsburgh, 1958), 
pp. 99-103; John M. Headley, The Emperor and his Chancellor: A Study o f  the Imperial 
Chancellery under Gattinara (Cambridge, 1989).
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suggested by Gattinara. In this, his need for Cobos was 
greater and Gattinara had overplayed his hand. Charles's 
lack of support for Gattinara was. probably also influenced 
by his 'balance of power' tactics.
Gattinara was in charge of foreign policy and the 
affairs of Aragon and Italy, but increasingly excluded from 
the more important affairs of Castile. Cobos combined the 
role of personal secretary to the emperor with his positions 
as secretary in most of the main ministries, thus 
maintaining his guiding hand on the pulse of power. Salinas, 
Charles's brother's ambassador, wrote in 1523
Cobos tiene todo el cargo del Estado de Castilla .. 
estar muy en la gracia de S. M. y todas las cosas de 
estos reinos se despachan por su mano (Cobos is 
completely in charge in Castile, he is very much in the 
emperor's favour, and everything in these kingdoms
. 172passes through his hands).
Cobos's position was strengthened by his support of 
Charles during the comuneros revolt. The Biblioteca 
Nacional, manuscript 1751, 8 October 1522, lists the
comuneros convicted and those pardoned: 'el dicho perdon
ante el Secretario Francisco de los Cobos' (said pardon 
confirmed before Cobos). The subsequent Hispanicisation of 
the consejos and the regional centres of power enabled him 
to place his people in key positions.
In fact, Charles's relationship with the alta nobleza 
was conditioned by the trauma of the comuneros revolt, and
172 Rodriguez-Villa, A., ed., Martin de Salinas, embajador del infante Don Fernando 
(1522-1539) al emperador Carlos V y su corte, segun sus cartas (Madrid, 1903), p. 210.
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worries about intrigues in his brother's court. He needed 
their help but did not fully trust them. Thus he employed 
them in the casas reales or they represented him in various 
territories, or retired to their sehorlos. This gave 
opportunities for hidalgos like Cobos.
The major post that Cobos did not yet hold was 
Secretario del Estador a post to which he did not attach 
great value as it would have limited his ability to travel 
with the emperor. Juan Aleman, a protege of Gattinara, held 
this position under Gattinara, who was President of the 
Council. And thus it would serve Cobos's interests if he 
could break the link between Aleman and Gattinara. Some 
sources indicate that Aleman was also trying to discredit 
Gattinara with the emperor by spreading rumours that he had 
papal pretensions. However, it was not until 1528 that 
Aleman was accused of interfering with documents to change 
their meaning for his own profit, as well as taking bribes 
from Francis I. However, the former charge was more serious 
in a world where documentary form was often more important 
than bribery by a foreign power. Aleman was banned from 
court, and some stigma attached to Gattinara, his patron.
Cobos became Secretario de Estado in 1529. Gattinara 
died in 1530 before Charles V's coronation in Bologna. The 
post of Grand Chancellor was not filled. This made the 
position of Secretario de Estado more important. A 
chronicler of the time, Lopez de Gomara, in his Anales, 
stated that Cobos was responsible for Aleman's fall, but no
114
• i n ' l
manuscript evidence could be found to substantiate this. 
Although Cobos was the main beneficiary, a more likely 
interpretation is that it was the result of a combination of 
Gattinara and his intimates reacting to Aleman's betrayal of 
their interests. The Biblioteca Nacional manuscript 
collection has several letters from Aleman to Cobos 
requesting his intercession with the emperor to allow him to 
return to court, which may show his lack of suspicion of 
Cobos.174 Keniston writes that 'with the disappearance of 
Aleman, Cobos is left as the only secretary who enjoyed the
• 175confidence of the king.' This is perhaps an exaggeration, 
and Charles always kept a 'balance of power' among his 
servants. It does, however, signal Cobos's arrival at the 
peak of his influence.
Another possible explanation for Cobos's late arrival 
to the position of Secretario del Estado was that the 
function of this job was carried out in a committee, or 
consejo, and this would have restricted Cobos's ability to 
be with his emperor on his travels. When he became 
Secretario del Estado his solution to this dilemma was to 
travel, to be close to the emperor, and have his hechuras, 
or clan members refrendar state documents. From the 
signatures of various manuscripts in Simancas one can see a 
pattern of Cobos travelling with the emperor while his 
nephew, Juan Vazquez de Molina — part of the Ubeda group and
173 BN, Ms 1751, ff. 1-53, Anales del Emperador Carlos V.
174 BN, Ms 1778, ff. 172-173, Juan Aleman, A1 muy magmfico comendador mayor de 
Leon, 1529.
175 Keniston, p. 114.
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also personal secretary to the empress — remained behind in 
consejOf until Vazquez's appointment as Secretario de Guerra 
in 1533. An example of this was Charles issuing a cedula, on 
8 March 1529, to his council and to Isabel his regent, 'que 
durante el tiempo que estuviese ausente de los reinos 
Francisco de los Cobos, en los asuntos que este entendia le 
sustituya Juan Vazquez de Molina' (during the time that 
Cobos was absent from the kingdoms he will be substituted in
i nr
his area of competence by Juan Vazquez de Molina) . When 
Cobos stayed behind in consejo Juan Vazquez travelled with 
the emperor. Ambitious men wanted to be with the emperor, so 
Cobos had to control this carefully. When, after Cobos died 
and Eraso succeeded him, Eraso travelled with the emperor.
From 1529 to 1536 Cobos accompanied Charles V and was 
at the peak of his influence but, as the consejos had to 
stay behind to govern and carry out Charles's commands, it 
was essential for Cobos to have his chosen men in place. By 
1530 he had placed his hechuras, and was confident enough to 
travel. He attended the emperor's coronation by Pope Clement 
VII — Giulio de Medici — in Bologna and managed his 
correspondence from there. He also had Clement VII issue a 
bull from Bologna, dated January 8 1530, granting Cobos and 
wife, family and a long list of friends 'indultos, gracias y 
privilegios,' as previously cited. There is a portrait of 
Pope Clement VII (a Medici) by Sebastian del Piombo in the 
Getty Museum, ironically positioned close to that of Cobos.
176 AGS, QC, leg. 30,1529.
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The Medicis became important allies of the . emperor and 
Cobos. This will be revisited in Chapter Four.
Cobos's elevation attracted the admiration of Garcia de 
Loaysa, the emperor's confessor. Letters from Loaysa, 1530- 
31, from Rome are included in the Coleccion de Documentos, 
CODOIN, XIV, in the Biblioteca Nacional. An example is his 
letter to the emperor, 6 July 1530:
Siempre fui en que el secretario Cobos era el cofre de 
vuestra honor y de vuestros secretos ... que sabia 
cumplir vuestras negligencias ... y tiene una prudencia 
de molde maravillosa ... Sienda esto verdad, digo Senor 
que mi voto es que V.M. sea el Gran Chanciller el 
efecto de todos vuestros negocios vayan por el consejo 
y manos de Cobos (I always believed that Cobos was the 
jewel-case of your honour and your secrets, that he 
knew how to pick up after you, and is wonderfully 
prudent, ... therefore my view is that you should be your 
own Grand Chancellor and alT your business might go
177through the council and Cobos).
In fact the prudence of Cobos was a widely-held view, 
but it is also interesting that the confessor saw no need 
for a Grand Chancellor. Garcia Loaysa, as bishop of 
Siguenza, was later sent as ambassador to the papacy and 
conducted much correspondence with Cobos, full of rhetoric 
and phrases of respect and admiration. A letter, dated Rome 
30 November 1531, from Loaysa conveys the pope's admiration 
as well. Loaysa continually seeks to return to court, but
• 178 • •Cobos found him more useful in Rome. Cobos's ability to 
quickly deliver mercedes within the emperor's gift was noted 
by Venetian ambassadors and by Salinas, the ambassador at
177 Coleccion de Documentos Ineditos para la Historia de Espana, 112 vols (Madrid, 
1842-1895) XIV.
178 BN, Ms 1778, Cardenal de Siguenza Garcia Loaysa, A1 muy senor comendador mayor 
de Leon del consejo supremo de la Majestad Catolica, 1531.
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court for the emperor's brother, Fernando. Salinas writes to 
Fernando on 27 August 1533 saying he has asked Cobos, on 
Fernando's behalf, to acquire an habito for the papal 
nuncio. On 12 September he writes again saying that it had
179 ■been granted. Letters from Salinas to Fernando are very 
important contemporary sources that testify to the growing 
influence of Cobos and Granvelle. On 15 December 1535, 
Salinas, then moving with Charles's court, wrote from Naples 
that 'de Cobos no se habia de hacer en ello cosa alguna sin 
su orden y consejo' (nothing can be done without Cobos's 
order and consent) . 180 Cobos was engaged in a multitude of 
tasks in these years, including arming the coasts against 
French and pirate raids, preparing for the Tunis expedition 
and reviewing Charles's 'Instruction' to the empress, then 
appointed regent on his departure for Tunis.
From this time on, Cobos signs, refrendar, his 
correspondence as Comendador Mayor de Leon without stating 
his official title of Secretario de Estado. This has caused 
some historians to doubt his official title. But this is 
clearly stated in the Quitaciones de Corte in the Simancas 
archives, naming appointment and date. He appears to have 
been more interested in his senorial titles than the 
bureaucratic title of Secretario de Estado. These were more 
personal to him than a bureaucracy and reflected his greater 
power and closeness to his emperor. Charles does not refer
179 E. Alberi, ed., Relazioni degli Abasciatori Veneti al Senato, 6 vols (Florence, 1859), I, 
pp. 60-64.
180 Rodriguez-Villa, ed., p. 693.
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to him as mi Secretario de Estado, but as Comendador Mayor 
de Leon del mi Consejo de Estado.
Cobos and Tavera
Although Cobos was well placed he still had rivals at 
court after the death of Gattinara. Among those was Tavera, 
archbisop of Santiago, President of the Consejo de Estado 
and Capellan Mayor to the emperor. The relationship between 
Tavera and Cobos has been difficult to uncover due to the 
seclusion of Tavera's papers in the small private archive of 
the Duchess of Medinaceli in Toledo. They are not in the 
larger archive of the nobility, the Hospital de Tavera, as 
would be expected. The archive is an extension of the 
Duchess's Casa de Pilatos archive in Seville. The archivist 
only visits twice a year, so access is difficult and there 
is no catalogue.
The reforms of 1523, following the defeat of the 
comuneros, 1520-21, attempted to meet some of the grievances 
of the rebellious cities, particularly regarding the need to 
replace the foreigners at court and reform some 
institutions. There is much written by historians of this 
period about institutional reform. Some historians have
tried to show a relationship between financial need and the
• • 181 •growth of representative institutions. Economic historians
have developed models of the growth of trade from 1500 and
181 I. A. A. Thompson, Crown and Cortes: government, institutions, and representation in 
early-modern Castile (London, 1993).
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182related this to the development of institutions in Europe. 
However, there is little evidence in the documents that new 
consejos such as the Consejo de Hacienda gave more power to 
permanent institutions, which might have acted as a check on 
the emperor's war policies, many of which were against the 
interests of Castile. The next chapter analyses closely the 
change in the balance of power between the nobility and the 
cities, as Charles's financial needs grew and he came to 
rely on the servicios provided by the cities to supplement 
royal 'domain' revenues. Nevertheless, it simply was not in 
the nature of Charles's patrimonial form of rule that 
institutions should form a representative . role. Instead of 
institutions, Charles acted through individuals whom he 
could trust. On arriving in Spain, Charles had placed his 
Burgundian favourites in Church and council to protect and 
promote the ascendancy of his dynasty. He largely ignored 
the conciliar system of the Catholic Kings and, with new 
taxes, he alienated the Castilian cities and churches. As 
many Castilians had supported his brother, Fernando, for the 
throne he needed to place his Burgundian clients in key 
positions.
The reforms of 1523 included the taxation of 
ecclesiastical property and the dis-establishment of the 
Military Orders, with their wealth used to finance Charles's 
military projects. Cobos facilitated this policy, which 
required a papal bull, through his close connections with
182 D. Acemoglu, The Rise o f Europe: Atlantic Trade, Institutional Change, and Economic 
Growth,' American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (2005), pp. 546-579.
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Pope Adrian, who had been Charles's regent during the
comuneros uprising. The financial need driving this policy 
effectively resulted in the appropriation of the wealth of a 
powerful group in society. Tavera was appointed president of 
the Council of Castile (1523-1539) and Cobos secretary of 
the newly created Consejo de Hacienda. Tavera also 
represented clerical interests as archbishop of Santiago, a 
seemingly powerful combination. He later became Inquisitor 
General, defeating the Erasmian Inquisitor General, and 
archbishop of Seville, Alonso Manrique, in a power struggle, 
as the religious climate changed under Luther's assaults. 
Ambiguity of religious identity became dangerous and the
Inquisition enforced choice. Manrique was dismissed by 
Charles. Tavera was named archbishop of Toledo, 1534-45, the 
most powerful prelate in Spain. So he was a formidable 
competitor for Cobos, at least until the mid-153Os. Contrary 
to the views of some historians, it is more probable that
these reforms were more about solidifying Charles's dynastic
and patrimonial interests than any idea of administrative
• 183efficiency. Charles needed loyal Castilians to ensure his 
dynasty, and Tavera and Cobos provided such a group with 
their clientage, and Charles could balance that power 
between their respective factions through his royal gracias 
y  privilegios. These conciliar reforms have been well
1 A. Espinosa, ‘The Spanish Reformation, Institutional Reform, Taxation and the 
Secularisation o f Ecclesiastical Properties under Charles V ’, The Sixteenth Century 
Journal XXXVII, no. 1 (2006), pp. 3-24; J. A. Escudero, Los Secretarios del Estado y  del 
Despacho, 4 vols (Madrid, 1969), I.
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184covered by Carlos Morales. Tavera, m  particular, re­
inforced the auditing reforms of the Catholic Kings with 
regular visitas and residencias to clerical and judicial 
bodies, such as the audiencias and the chanceries of Granada 
and Valladolid. This was a significant attempt to hold the 
clergy and judicial bodies accountable, although often used 
as a political weapon rather than an inquiry into probity.
Tavera and Cobos had both learned their administrative 
skills in the court of Fernando, and gradually placed their 
fernandino contacts in key positions: Tavera brought in more 
letrados from the universities, and clerics, jurists and
prelates; Cobos, his friends from Ubeda. Cobos, therefore, 
encouraged Charles to reclaim spiritual power over clerics 
and to remove them from positions on the consejos and thus 
undermine the position of Tavera. Tavera's power over the 
clergy was weakened by their refusal to grant funds to the 
emperor at the Cortes in 1527 in Valladolid. Instead, Tavera 
and Manrique squabbled over orders of precedence in
speaking. The emperor's decision is conveyed in manuscript 
11599, No. 9, folios 98r to 99v in the Biblioteca Nacional. 
This is one of the very few documents in Cobos's 'hand'. It 
conveys the emperor's decision to give precedence to
neither, but to take turns at his side; it bears the
inimitable Cobos signature rubric.
184 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ’El regimen polisinodial bajo la egida de Cobos y 
Tavera,' in La Corte de Carlos V, ed. J. M. Millan (Madrid, 2000), II, pp. 43-49.
Ibid, El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602 (Madrid, 1996), pp. 34-48.
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Representatives of the cities at the Cortes also 
refused to raise the alcabala or to increase the servicio, 
an annual subsidy granted by the cities. The alcabala was a 
form of tax levied on commercial transactions, nominally at 
10% but usually compounded for a set sum. An encabazamiento 
— a composition payment — was usually agreed by the Cortes. 
It was then allocated to cities dependent on population size 
and volume of commerce. Cobos, Tavera and Manrique disputed 
between themselves on these amounts, and this issue caused 
the hostility between Cobos and Tavera. Tavera presided over 
the Consejo de Castilla, and was responsible for the 
negotiations on servicios at meetings of the Cortes. His 
failure to deliver on the emperor's requests weakened his 
position versus Cobos who was developing his own approach to 
the cities. This issue will be discussed in Chapter Four.
Yet Tavera still had the emperor's confidence when 
Charles appointed Isabel as regent in 1528, and again in 
1529 to 1533. The emperor issued 'Instructions' for her to 
consult carefully with Tavera as president of the Consejo
185Real, when Charles left for Italy. These 'Instructions' 
confirm Tavera's importance but not necessarily his 
predominance, as argued by Carlos Morales. Correspondence 
between Charles and Tavera, during the former's absence, 
shows a policy to obtain Pope Clement VII's blessing for 
using clerical subsidies for the imperial defence of 
Christendom. Tavera then negotiated with the clergy and the
185 CDCV, II, pp. 148-153.
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cathedral chapters for their contribution to Charles's
1financing, as agreed with the pope. But Tavera's 
appointment as regent gave Cobos the opportunity to travel 
with the emperor, thus strengthening his position, although 
Tavera took the opportunity of the emperor's absence to 
place more of his people in the various councils. Charles, 
on his return from Italy in 1533, for the first time 
expressed public displeasure with Tavera's administration. 
Criticisms had reached him from members of the Royal Council 
regarding the disaffection of some nobles, which alarmed the 
emperor due to his memories of the comuneros uprising. The 
conflict was more between Tavera's newly promoted letrados 
and the old nobility who felt an infringement of their 
traditional jurist powers in their seiiorios and the 
replacement of some oidores (judges) in the chanceries. It 
seems that Tavera had exceeded the delicate balance between 
inaction and exercising authority on the emperor's behalf.
As Charles's financing needs grew, so did the 
importance of the Consejo de Hacienda and Cobos' s role to 
obtain the funding. With the death of Gattinara in 1530, 
Cobos concentrated on sidelining all challenges, which he 
largely succeeded in doing until the generational changing 
of the guard of 1545-47, as Philip's men came to the fore.
Cobos was both a personal ' secretary to Charles, 
providing advice over a range of issues and dealing with his 
correspondence when travelling, and Secretario de Estado,
186 AGS, E, leg. 20, f. 172. Cardinal Tavera, 1530.
running a bureaucracy. Manuscript 1778 in the Biblioteca 
Nacional contains a large collection of letters to Cobos 
dealing with the complexity of everyday matters from a wide 
variety of people. In these letters Tavera mixes business 
and family matters. At this stage, their relationship 
appears warm, at least from Tavera's side, as we have no 
known surviving replies from Cobos. In undated letters 
Tavera describes the appointment of a visitador (auditor) to 
the audiencia of Granada, and his naming of capelos 
(chaplains) and oidores and the need for defences against 
Barbarossa. Tavera writes about the health of Cobos's wife 
and children, then delivers news about Cobos's family and 
describes his visits to Cobos's son, Diego, in Ubeda and to
187Dona Leonor. These letters also deal with political issues 
such as the naming of justices for the audiencia of Granada, 
reporting on conflicts in the municipalities about the 
alcabala, and disputes between bishops. He also refers to 
the marriage of Juan Vazquez de Molina, Cobos's nephew and 
powerful client, and showers praises on him. This Ms 1778 
contains a sample of letters received by Cobos and reveals 
the wide range of issues with which he had to deal. Given 
the competition for power with Tavera and later disputes, it 
is interesting to follow Tavera's solicitous concern for 
Cobos and his family. While this may be dismissed as empty 
rhetoric, it could have been sincere. The two men had been 
together since the court of Fernando and were bound together
187 BN, Ms 1778, f. 165v. Cardenal Tavera, 'Juan Tavera A1 Comendador Mayor Francisco 
de los Cobos, del Presidente sobre noticias familiares,' s.d.
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by ties of common purpose and common interests in serving 
the emperor.
Curiously, Cobos supported the appointment of Tavera as 
archbishop of Toledo on the death of Fonseca in April of 
1534. It probably was in that year that Cobos and his 
faction gained the upper hand. Cobos had been recommending 
the removal of the clergy from the Royal Council and the 
pope did not like the presence of the primate of Spain in 
the Royal Council because of potential conflict between 
clerical and temporal juridical functions. However, the 
immediate reason for Cobos's support was his need for the 
primate's agreement to his desire to acquire the 
Adelantamiento de Cazorla, which had belonged to Toledo 
since the 13th century. This has already been dealt with in 
detail in Chapter Two.
Tavera then named Cobos Adelantado de Cazorla in May 
1534, making this Cobos's anno mirabilis. Conflict resumed 
on Tavera's refusal to make this appointment perpetual for 
Cobos's lineage, a matter of critical concern to Cobos. 
Cobos felt strong enough to by-pass Tavera and have both 
Charles and the pope ratify the Adelantado as a perpetual 
appointment in 1537. This led to a rupture in the 
relationship with Tavera and, as we have seen, the conflict 
worsened with the new primate, Siliceo, after Tavera's death 
in 1545.
Tavera suffered another setback in his failure to 
extend the sisa (per capita sales tax) to the nobility in
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the Cortes of 1538-39. This resurrected the earlier 
differences with the nobility and they issued petitions to 
the emperor requesting his removal. That was done in 1539, 
after the death of the empress. The pope also favoured a 
move to Inquisitor General for Tavera to avoid conflict with 
temporal power, and Charles appointed him in December 1539 
before he left on another campaign. Tavera continued to be 
consulted by the Royal Council and Charles issued an
'Instruction' to him as his regent from Madrid on 10
188November 1539. Tavera hardened the policy towards 
prohibited books on the Index, including the works of 
Erasmus, and forbade translations of the scriptures.
In 1543 the emperor left for Germany and gave the 
regency to Philip. He appointed Tavera, Cobos and Alba to 
advise his son. In his 'Secret Instruction' to Philip from 
Palamos, on 6 May 1543, he reminded him that Tavera and 
Cobos represented two opposing factions, 'que hay 
parcialidades entre sus servidores' (there are partialities 
[factions] among your servants). Their inclusion as advisors
189was an attempt to balance the influence of both. While 
recommending he listen to their counsel, he warned Philip 
'not to place yourself in the hands of any one counsellor'. 
He also advised Philip:
'Not to be deceived by the fraternal demonstrations of 
affection and show of harmony publicly displayed by his 
advisors: in private they will do precisely the
opposite.'
188 CDCV, II, pp. 43-55.
189 CDCV, II, pp. 104-118.
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Ernesto Schaffer wrote that J. M. March stated that this 
"Secret Instruction" was an imperishable monument to 
Charles"s sovereign perspicacity and profound knowledge of
r190men.
In a most important manuscript 10300, folios 116-133,
in the Biblioteca Nacional, a letter from Cobos to the 
emperor, there is a detailed analysis — assassination — by 
Cobos of the characters of other members of the Royal
Council. If any proof was needed of Charles's advice this 
confirmed its wisdom. It was written, apparently, on 6 
February 1543, three months before the "Secret Instruction". 
Comparing the styles of the two manuscripts there is a clear 
similarity in the assessments and warnings delivered by both 
men, which suggests Cobos's power and influence on the
emperor. The historian Fernandez-Santamaria has referred to 
these similarities. It purportedly was a response to the 
emperor's request for a report on Philip, but Cobos used the 
opportunity to influence the emperor's views on members of
• 191 •the council, many of whom were Cobos's rivals. Keniston 
finds "some puzzling problems' about the dates of the 
letters, arguing that the emperor was not in Palamos on the 
date stated in Cobos's letter, which is a copy from the 
Osuna archive (probably 18th century).192 But, given the 
emperor's peripatetic style of governing, it is almost
190 Dr. E. Schaffer, El Consejo R ealy Supremo de las Indias (Seville, 1935), p.77.
191 J. A. Fernandez-Santamaria, The State, War, and Peace -  Spanish Political Thought in 
the Renaissance, 1516-1559 (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 237-244.
192 Keniston, 268-269.
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impossible to know where he was on a particular day or 
month. Although Vicente de Cadenas has made a valiant
attempt from the Simancas archives to trace Charles's 
'itinerarios, permanencias y despachos relevantes de su
• 193vida.' Dates of letters were often omitted from documents. 
The important point is the similarity of opinion pronounced 
by both men.
Many of the emperor's letters, even from as early as 
1517, before his arrival in Spain, took the form of 'dandole 
instrucciones para el mejor gobierno de Espaha hasta el 
momento en que llegue para tomar posesion de mis reinos' 
(giving instructions for the better government of Spain 
before I come to take possession of my kingdoms). This was 
addressed to Cardinal Cisneros, the regent, from Brussels, 
21 April 1517.194 Cisneros suspected that it was drafted by 
Cobos, and it greatly displeased him. This phrase, 'dando 
instrucciones para el mejor gobierno' was used in all of 
Charles's dynastic commands. During his absence from 1543
Charles appointed Fernando de Valdes president of the Royal 
Council and the emperor warned Philip about the rivalry 
between him and Tavera. Cobos supported Valdes to further 
weaken Tavera's influence. But the enmity between Cobos and 
Tavera is best illustrated in the manuscript containing
Cobos's response to Charles's request for an opinion on his
son and councillors. 'Tavera spent too much time trying to
193 Vicente de Cadenas, Diario del Emperador Carlos V. Itinerarios, Permanencias, 
Despachos, Sucesos y  Efemerides Relevantes de su Vida (Madrid, 1992).
194 RAH, Salazar y Castro, Ms 198, 59729, h. 117 and 118. Carlos V El Emperador, 1517.
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strengthen his client network.'195 Tavera progressively lost 
influence at court for himself and his clients, many of whom 
left court. Cobos seems almost dismissive of Tavera in his 
letter to Charles of 5 May 1545 discussing various 
appointments ' se podria emplear el secretario Juan Vazquez 
[Cobos's nephew] como quiera que este cargo se ha de dar a 
voluntad del Cardenal de Toledo, Inquisidor General' (you 
could employ Juan Vazquez in the Inquisition, but I know you 
wish this post to be for the cardinal of Toledo).196 He died 
in Valladolid on 1 August 1545 and was interred in the 
hospital de San Juan Bautista in Toledo. Ironically, this 
was his 'good work', begun in 1541, with perhaps a similar 
intent to Cobos's El Salvador: to escape from purgatory.
Cobos and Powerful Friends
Perhaps the best sources on Cobos, revealing diverse 
sides to his character, are the correspondence between him 
and powerful friends whom he had positioned in posts to 
provide him with a window on events at important centres 
outside of court. Several sets of such documents have been 
examined and among the more illuminating are the letters 
from Franciso de Borja, governor of Cataluria; Lope Hurtado 
de Mendoza, ambassador in Lisbon in the 1530s; Diego Hurtado 
de Mendoza from Venice and, later, Rome; and Garcia de 
Loaysa, previously Charles's confessor, bishop of Siguenza, 
from Rome.
195 BN, Ms 10300, Osuna, Francisco de los Cobos, ’Copia de una carta de Francisco de los 
Cobos a Carlos V, sobre Felipe II y otros asuntos de gobierno,’ 1543.
196 CDCV, II, p. 387.
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Francisco de Borja
Cobos seems to have felt a special affinity to Juan, 
the Duque de Gandia and above all, Francisco de Borja, 
Gandia's eldest son. Francisco's correspondence with Cobos 
is especially important for depicting relations with Cobos — 
both personal and high state policy — in the years when 
Cobos held sway.197 In this regard his correspondence merits 
fuller discussion. The dukes of Gandia were crucial to Cobos 
and the emperor in defending a vulnerable Mediterranean 
coastline. From Barcelona to the towns of Gandia, Javea and 
Alicante, Berbers under Barbarossa frequently attacked 
coastal villages carrying off people to work the galleys or 
to be imprisoned for ransom in Algiers. The dukes built 
formidable church/fortresses all along the coast for people 
to shelter. A visitor to Javea would see a magnificent 
example of this military-style church. The Borjas — the 
italianised name ' of Borgia is more familiar to English 
speakers — as dukes of Gandia, were a Valencian nobility who 
had fought the germanlas — the Valencian version of the 
Castilian comuneros — on Charles's behalf. Their property 
was looted and correspondence of Juan de Borja, the duke, 
with Charles and Cobos, listing robbed possessions from the 
casa de Gandia, eventually resulted in restitution de los 
bienes robados (stolen goods). Charles asked his tesorero 
general, on 31 January 1523, to compensate the duke and 
issue a carta de pago for his services in fighting the
197 •Jesu Societatis, ed., Sanctus Borgia, Quartus Gandiae Dux, 6 vols (Rome, 1903), II.
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germanla.198 The dukes of Gandia were inheritors of the 
ancient kingdom of Valencia with their principal residence 
in the ducal-palace of Gandia.
The Bor j as were also close to the papacy and were 
Erasmian humanists, poets and writers, like many other of 
Cobos's friends. The pope, Alexander VI, Rodrigo de Borja, 
was Francisco's great uncle, and Paul III owed his papacy to 
Alexander. Pope Paul created Rodrigo and Enrique, two of the 
Duke's sons, cardinals, and no family was closer to the 
papacy. These links explain the emperor's privileges to the
■a
Borjas, and Cobos's solicitous correspondence and 
cultivation of the family, initially with Juan de Borja, the 
duke, and then with Francisco. The Zabalburu collection of 
manuscripts in Madrid has many letters from the duke to 
Cobos and others. On losing a loyal servant the duke writes 
to Cobos 'suelen olvidarse los hombres subiendo' (you should 
forget men on the rise). No one could forget Cobos.
The duke was incessant in his letter-writing to friends 
and popes, seeking privileges for his family with growing 
success.199 Apart from the cardinal's hat, other sons received 
encomiendas from the emperor. The Borjas saw these 
appointments as opportunities for serving the emperor, 
particularly in Rome. The duke wrote to Philip 'con ser 
cardenal y residir en Roma se han de ofrescer siempre cosas 
en que el pueda mostrar lo que desea servir a V. M. ' (as
198 Ibid., p. 32.
199 Zabalburu, M 22-23, Duque de Gandia, 1530.
132
cardinal residing in Rome there will always be opportunities 
to serve Your Majesty). 200 Cobos' s connection with the Bor j as, 
both father and son, helped him to obtain the pope's bull of 
1530, and in 1535 his Adelantamiento de Cazorla. Francisco 
de Borja, became Marques de Llombay from 1529 until his 
father died. He assumed the dukedom in 1543.
Cobos had Francisco appointed Virrey de Cataluha 
(Viceroy and Governor) from 1539 to 1543. He became a Jesuit 
in 1543, and was sanctified in 1624. It is for this reason 
that we have a six volume collection of his letters prepared 
by the Society of Jesus, 1894-1911 — part of their 150 
volume series on saints, Monumenta Historicum Societatis 
IesUf Romae. Many of these letters and Cobos's replies. are 
from original manuscripts in the Simancas archives, Estado 
section. They cover family correspondence between the elder 
duke and his wife with Cobos from 1529 to March 1545. MS 
9/130, Historia Genealogia de la ilustrisima y nobilisima 
Casa de Borja has also been consulted in the Salazar y 
Castro collection in the Real Academia de la Historia by 
Ruig de la Pena, 1650, as well as the Archivo de la Nobleza 
in Toledo — the Osuna collection. This latter archive, 
legajo 1041, has seventeen original letters from Charles V 
to Borja, 1539 to 1543, and legajo 561, caja 13, 20-36. MS 
2368 in the Biblioteca Nacional also has an exchange of 
letters between Francisco Borja and Cobos. The private 
library, Biblioteca Zabalburu — Miro and Altamira sections —
200 AGS, E 279, Duque de Gandia al Principe Felipe, 1540.
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in Madrid has several letters between Cobos and Francisco de
Borja, both when he was Marques de Llombay and when he
• • 201 » •inherited the dukedom. The Archivo General de Simancas, in
its Estado section, also contains an important exchange of 
correspondence.202 Estado 62 has letters from Cobos to the 
Duque de Gandia, and from the Duquesa de Gandia to Cobos. Of 
particular interest is the summary of letters from Borja, as 
virrey de Cataluna, to Charles V, prepared by Cobos and with 
his comments in the margins. Sometimes detailed as to the 
military dispositions taken by the viceroy, at other times a 
simple 'me ha parescido bien que se haga' (it seems good to
203 ’ •me, go ahead). Many of Franciso's letters to Cobos were 
direct pleas for military help against revolts by moriscos 
and threats by the Turks and their French allies.
In 1529 Cobos arranged Francisco's marriage, las 
capitulaciones matrimoniales and the dote (dowry) at the 
request of the emperor, whose Portuguese wife Isabel asked 
him to find a husband for her favourite lady-in-waiting, 
Eleonor de Castro, a Portuguese, like herself. He negotiated 
the terms of the alliance with Francisco's father the Duque 
de Gandia. Cobos obtained a privilege for Francisco and his 
wife to enter the empress's service at court. The empress 
wrote to the Duque de Gandia that for don Francisco 'ella 
personalmente se encargaria de su acrescimiento y que 
siempre que le pidieran alguna merced hallarian en ella muy
201 Zabalburu, Miro, Z 119, 163, Marques de Llombay a Cobos, 1539.
202 AGS, E, 167,169,279, 289, Virrey de Cataluna a S. M., 1539.
203 AGS, E, 62.
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entera voluntad' (she personally would take charge of his 
advancement and, whenever he asked for a favour, he would 
find in her full support) . 204 Charles immediately granted him 
the title Marques de Llombay. This process of arranging 
marriages was part of Charles's and Cobos's policy of
• 205controlling the matrimonial links of the nobility.
In fact no noble could marry without the emperor's 
consent. His purpose was to avoid the formation of all- 
powerful independent families; los grandes were primos 
(cousins), part of an extended family. With Francisco, Cobos 
had succeeded in placing a further client in the queen's 
household. These already included his wife and their 
children, Diego and Maria, as well as brothers of his wife 
and his nephew, Vazquez de Molina. Ruy Gomez de Silva, 
Eleonor's Portuguese cousin, was also there as a close 
companion to Philip, later to be called el Cobos de principe 
Felipe. The emperor left to Isabel, regent from 1529-1533, 
the implementation and control of noble alliances. Cobos, 
through his family within the palace, was able to influence 
these decisions. Francisco and the others were in frequent 
correspondence with him over this. While viceroy of 
Cataluna, Francisco also engaged in matrimonial politics in 
the region under his control, implementing the emperor's 
wishes.206
204 Toledo, Archivo de la Nobleza, Osuna, 13, 21, La emperatriz al duque de Gandia, 1529.
205 Martinez Millan, ed., La Corte de Carlos V, Vol. II, p. 96.
206 Toledo, Archivo de la Nobleza, Osuna, legs. 13, 31, Marques de Llombay al emperador, 
1542.
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In his Borja correspondence Cobos once again mixes 
affairs of state with family concerns. There are many 
letters, almost daily, from 1540 from Francisco — he had 
been appointed viceroy of Cataluna by Charles in 1539 — 
seeking Cobos's military help to defend the coast against 
Berbers and the Turks, and to put down a revolt by moriscos 
in Valencia where they outnumbered 'Old Christians' until 
their expulsion. Borja's letters were frequently seeking 
more naval craft to defend and intercept marauders. Philip 
was regent from 1539 to 1543, but too young to rule. He was 
therefore advised by Tavera, Cobos, Alba and Juan de Zuniga. 
The latter had been his tutor. The letters from Francisco 
Borja to Tavera were formal, concerning military matters and 
to be read by the Consejos de Estado y  de Guerra; by 
contrast the letters to Cobos were for his personal perusal.
Barcelona was a military centre of great importance for 
the empire, situated halfway between Valladolid and Rome. It 
protected the vulnerable Pyrenean frontier from continuous 
French incursions, and defended against coastal attacks from 
France's Turkish and Berber allies. Imperial mail concerning 
events in this entire region passed through the viceroy's 
office. Coastal ports had to be protected and information 
acquired from docking ships — Barcelona was a hotbed of
207 •espionage on imperial affairs. Francisco wrote to his 
father, the Duque de Gandia, alerting him to a possible 
attack on Valencia by the galleys of Barbarossa, aided by
207 AGS, E 289, 33-42, Marques de Llombay al emperador, 1542.
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• 208 monscos, always a possible Ottoman fifth-column. In
addition, there was often concern about a joint
French/Turkish invasion of the coast, given their alliance
against Charles. In this regard, Francisco describes
arrangements to move vulnerable population and nuns to
different convents and to the fortress-style churches in
Gandia and Javea.
By the early 1540s, Francisco was well informed of 
international events by Cobos.209 But after the failure of the 
emperor's expedition to Algiers in the autumn of 1541, 
Francisco's letters to Cobos reveal a criticism of the 
emperor's policies of fighting on so many fronts: the Turks, 
the French and the Lutherans. This is shown by the following 
extract:
escusare yo de decirlo, aunque siempre parece que 
estara mejor el Turco en Constantinople que no en 
Belgrado, verdad es que se pueda esperar cada dia mayor 
dano si la reformacion de la Iglesia no sucede como es 
menester, y si uno particularmente no echa de su casa y 
de su conciencia los enemigos spirituales, porque estos 
son los que dan la Victoria al Turco ... Por lo mucho que 
importa encaminar esto que digo lo escribo a vuestra 
sehorlo, porque se el celo que tiene el bien comun y 
particular (excuse me for saying so, although it always 
seems better to have the Turk in Constantinople than in 
Belgrade, it is true that one can expect more harm if 
the reform of the church does not succeed as necessary, 
and if one particularly does not throw out of his house 
and of his conscience spiritual enemies, because it is 
this that gives victory to the Turks ... for the 
significance I give to this I write to your senorio,
for I know the importance you give to the common weal).
210
208 A. C. Hess, The Moriscos: an Ottoman fifth column in sixteenth century Spain,’ 
American History Review, no. 74 (1968).
209 Societatis, ed., pp. 44-77.
210 AGS, E, 280, \A5, Marques de Llombay a Cobos, 1541.
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For Francisco Borja, the fight against the Turk and 
reform of the church, he believed, began with internal 
spiritual reform. In this he may have been a visionary, but 
he was following Erasmus's call for a united church to 
confront the Turk and, perhaps, also advice from his Jesuit 
friend Ignatius Loyola. The emperor also called for 
universal Christian orthodoxy, but was not prepared to 
compromise with Lutheran demands. Charles's discourse in the 
1520s was influenced by Erasmians like Gattinara and Valdes, 
but this may have been rhetoric — the reality was a need to 
legitimise his dynasty and expand his patrimony. By the 
1540s empire and universal Christianity were more obviously 
a tool for his dynastic ambitions.
Borja was hopeful of positive results from the meeting 
between Charles and Pope Paul III, in October 1541, 
concerning religious schism in Europe.211 French pressure and 
joint attacks with the Turks, their allies, intensified 
after the defeat of Algiers, and caused Cobos to seek 
further means of financing for the growing burden of 
military expenditure. Borja's viceroyalty was ended in 1543 
as military preparations were undertaken for another war 
against France. The Duque de Alba was appointed Capitan 
General to resist the French invasion. The emperor believed, 
or had the idea implanted, that Borja 'no era un buen 
militar' (Borja was not a good soldier). Alba insisted on 
complete military authority in all regions and therefore was
211 AGS, E, 145.
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in conflict with Borja, and Cobos had suggested to the
emperor that Borja be moved to the prince's court as domo-
212mayor (major-domo). Charles had issued his famous 
'Instruction' — his political testament — to Philip while in 
Barcelona in 1543, and Cobos was concerned to ensure that he 
would be well served among the new men around Philip. 
Charles may also have wished to clip the wings of a very 
powerful viceroy and to take back into the royal realengo 
(royal territories) certain senorios in the strategic
• 213frontier territories.
Francisco's letters to the empress and those of his 
Portuguese wife show deep affection. He led Isabel's funeral 
cortege at Granada in 1539 when the emperor fled in grief to 
a monastery. He paid for the celebration of a yearly mass on 
the anniversary of Isabel's death. He had received many 
mercedes from her. He became a Jesuit two months after the 
death of his wife in 1546. His spiritual conversion seems to 
have dated from these twin events. The recently opened Moneo 
extension to the Prado Museum in Madrid has enabled the 
hanging of many 19th century paintings previously hidden away 
in the depository. Many of them depict a 19th century view of 
characters from Spain's Golden Age. One such, is a very 
large canvas by Jose Moreno Carbonero, entitled Conversion 
del Duque Gandia, 1884. It depicts the open coffin of the 
empress and Francisco de Borja, now Duke of Gandia, in a 
black cloak embracing an armoured knight — possibly Loyola —
212 Ibid, p. 287
213 Ibid, p. 289
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in his sorrow. The story of his conversion was well known in 
the 19th century.
Affection and love for the empress was a connection
between the emperor, Borja and Cobos. Cobos's wife, Maria, 
served her at court, as did Cobos's favourite nephew, Juan 
Vazquez. But Borja was more deeply and spiritually affected. 
Leone Leoni's statues, now superbly displayed in the 
cloister of the Prado's extension, show the beauty of
Isabel, which we already knew from Titian's portrait. He
began a programme of good works, repairing the hospital in
Gandia, building schools, a Jesuit college and convents. He 
also asked, in his testament of 1547, for sufragios (good 
works for a soul in purgatory) for his great uncle, Pope
Alexander VI, the Borgia pope. He renounced his title, which 
he had acquired on the death of his father on 8 January
1543, and senorios to Charles, who still called him. ilustre 
duque primo. He could renounce his bienes (wordly goods) but 
not his lineage — his condition of nobility — only the
emperor could relieve him of that. He became the third 
General of the Society in 1565. Cobos, who died one year 
after Francisco's conversion to a Jesuit, was much 
influenced by him. Their relationship, depicted in their 
extensive correspondence, throws an important light on
Cobos's nature. He is not the one-dimensional sin culto 
(philistine) of some accounts, and seems to have shared a 
spiritual bond with Francisco, if not the same religious 
fervour. His own acts of 'good works' followed Francisco's 
example, albeit posthumously. The Renaissance chapel of El
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Salvador recognises purgatory and it is Cobos's 
acknowledgement of faith, perhaps in the Erasmian mould 
rather than the emerging tridentate orthodoxy.
Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, el Segundo Conde de 
Tendilla
Diego, like the Borjas, came from an extensive noble 
family imbued by humanist ideas, which are well described by 
Helen Nader.214 The family's power came from the Duke of 
Infantado's alliance with Isabel in the 15th century civil 
wars. However, the- inestimable genealogical investigation by 
Antonio Matilla Tascon in the protocols of nobility show an 
earlier Hurtado de Mendoza as the son of Queen Urraca, an 
11th century monarch.215 Subsequent Hurtado de Mendozas were 
consejeros to kings, ayos (tutors) to princes, courtiers and 
warriors. The Hurtado de Mendozas were secure in their 
lineage. Thus later accusations of marrano (Jewish) origins 
had little relevance to them. The family letters in the 
Osuna section of the Archivo de la Nobleza in Toledo show a 
high interest in literature and' intellectual inquiry 
throughout the family. They also show a diversity of belief 
within the tradition of the church. They rejected the 
scholasticism of the Castilian colegios mayores (elite 
graduate schools) which believed in theological correctness 
— 'correct' (i.e. orthodox) religious practices — and taught
214 Helen Nader, The Mendoza Family in the Spanish Renaissance, 1350-1550 (Camden 
NJ, 1979).
215 • rAntonio Matilla Tascon, Documentos notariales de nobles (Madrid, 1987).
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21 f\rhetoric arguing to 'incontrovertible conclusions.' Many 
family papers were copied by Luis de Salazar y Castro in the 
eighteenth century, and were consulted in the Real Academia 
de Historia.
Cardenal Pedro Gonzalez de Mendoza (el Gran Cardenal) 
was named archbishop of Toledo by Isabel in 1485 and she 
appointed his brother, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza as 
Adelantado de Cazorla, a positon within the domain of Toledo 
until Cobos acquired it. This earlier Diego was uncle to 
Cobos's friend and possessed Cazorla, which Cobos coveted. 
Cobos's first concern was to emulate the landed nobility — 
to build a landed estate for his first-born, also named 
Diego, acquire mercedes and advance his family, securing 
their legal hold on estates with noble titles. Closeness to 
Castile's oldest family, the Mendozas, was important to 
Cobos. Hereditary titles were usually associated with 
mayorazgos (entailed estates). This explains Cobos's 
tenacity over Cazorla, as he could not acquire nobility 
directly, and relied on his son's marriage and subsequent 
possession of a mayorazgo to continue the family line. Helen 
Nader extensively researched these sources on the Mendozas 
and the notarial documents.
In Vida y Obras de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, there 
is an extensive record of correspondence with Cobos which
216 Richard L. Kagan, Students and Society in Early Modem Spain (Baltimore, 1974).
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• • 217throws light upon another aspect of his character. Letters 
from Diego describe Cobos's adventures in Venice. They 
confirm Charles's 'Secret Instruction' of 6 May 1543 to 
Philip warning him that Cobos was a womaniser. Charles knew 
his personality: 'era un hombre fiel y de experiencia, tan
solo le fallaba las pasiones, era un grandisimo mujeriego'
(he was a faithful and experienced servant, his only
218weakness was his passions, he was a great womaniser).
Diego was a poet, writer, diplomat and warrior — the 
kind of character Cobos perhaps would have wished for 
himself. Together they accompanied the emperor on the Tunis 
expedition, where Charles gave Cobos the rich silks which 
adorned Barbarossa's campaign tent as well as three carpets, 
which later appear in Cobos's testamento. But most
importantly, Cobos's association with the Mendoza family — 
and his wife was a Mendoza — the Borjas and others, makes it 
difficult to believe Keniston's statement that he was 
without culture. He was neither a letrado nor a noble, but 
enhanced his status through marriage, and the political 
patronage of the emperor. He was obsessed with acquiring
wealth, but also desired the companionship of the most
cultivated of the nobility. Cobos's ambition was typical of 
his period, but he also surrounded himself with humanist 
friends and patronised the arts. Collecting paintings 
implied a personal connection with illustrious artists.
217 •Angel Gonzalez Palencia, ed., Vida y  Obras de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 3 
vols. (Madrid, 1942).
218 CDCV, II, p. 110.
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Popes and kings saw themselves as statesmen, warriors and 
patrons of the arts — why not Cobos?
Diego's father, the first Conde de Tendilla, as viceroy 
for newly-conquered Granada, had early conflicts with Lope 
Conchillos and the rising Cobos over their attempt to impose 
the legal power of the audiencia in Granada. He complained 
to Cisneros and King Fernando about the avarice of 
Conchillos 'y el rapaz de Cobos' (the rapaciousness of 
Cobos). The letters from Tendilla to his agent at court,
Francisco Ortiz, 1514-1515, from the Osuna collection, Ms 
3406, were copied in the eighteenth century by the Marques
* 219 • • ■de Mondejar. The Biblioteca Nacional also has a manuscript, 
in which Tendilla writes to his agent that Conchillos and 
Cobos were interfering in his administration and demanding 
money. He continues:
El costado abierto por Zapato y Cobos.' [Cobos was
ungrateful] 'Aviendo yo hecho por Cobos mas que ningun
del reyno porque yo le hice dar la contaduria de
Granada ... y le he hecho otras buenas obras que no
cuento aqui ... al senor comendador mayor de Calatrava
dezi leeys con quanto estudio trabajan Conchillos y
Cobos por su parte por enemistarme (My ribs have been
opened by Zapato and Cobos. I have done more for Cobos
than anyone in the kingdom because I gave him the
accountancy of Granada ... and I did other things for him
which I will not recount here ... you can tell the
Comendador Mayor of Calatrava that Conchillos and Cobos
• 220 work to make me their enemy).
In writing to his secretary at court, on 12 May 1515, he 
said that his authority in Granada was 'usurped by those who
219 Toledo, Osuna, Ms 3406, Marques de Mondejar, Conde de Tendilla, 7 July, 1515, letter 
from Tendilla to agent Ortiz.
220 BN, Osuna, Ms 3315.
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had the King's pen,' a probable reference to Lope
• 221Conchillos, Cobos's chief.
With the death of King Fernando in 1515, Tendilla was 
losing influence and the new men among the royal
secretaries, such as Cobos and Conchillos, had become
hostile. His favours and patronage to Cobos and bribes to 
Conchillos had not won them over — his letters reflect his 
bitterness. Borja's aphorism about not trusting men on the 
rise was not heeded. Tendilla had been an ambassador to Pope 
Innocent VIII and was close to Rodrigo Borja, the papal
chancellor who had helped to negotiate an alliance between
the Mendozas and the Catholic Kings. He also completed 'good 
works,' building schools, founding hospitals, and churches, 
like the Borjas and other Renaissance humanists of the time 
on whom Cobos modelled himself. But there was a distinction 
between 'good works' and the motives, which prompted them. 
Cobos, although following the common practice among nobility 
of doing 'good works,' was perhaps guilty of 'works without 
faith.' He must have been aware of the arguments between 
Luther and the Spanish church on the issues of 
'justification.' Certainly his friendship with Tendilla's 
youngest son, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, ambassador to Venice 
and then Rome, would have made him aware of the debate. 
Tendilla was frustrated by the 'rising men' who disregarded 
his distinguished career. Lacking King Fernando's patronage,
291 Ibid., Marques de Mondejar Conde de Tendilla, Copiador de cartas por el Marques de 
Mondejar, 1513-1515.
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he was abandoned. Power had moved from the 'old' nobility to 
a new class of secretaries, such as Cobos.
Cardenal Cisneros also seems to have suffered from the 
manoeuvrings of Conchillos and Cobos. When Cobos was made 
secretary in 1517 — he already supervised the libros de
cuenta y razon (accounting books) — he wrote to Cisneros
ordering the immediate payment of 100,000 ducats to the
emperor and for all the court's ordinary expenses to be paid 
from monies collected by the archbishop during his regency. 
This was a slur on the worthy cardinal. But it may have been 
effective in leading to a rupture between the aging cardinal 
and the king. Bartolome de Las Casas accused Cobos of 
creating this rupture. They were later to cross swords over
Las Casas' s wish to improve the treatment of American
222 •Indians. Cobos was responsible for Las Casas's
interrogation in 1519. Cobos was to live to see the
manoeuvrings of another generation in the 1540s, as the
emperor's son moved his court into positions of influence,
and power changed with royal authority.
The irony is that Tendilla's youngest son became very
close to Cobos, particularly when imperial ambassador to
Venice, 1539-46. Cobos obtained this appointment for Diego
after first offering him the viceroyalty of Mexico. This
post then went to Antonio de Mendoza, his brother, who
became Mexico's first viceroy as well as the client of Cobos
who thereby extended his tentacles to the New World. Diego
222 Lewis Hanke, Bartolome de las Casas, 1474-1566, bibliografia, crltica, y  cuerpo de 
materiales para el estudio de su vida (Santiago de Chile, 1954).
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described himself and his brothers Antonio and Bernardo, 
President of the Council of the Indies, 1545, as hechuras
223 •(henchmen) of Cobos. Antonio introduced the printing press 
to the New World and founded the first university there. 
Cobos moved Diego to be ambassador at Rome in 1546. Carande 
quotes a letter from Cobos to Charles, 8 July 1543, about a 
merchant's loan that he asks Figueroa, Charles's ambassador
• • 224m  Genoa, to repay on behalf of Diego. Was this some 
indiscretion? At a later date Diego was appointed by Charles 
as imperial legate to the Council of Trent, where he tried 
unsuccessfully to negotiate reforms of the Church hierarchy. 
The Spanish theologians preferred a decision on the Church's 
position on 'justification by faith' — Luther's contentious 
issue. So the followers of absolute truth won the argument, 
rather than a humanist like Diego who thought that 'it is 
better to will the good, than to know the truth'(Petrach). 
By knowing so much about the thoughts of the Mendozas and 
Borjas we perhaps get closer to understanding Cobos's world­
view .
Diego followed in his father's tradition, with his 
interest in the humanities. He was fluent in Latin, Greek 
and Arabic. He wrote poetry and history and translated 
Aristotle into Spanish. Like Erasmus he went to the original 
sources for his translations, correcting errors. He was Jun 
hombre culto' of the Spanish Renaissance and had studied in
223 BN, Ms 10459, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, Cartas a diversas personas, 1544.
224 Ramon Carande, Carlos V y  Sus Banqueros: Los Caminos del Oro y  de la Plata 
(Barcelona, 1987), II, p. 247.
Granada with Peter Martyr — of De Orbe Novo fame — who
• 225received a pension from Diego's father. Martyr's Opus 
Epistolarum has extensive correspondence with Tendilla. 
Martyr followed the works and teachings of Erasmus and had 
considerable influence on Spanish culture through his 
contacts at court. He helped a generation of young Spaniards 
to study Greek and Latin at court rather than going to 
schools in Italy. The Epistolario de Don Diego Hurtado de 
Mendoza: Vida y Obras, collected in three volumes from the 
Archivo General de Simancas provide the correspondence 
showing a sharing of interests between Cobos and the much 
younger Diego (born 1503 ).226 This collection illustrates the 
qualities Cobos so much admired in his friend — a 
combination of scholar and adventurer. They accompanied the 
emperor on the successful Tunis expedition of 1535 together 
with another adventurer, Luis de Zuniga. Cobos loved 
adventurers: he often referred to the book Un libro de mi
vida, a book about the adventures of Alvaro de Guzman, and 
he had a business partnership in Guatemala with the 
ruthless, swashbuckling lieutenant of Cortes, Pedro de 
Alvarado, the Adelantado of Guatemala, whom he married to 
his cousin in Ubeda, Doha Beatriz de la Cueva. Diego's book 
on the functioning of councils, Sobre el modo de deliberar 
en los Consejos (how to debate in councils) seems modelled
225 Peter Martyr, De Orbe Novo 1511.
226 Angel Gonzalez Palencia, ed., Vida y  Obras.
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227on Cobos's method of governing. Their letters are intimate 
and jocular and show Cobos, not as the ascetic councillor, 
the prudent man, much commented upon by chroniclers.
While in Venice, Mendoza was introduced to Titian by
Pedro Aretino, a man who made his living blackmailing
• . . .  . . 228prominent people into giving him annuities. A collection of
816 letters addressed to Aretino (1492-1556) by, among 
others, Charles V, Michelangelo and Titian has been recently 
acquired by the John Carter Brown Library, Providence, Rhode 
Island. Sampling a few of them shows that scurrilous 
broadsheets would be printed and widely disseminated if 
people failed to oblige him. Charles V thought it better to 
employ him to blacken Francis I in their eternal propaganda 
war. Aretino was often an intermediary between Cobos and 
Mendoza and the circle of Venetian painters. They saw 
themselves as patrons and. exchanged information on painters 
such as Titian, Tintoretto and Veronese. Through Cobos, 
Mendoza and Aretino, Titian was commissioned to paint a 
portrait of the dead empress, Isabel, which can be seen in 
the Prado Museum. Titian also painted Diego (in the Galleria 
Pitti, Florence). Diego writes to Cobos 'Estoy bueno y 
hermoso y por esto el retrato no ira, quiza, tan feo como V. 
S. se piensa' (I am so good and handsome that the portrait 
will surprise you; I am not as ugly as you think). 229 Given
227 Paris, Bibliotheque National, Ms Esp. 143, ff. 73-82v, Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, 
Sobre el modo de deliberar eh los Consejos, 1540.
Pietro Aretino, Lettre scritte al Signor Pietro Aretino, ed. Francesco Marcolini (Venice, 
1552).
229 AGS, E, leg. 1316, f. 128. Hurtado de Mendoza al Comendador Mayor, 1540.
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Cobos's practice of obtaining the best, it is possible that 
Cobos also commissioned a portrait to copy his friend and 
conform to the emperor's taste. But the only ones extant are 
one in the Titian style in the Casa de Pilatos at Seville 
and a Dutch painting in the Getty Museum in Los Angeles. The 
Seville painting, in the Duchess of Medinaceli's collection, 
is full-length with Cobos dressed in a gold-edged 
embroidered cloak and suit bearing the insignia of the Order 
of Santiago. He wears a decorated black cap. The inscription 
reads: 'Fr. de los Cobos, Comendador Mayor de Leon'. A
digital picture is shown below.
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We can compare this with the Getty painting by Jan
230Gossaert, below.
The Biblioteca Nacional has a transparency of the Seville
• • ■ 2?/picture m  the Bellas Artes section, Iconografia Espahola.
But its authenticity may be doubted. He is a more majestic 
figure in his robes, but the face is very different from the 
Getty portrait. It is also noticeable that the pearl-studded 
brooch he is holding is not the Santiago shell — the venera 
or emblem of his Order — that he wears in the Dutch 
painting. The last Marquis of Camarasa died in Los Angeles 
in 1948. He had held on to the Dutch portrait of his 
ancestor, and Getty acquired it on the marquis's death. The 
Seville painting — so-called Titian style — was brought by 
the Medinaceli family to Seville from Ubeda when they 
absorbed the Camarasa title in the 1940s. Sotheby's valued 
it in 2002 at between 2,000 and 3,000 pounds sterling, 
according to the curator's inventory.
230 ~Los Angeles, J. Paul Getty Museum, Jan Gossaert, Retrato de Francisco de los Cobos y  
Molina, c. 1530-1532.
231 rBN, Bellas Artes, Valentin Carderera, D. Francisco de los Cobos y  Molina, 
Comendador Mayor de Leon, 1885-1884.
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Cobos and Diego were certainly in the circle of 
Venetian painters, critics, and patrons. They saw themselves 
as patrons, often with Aretino as their intermediary, and 
exchanged information on painters such as Titian, Veronese 
and Tintoretto. Tintoretto had painted Apollo and Marsyas 
celebrating the rise of Aretino in Venetian artistic 
circles. Veronese had painted the 'Youth between Virtue and 
Vice,' depicting two roads offered man from childhood: vice 
and virtue. Vice has the form of a Venetian cortesana, the 
iconography of the time — redhaired, bejewelled, exposed 
bust — virtue is crowned with a laurel as the symbol from 
antiquity. Cobos and Diego would have known this painting 
and chose the world of Venetian cortesanas knowing that they 
were chasing vice, but with redemption in the next life 
through their Jgood works. '
Redemption was always a feature of their political 
thought. Diego wrote love poetry to Leonor Gonzaga, the 
daughter of Marquis Francesco Gonzaga of Mantua and Isabel 
d'Este, who were also connected to the Borjas. Castiglione 
writes about her in II Cortesano. The Venetian cortesanas 
occupied Diego and he continually reminds Cobos of their 
affairs and encourages further visits in letters during 
1540.232 But he was also a scholar and Cobos may have envied 
him his command of Greek, Latin, and Arabic. Diego collected 
rare Greek manuscripts and his library was donated to Philip
232 Antonio Gonzalez Palencia, Vida y  Obras de Don Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, III, pp. 
284-285.
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II's El Escorial library. C. Gesner, Bibliotheca Universalis 
(Zurich, 1545) printed Diego's catalogue.
While in Venice, after a dispute with Aretino, there 
appeared satirical poems against Diego 'quel don Hurtado 
arcimarrano' (Hurtado, archjew). This, through repetition, 
has given rise to the belief that he was a converso. 
However, although Diego was tolerant of religious 
differences and had grown up among moriscos, he was an 
imperial ambassador representing Charles's views to a 
foreign court. It is doubtful that he would practice 
unorthodox rituals and more probable that after he refused 
to increase an annuity to Aretino, the latter spread false 
rumours about his ancestry.
Lope Hurtado de Mendoza
Diplomatic correspondence is a necessary source of 
contemporary comment and helpful in glimpsing the thought 
and mentality of the period. Salinas, the ambassador of the 
emperor's brother, is quoted often by Keniston, as are the 
Venetian ambassadors. Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, one of 
Diego's brothers, was ambassador to Lisbon from 1529 to 
1532. As such, his letters to Charles V, the empress, Tavera 
— as President of the Royal Council — and Cobos, illustrate 
the importance of the Portuguese alliance. The Gulbenkian 
Foundation library in Lisbon has preserved this 
correspondence. In addition, the Zabalburu private library 
in Madrid has manuscripts of letters from and to Lope
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233Hurtado de Mendoza and Juan Vazquez de Molina. Juan Vazquez 
was attached to the empress's court and was Cobos's nephew 
and client within that court. Juan Vazquez is named in the
234empress's testamento.
The Habsburg matrimonial alliances were the object of a 
carefully calculated territorial strategy. Isabel of 
Portugal, who married Charles in 1526, came with a fabulous 
dowry of 900,000 ducats of gold. As she acted as regent from 
1528 to 1533 there is an extensive exchange of letters 
between her and Lope Hurtado. His letters frequently deal 
with Spanish/Portuguese negotiations. After Magellan's 
circumnavigation Charles gave up the Moluccas to Portugal 
for a large sum, thus tidying up most of the outstanding 
issues remaining from the 1494 Treaty of Tordesillas, which 
had divided up the world with papal blessing. Lope Hurtado's 
letter 'al muy magnifico senor Francisco de los Cobos, 
secretario y del Consejo de S. M.' of 31 March 1529, 
indicates Cobos's role in negotiating the financial payment
235for the Moluccas, given the 'emperor's great need.' From 
1530 such letters to Cobos addressed him as, 'muy magnifico 
senor el Comendador Mayor de Leon, secretario y del Consejo 
de S. M. mi senor' (to the very magnificent Comendador Mayor 
of Leon, secretary and of the council of His Majesty) . 
Letters are exchanged from March 1528 to June 1529 about the
233 Madrid, Zabalburu, Miro 14, 15, D 356, 361, 382, Lope Hurtado de Mendoza a Juan 
Vazquez Molina, 1529-1532.
'J'lA
Zabalburu, Altamira, D 62, La Reina Isabel, Testamento.
235 Aude Viaud, ed., Correspondance d ’un Ambassadeur Castilian au Portugal dans les 
annees 1530. Don Lope Hurtado de Mendoza, 1 vol. (Paris, 2001), p. 341.
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Moluccas sale. The continual conflict with Francis I is also 
an important topic as the emperor seeks the assistance of 
Portugal's still powerful navy against French corsairs and 
Barbary pirates. And the Portuguese sought Charles's help 
against the French incursions in Brazil. Charles was 
brother-in-law to Don Joao III. Philip II also married a 
Portuguese princess. Thus the genealogical connection was 
strong.
This glimpse of Cobos's correspondence with powerful 
friends is limited by its largely one-sided nature. There is 
a danger of generalising from partial documents, which may 
be partial assessments relating to particular events. 
However, the data does demonstrate Cobos's concern with 
events beyond secretarial work at court. And cumulatively, 
we do get a qualitative idea of the evolution of Cobos' s 
power and influence and his large dimension in the affairs 
of the emperor. It was important for him to have clients 
well placed at important diplomatic posts — particularly 
those close to the papacy — as well as at strategic regional 
viceroyalties, where the security of the emperor's patrimony 
was at risk. His rise to power may have been the result of 
his mastery of the administrative machinery of Castile, but 
his retention and consolidation of that power depended on 
his network and alliances with friends in powerful places. 
The correspondence with Cobos illustrates the importance of 
seeking his approval and his actions among the complex of 
powerful characters in which he moved.
The developing administrative complexity of the empire 
required reforms of public policy, particularly with regard 
to fiscal issues. However, Cobos did not deal with this to 
reinforce the authority of the state — a concept more 
appropriate to a later period. His concern was meeting the 
financial needs of the emperor, who saw Cobos's service in 
personal terms, as a dynastic servant, an extension of his 
patrimony, family and dynasty. Gattinara had wanted 
improvements in administration to serve the increasing 
complexity of empire, but Charles and Cobos preferred the 
personal methods of government. Money and finance were at 
the centre of the emperor's confidence in Cobos and 
therefore were the means by which Cobos transformed trust 
and confidence into political power. As long as Cobos 
delivered to Charles, he held the emperor's esteem. War 
required more finance — the sinews of empire — but Cobos and 
the Fuggers were always there with a banker's draft. Cobos's 
victory over Gattinara was essentially a Pyrrhic one. Longer 
term, Gattinara's proposed reforms might have changed the 
balance between economic and political power by sharing the 
burdens of imperial policy and thus avoiding the bankruptcy 
of 1557. This financial question, upon which some of Cobos's 
most important policies can be discerned, will now be 
examined.
Chapter Four
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The Finance of Empire 
Securing Funds for War: the role of Cobos
Finance has not simply been one more means of
government, but the essential basis of its action.
Financial dominance makes politics possible.236
• • 237Imperial power without credit lacks foundations.
In tackling finance of this period the importance of 
the work of Ladero Quesada on the forms of financing and 
institutions in 15th century Castile must be acknowledged. 
These were the foundations inherited by Charles V and Cobos, 
and provide an essential resource to understand how Cobos 
harnessed them to meet his emperor's needs. The work of 
Ramon Carande on the asientos (contracts) found in the 
archives of Simancas is another essential contribution 
towards advancing our understanding of the documentary 
complexity of the financial accounts in Castile's Hacienda.
It is doubtful that Charles placed finance as the 
driver of imperial policy in Ladero Quesada's meaning; for 
him policy came first and finance would be found. He did, 
however, realise the importance of credit as the key to much 
of his war policy, and war was a means of dynastic policy. 
This is reflected in the second quote from Carande's classic
M. A. Ladero Quesada, La Hacienda real de Castilla en el siglo XV  (Seville, 1973), p.
9.
937 Ramon Carande, Carlos V y Sus Banqueros, 3 vols (Barcelona, 1987), III, p. 247.
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on Charles V and His Bankers. Ehrenberg describes credit as 
‘pecunia nervus belli' (money is the sinews of war). 'Demand 
for capital for war purposes,' he writes, 'caused a 
transition from barter exchange to money and credit and the
238growth of the large German and Italian financial magnates.'
Bodin was to write later about France in the 16th century
239that, 'the sinews of the state are m  its finances.' It 
was the beginning of the growth of large accumulations of 
capital and the development of finance capitalism through 
credit. Soldiers had to be paid in gold and this 
necessitated credit. Charles wrote to his son Philip as part 
of his Political Testament of 1548:
That the fundamental principal to sustain war is money 
and credit and without this you can do nothing. It is 
from finance that one can receive the most harm and the 
most advantage for my projects. You should favour 
finance over everything.240
He repeated this advice in 1553 when his credit was in 
doubt, raising money was extremely difficult, and his 
financial secretary, Cobos, was dead.241
Time and again Charles failed to consolidate his 
victories due to lack of money. Thus, after the capture of 
Francis I at Pavia, on 24 February 1526, and his later 
success against the Lutherans at Miihlberg, where he captured 
Frederick of Saxony, on 24 April 1547, he failed to achieve
238 Richard Ehrenberg, Capital and Finance in the Age o f  the Renaissance: a study o f  the 
Fuggers and their connections (New York, 1928), p. 21.
239 Jean Bodin, Les six livres de la Republique, 6 vols. (Paris, 1986), VI, p. 35.
240 Corpus Documental de Carlos V, ed. Manuel Fernandez Alvarez, 6 vols (Madrid, 
2003), III, pp. 578-592.
241 Ibid, III, pp. 594.
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a conclusive or decisive resolution of these conflicts.242 
The Miihlberg triumph over the Protestant League in 1547 
probably represented his apogee of power. This was 
celebrated in Titian's famous equestrian painting where he 
is wearing full armour with a figure of Christ on the 
breastplate and holding a Roman lance; Charles in heroic 
majesty, both as Christian and Roman warrior, showing 
gravity in victory. Leone Leoni's sculpture in bronze 
celebrating the same event shows him in full armour stamping 
on heresy.
Given the importance of finance, how did Cobos, as 
Secretario de Haciendar manage this need for money? What was 
his influence on Charles's financial policies? To what 
extent were they in fact Cobos's policies, or was he a man 
who simply processed rather than initiated policy? This 
chapter and the next one will seek to answer these 
questions. It will also show his centrality to the financing 
of Castile, and thus to the emperor's imperial policies, and 
his role in managing imperial finances — with emphasis on 
strategy and tactics. Although Cobos's importance has often 
been recognised by historians, it has been in the context of 
other themes and almost as an afterward. Historians have not 
yet investigated his central role in the finance of imperial 
policies.
The thesis will examine Cobos's role in negotiating 
with the Cortes, as the source of the servicios — Castile's
949 *BN, Ms 1751. Papeles tocante al emperador.
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main revenues from the municipalities. There was no 'fiscal 
absolutism' in Castile and it was important to deal with the 
Cortes. The servicios were linked to the extension of 
bankers' credit — as the principal form of security —
through the asientos: the bankers' contracts that Carande so
243diligently studied m  his major book on Castilian finance. 
Given the importance of these asientos Chapter Five will be 
devoted to that topic. This nexus between servicios and 
asientos can be considered as Cobos's main contribution to 
the finance of empire and his role has not hitherto been 
researched by historians.
But first, what were Charles's stated financial 
policies? The broader European context is essential here, 
especially the increasing needs of modern warfare. Cardinal 
Wolsey had introduced the 'subsidy' in Henry VIII's England, 
and the Italian cities and France had sought and introduced 
new ways to fund wars. France had the direct tax, the 
taille, extraordinary taxes from the Estates General and 
often interest-free forced-loans from the merchant classes. 
The dynastic Habsburg-Valois conflict created larger armies 
and stronger fortifications to withstand cannon fire, 
necessitating long siege-work, garrisoning, and military 
innovation.244 The larger mercenary armies could bargain for 
higher wages and cease fighting or run amock and loot — as
243 Carande.
244 Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise o f  the West, 
1500-1800 (Cambridge, 1996).
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in the sack of Rome — if not paid on time.245 They were 
responsible to the Condottieri, the professional military 
contractors who recruited them, not to the emperor. Some 
fifty per cent of the U.S.'s non-combat military in Iraq is 
contracted from mercenary forces according to a 
Congressional investigation into the role of the private 
company Blackwater in the killings of Iraqui civilians — 
they too appear to have run amock. Mia Rodriguez-Salgado 
argues that 'war was an imperative imposed on Charles V and 
Francis I by dynastic imperatives or personal and political 
ambitions.'246 Thus Charles was compelled to defend his 
scattered patrimony from Milan, Franche Comte, the 
Netherlands and his Castilian Pyrenean frontier 
(Fuenterrabla) constantly under attack from Francis I, who 
felt these territories were his dynastic 'right.' But 
Charles also took his defence of Christendom seriously and 
was on the defensive against the Turk and the corsair 
Barbarossa's coastal incursions, thus requiring naval power 
as well as land armies. Rhodes had fallen to Suleiman, the 
Turk, in 1523.
Bishop Mota, as President of the Cortes, enunciated 
Charles's views of his imperial role early in 1518. In 
Valladolid, and later at the Aragonese Cortes in Monzon, he 
said:
I have come not to gain new kingdoms, since I have
inherited enough; I accept the throne to correct great
245 James D. Tracy, ‘War Finance and Fiscal Devolution in Charles V ’s Realms,’ in The 
World o f Emperor Charles V, ed. W. Blockmans (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 102.
246 M. J. Rodriguez-Salgado, The Changing Face o f Empire (Cambridge, 1988), p. 16.
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evils in our Christian religion and for the enterprise
• . 247a g a i n s t  i n f i d e l s .
Mota, at the same Cortes in Valladolid, also delivered 
Charles's razonamiento (royal statement to persuade) 
requesting more servicios, 'according to reason and custom.' 
He cited the enormous expenses Charles's forefathers had
incurred for Castile in defending Naples and Sicily. As a
248result 'his royal patrimony had received much damage.' Of 
course, % he was also seeking help to pay for the imperial 
crown. Mota reminded them of Hispania's glorious past in 
providing three Roman emperors: Trajan, Hadrian and
Theodosius. The implication was that the imperial idea was 
inscribed in Spanish history. In most subsequent Cortes 
Charles would begin by listing his services in defending 
Christendom and the costs 'finding our patrimony and royal 
incomes exhausted by the great expenses ... in defence of our
249 • • •realms.' This was his razonamiento for requesting
extraordinary servicios — taxes from the Cortes to 
supplement his royal domain income and ordinary servicios 
for his extended household expenditures.
Charles gave a similar review of his ideas on the 
nature and duties of his position and inheritance in his 
judgment against Luther at the Diet of Worms, on April 1521:
I am a descendant of the Most Christian Emperors of the 
great German people, of Catholic Kings of Spain ... they 
were defenders at all times of the Catholic Faith ... I
247 Manuel Colmeiro, ed. Cortes de los Antiguos Reim s de Leon y  Castilla (Madrid, 1861- 
1903), IV, pp. 294-295.
248 AGS, Escribania Mayor, leg. 149.
249Ibid, legs. 287, 303.
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am resolved to maintain everything which these my
forbears have established especially that ordered at
the Council of Constance. It is certain that a single 
monk must err if his opinion is contrary to that of all 
Christendom ... I am resolved to act and proceed against 
him as a notorious heretic.250
These views were taken by Menendez Pidal as a 
definition of Charles's imperial idea, which he believed was 
based on the Catholic Kings — a Castilian empire rather than
251Habsburg. But this seems to succumb to the propaganda used 
by Charles and those around him, like Gattinara, to persuade 
the Castilan Cortes to support his imperial projects. His
razonamientos before each meeting of a Cortes from 1518 to 
1521 were rather a form of political propaganda, a speech 
from the throne, where ancient virtues of Castile were 
praised. Charles sought legitimacy in Castile for his 
dynasty — his mother was the titular monarch, and his 
brother Fernando was preferred by the nobility. Above all, 
given his limited domain revenues, he needed the Cortes to 
be willing to make extraordinary grants to finance his plans 
— and this was his purpose — a sufficiency of funds for his 
enterprises was the emperor's primary concern. Much 
historiography has discussed the single issue of Charles's 
imperial idea. But neither this nor a financial explanation 
can suffice to explain his actions. Much of his actions were 
contingent upon events and chance rather than his
250 Martin C. Rady, Emperor Charles V (London, 1988), doc. 3, p. 99.
251 R. Menendez Pidal, ‘Formacion del Fundamental Pensamiento Politico de Carlos V ,’ in 
Charles Quint et son temps, ed. Renouard (Paris, 1958), pp. 1-8.
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intentions. This chapter will, however, focus on finance, 
which limited his aspirations.
It was the revolt by the towns, the comuneros, from 
1520 to 1523, against the failure of the new king to support 
the towns in opposition to aristocratic depredations that 
forcefully showed the need for reform. The luke-warm support 
of the nobility taught Charles that he had to manoeuvre to 
get the support of the municipalities to protect his 
dynasty. This, therefore, was Cobos's main political task. 
But he also needed a financial response to imperial 
expansion, and this was his central role. It was against a 
background of continual conflict that Cobos sought to widen 
financial sources of income and to extend traditional forms 
of raising extraordinary revenues. His task was to raise new 
funds while also managing a rapidly growing stock of debt. 
There was no stock exchange to facilitate large placements 
of government loans with an active market setting prices and 
maintaining liquidity. He had to work with multiple and 
fragmented sources of credit with continual doubt on the 
ability of these sources to absorb the huge demands of 
Charles's policies. His ability to do this required a 
remarkable grasp of Castile's traditional strengths and an 
ability to manage and manipulate the system. .
Each part of Charles's empire maintained its financial 
autonomy. Furthermore, the Netherlands and German states' 
revenues were largely encumbered. Even the Cortes of Aragon 
had a separate financial servicio and had to be persuaded to 
advance funds. Thus Cobos and Charles largely had to rely on
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Castile, which had the unique tax of the municipalities (the 
servicio) r the wealth of the Military Orders and that of the 
clergy, and the growing treasure from the Indies. Cobos 
could not prevent the consequent rapid and massive increase 
in debt, raising its cost to a ruinous extent. Bankers and 
investors anticipating default or at least delays in payment 
drove rates of interest up to double digits, quadrupling the 
rates prevailing earlier in Charles's reign. Cobos had no 
remedy against 'this consumption of the purse; borrowing 
only lingers and lingers it out, but the disease is 
incurable.'252
The natural risk-aversion of the nobility did for some 
time keep a lid on interest rates of the juros (bonds) which 
they thought of as safe investments guaranteed by royal 
revenues, but this changed as the credit of the emperor 
deteriorated. Cobos's purpose was to serve his emperor's 
needs but he also served his most particular interest in 
becoming an independent senorlo of Cazorla and Sabiote, 
which can be viewed as Cobos's sub-text. Each step in 
Cobos's career can be plausibly interpreted as a step on the 
road to Cazorla and greater financial independence. Although 
his career was of course contingent on events and the 
emperor's wishes, it is remarkable how closely Cobos was 
able to direct his career, unlike his emperor. Though 
Charles acknowledged the importance of finance, there was no 
concept of a financial policy or the need to manage
252 Henry IV, Part 2, 1.2.216. Sir John Falstaff.
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financial resources throughout his territories. The 
vocabularies of his letters make no reference to such 
issues. Limits of expenditures were not defined by income; 
expenses came first and credit provided the liquidity 
secured against future revenues. If ordinary royal 'domain' 
revenues did not suffice, other sources would be found; a 
shortage could not be allowed to thwart his patrimonial or 
imperial ambitions.
The purpose of war was to expand dynasty and wealth, 
and in so doing to satisfy retainers and predatory rent- 
seekers. Of course, the irony was that war finance would 
eventually consume the emperor's resources and impoverish 
the empire. There was no consideration of enriching or 
impoverishing his territories. Wealth was measured in 
personal terms and a connection to the underlying economy 
would not have been understood. Imbalances in trade that 
could lead to the outflow of wealth and the compounding 
effect of huge debt-service were not yet understood in the 
context of national accounts. It was not until later in the 
century that these issues were explored by Bodin and the 
tracts of the arbitristas, Book-keeping by treasury 
accountants (contadores and tesoreros) was done to measure 
the allocation of wealth and to determine each person's or 
class's reward in the hierarchy of patronage. Thus the 
thesis examines how Cobos responded to imperial policy 
decisions made by Charles and the methods he used to meet 
his master's wishes. Cobos was not making high policy in the 
manner of the Conde-Duque Olivares under Philip IV. He was
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in essence a man of influence, but could not, or did not, 
seek to deter the emperor's imperial ambitions or encourage 
them in the manner of Gattinara or Bishop Mota. He had seen 
the consequences of Gattinara's attempts to modify imperial 
policies and structures of administration.
Cobos had to devise and manage fiscal policies that 
would form a basis for raising revenues beyond the royal 
domain. Extraordinary expenditure was related to war 
policies, which Cobos could not influence. Furthermore, the 
need was always urgent and expenses had to be met in distant 
places to which funds had to be transferred. Sources of 
domain revenue took time to accumulate and were often in 
kind, but they were also insufficient. Castile had the 
advantage of the alcabala, a transaction tax, which could be 
farmed out or mortgaged for immediate money. The need was 
always for speed, and this meant credit.
Credit required the lenders to believe that the debtor 
had the capacity and will to repay as well as the 
possibility of enforcing collection. A prince's will was 
considered to be suspect, as his ability to pay depended on 
his domain income, which was rarely sufficient to repay 
large loans — much of Crown land had been sold in earlier 
periods. Granvelle (Charles's counsellor for German and 
French policy) reportedly told a Welser that 'there is a
• • • 253 •time to promise and a time to keep. ' This phrase, although 
unclear, implies uncertainty about commitments, perhaps like
253 Maurice van Durme, ed., Correspondence de cardenal Granvelle (1531-1563) (Madrid, 
1956).
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a Russian tycoon recently quoted as saying: 'If I can't pay
BNP [a French bank] $4 billion, is it my problem or is it 
theirs?' A princely word was not as good as security. The 
doctrine of usury was a useful escape from his solemn word. 
Therefore, the emperor had to rely on the credit of the 
cities to satisfy foreign bankers. Municipalities were 
corporations, like the medieval Italian cities, whose 
members were responsible for the collective obligations of 
the municipality in perpetuity, unlike a prince who could 
refuse to recognise a predecessor's debts. The creditor had 
a right to collect from the property of defaulting 
individuals, who were often traders with assets that could 
be seized. The bankers, therefore, had a preference for the 
credit of the cities.
There was no unified tax-system integrating various 
'rentas' into a single administrative system. There was so 
much subdivision. Instead there was multiple pledging or 
selling of individual streams of revenue so that parts of 
the emperor's income were often burdened with charges far in 
excess of his total revenues. In addition, the Crown was 
generally unable to redeem pledges and this meant the 
permanent alienation of property, such as the sale of towns, 
previously under royal ownership. Cobos had to work with 
various elites to devolve tax collection to the points of 
wealth beyond the royal domain revenues. 'Extraordinary' 
revenues were necessary because of the alienation of much of 
royal lands in previous centuries. Charles's 'domain' 
revenues had to cover the costs of the bureaucracy, of state
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councils, ambassadors, salaries and pensions, and the 
personal households of the empress and prince. Although 
frequently accused of extravagance by the Cortes, he was 
expected to act imperially and this required gift-giving to 
his followers; failure to be generous could provoke 
disloyalty among his important retainers.
Some of the changes instigated by Cobos to improve and 
widen the imperial revenues in Castile will be examined 
later in the chapter. Ultimately this would be insufficient, 
as war needs were never-ending and Cobos was driven to 
patchwork expedients and frequent windfalls, such as ransoms 
for Francis I and his sons; the King of Portugal's dowry 
money; extraordinary papal grants; and the sale of the 
Moluccas in the Pacific among other non-recurring items. 
Charles and Cobos may have started with an intention to 
widen the tax base, but liquidity crises in the end became a 
solvency crisis that was bequeathed to Philip II and his 
financial secretary, Francisco Eraso, Cobos's successor. 
Cobos had always found ways of staving off insolvency, but 
after his death this was not achievable by his successors; 
hence the repeated 'bankruptcies' of Philip II's reign.
Cobos and the C o r t e s of Castile
Charles lacked a cohesive empire. Each territory had 
its own laws, privileges and customs. His was a family- 
patrimonial empire and he largely had to respect the 
particularist traditions jealously defended by his 
territories. Centralised administration was therefore not
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possible in this context. Territories within the Crowns of 
Aragon and Castile and those outside of Spain had different 
constitutional provisions; they also had different forms of 
assembly and different roles and interests. The large towns 
and provinces of the Netherlands negotiated with their 
monarch for revenues raised there and to be used only in the 
Netherlands. There was always concern to defend a long land 
frontier with a hostile France. Naples and Castile did not 
have the same restrictions, although petitions by the Cortes 
of Castile began to request that their monies be used 
exclusively for their defence and they were often reluctant 
to see Castile's interests at the service of empire. The 
Castilian Cortes did not, however, have control over how 
money was spent. Neither did they directly initiate 
legislation — instead, the consejos and secretaries put 
forward legislative initiatives to the emperor.
The fiscal potential of Castile was therefore enormous 
and unrestricted and the servicios could go directly to the 
emperor's coffers. For this reason, a close study of the 
servicios is essential and will form a large part of this 
chapter. While the importance of the servicios has 
previously been studied, the role of Cobos in co-opting the 
Cortes and their servicios has not. They were the keystone 
of Charles's extraordinary revenues, and basic to obtaining 
credit from the bankers. There was always the need to 
anticipate future revenues through negotiation with the 
Cortes. Charles's territorial regents — Margaret, his aunt, 
and later Mary, his sister, in the Netherlands — did work
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with local institutions, such as the States General and 
Provincial States in the Low Countries, to finance Charles's 
imperial title and coronation expenses. Mary of Hungary, 
Charles's sister, was regent in the Low Countries from 1531 
to 1556. Her extensive correspondence with the emperor shows 
how active she was in raising money in Antwerp, and how 
concerned she was at Charles's refusal to allow her to grant 
patronage directly, which would have bound the States 
General more closely.254 'Mary negotiated an endless string of 
loans and freely assigned their repayment to Spain. '255 This 
assignment of bankers' contracts did preoccupy the Castilian 
Cortes, who objected to being the treasury for foreign wars, 
but Charles was grateful to his sister's efforts and did not 
consider the implications for his individual provinces.256
The poorer crown of Aragon, not fully united with 
Castile, demanded respect for its ancient fueros (charters 
of rights and privileges) and freedoms. The emperor's 
viceroys had difficulty being accepted in Aragon as they 
were considered foreign. Indeed Cobos, as a Castilian, well 
knew the difficulty of dealing with the Aragonese and left 
it to Granvelle, who dealt principally with German and 
French policy. Prior to Granvelle, Gattinara as Grand 
Chancellor had been in charge of Aragon. Cobos saw nothing 
but difficulty from that kingdom. They had their separate 
Cortes, and servicios were required but often unpaid. The
254 CDCV, I, pp. 444-446.
253 Rodriguez-Salgado, p. 59.
256 AGS, E 90, f. 87.
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Fugger bankers were aware of these difficulties and asked 
for an asiento charged to Aragon servicios to be transferred 
to Castile's servicios.251 Aragon's Cortes demanded the 
appointment to the emperor's councils of Aragonese, who knew 
their laws. Within Spain, the kingdom of Valencia and 
principality of Catalonia also had separate Cortes and 
territorial laws and fueros. Thus independent traditions ran 
strong in many parts of Charles's inherited territories and 
they jealously guarded their historical prerogatives. They 
were, therefore, not united in supporting his imperial 
enterprises. Their first priority was always their domestic 
needs and they were reluctant to allow funds to be used 
elsewhere.
Charles's long absences from his territories always 
raised the question of effective control and communication. 
Authority was provided by regencies and viceroys, which had 
a dynastic dimension in Castile, the Netherlands and the 
German territories. Fernando, the emperor's brother, ruled 
in the German territories. But it was always advice that 
Charles sought. He did not wish to govern indirectly through 
councils. These would have separated functions and 
competences and would have better co-ordinated his affairs, 
as Gattinara had suggested. A framework of councils provided 
stability, and communication was based on networks developed 
by Cobos, who was thus extremely well informed on events
257 AGS, Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda, leg. 486.
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within and beyond Castile, with friends placed in key 
courts.
The Castilian Cortes inherited a deep sense of property 
and individual rights. Fueros municipales and cartas de 
pueblas in many municipal archives illustrate the origin of 
ancient rights and the development of institutions through 
privilegios. These were referred to in Chapter Two, and have 
been studied by, among others, Salvador de Moxo and America 
de Castro. The petitions of Cortes were a development of 
original rights and a channel through which complaints of 
abuses could be heard. More importantly, Castile's monarch 
had to listen to these complaints sympathetically before the 
Cortes would approve royal demands for taxes. The nature of 
abuses and complaints presented by procurators, the 
representatives of the principal towns, in Cortes and the 
response of the emperor through new laws and pragmaticas 
(royal ordinances) tells us much about how change was 
negotiated. The need for the emperor to respond to petitions 
gradually passed legislative initiative to the procurators. 
This exercise of the right to petition contributed to 
correcting some abuses, and reform of the administration of 
justice. The emperor could and did procrastinate, but with 
his increasingly desperate financial condition he gradually 
complied through favourable ordenamientos and pragmaticas.
The procurators at the Toledo Cortes of 1525 asked 
Charles to ensure that ordenamientos followed his favourable
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258responses to their petitions once the servicio was granted. 
They required petitions to be resolved through the issuance 
of ordenamientos to the Contadores Mayores before dissolving 
the Cortes. Without this, they knew that Charles would use 
his favourite tactic of postponing their resolution until he 
called another Cortes as his financing deteriorated. This 
was the problem in granting supply before grievances were 
resolved.
But it was a problem of royal authority, which the 
procurators were reluctant to challenge. Charles always 
cited royal precedent to pass the servicio first and then to
259 •respond to petitions. Thus the procurators 'left with vague 
replies, without the essential decision.'260 Charles had 
frequently sworn not to impose new taxes (pechos) without 
the consent of the Cortes and without 'just cause.' His 
increasing demands broke their trust in the royal promise 
and they petitioned to place conditions on granting 
servicios, limiting their use to defence of the kingdom of 
Castile. But increasingly Charles followed the formality of 
obtaining consent of the Cortes to collect ordinary and 
extraordinary servicios, always excusing himself by 
'necessity of the realm.'
Historians have long established that special interests 
dominated the Cortes (as with today's US Congress). The 
purpose of this chapter of the thesis is to show how Cobos
258 Colmeiro, IV, p. 407.
259 Ibid, pp. 300-357.
260 Ibid, p.407.
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worked with these interests to satisfy them and achieve his 
ends. It is probable that this connection, for the first 
time, highlights Cobos's central role in ensuring a rising 
source of funding for Charles's projects. Procurators were 
not elected but appointed by local elites. They, therefore, 
represented the interests of the wealthier groups of the 
towns. Charles and Cobos attempted to influence the 
selection of procurators through the royal corregidores 
(Crown's officials within the cities). This did not respect 
the tenor of Charles's letters summoning the towns to send 
their procurators and promising to respect their freedom of 
choice:
By which I order you that when you and your 
municipalities receive my letters, as is customary, 
respecting your statutes and ordinances, to chose and 
name two good persons from amongst you. 261
The naming and election of procurators followed the 
statutes of each municipality. Some were chosen by a lottery 
(suerte), some by naming dos hijosdalgo (two knights) — 
following the lineage of the founders of the town — and some 
by rotation. The municipalities issued their procurators 
with limited poderes (mandate) for petitions from which they 
could not deviate, in effect therefore preserving urban 
power. Thus Charles repeatedly demanded that they be issued 
with unlimited poderes, that is plenipotentiaries whose 
powers had to be presented to the royal escribano (clerk), 
as secretary to the Cortes. Before the revolt of the
261 Ibid., p. 287.
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comuneros Charles instructed his corregidores to chose the 
procurators and ensure that they had poderes in agreement 
with those set out in his royal cedula ordering a Cortes. He 
was requiring general and absolute poderes, which was a 
break with the tradition of limited poderes. Thus one of the 
demands of the comuneros was for Charles not to send 
instructions to the towns about the form of the poderes. 
The towns were to be free to select their procurators and to 
grant limited poderes according to the ancient freedoms of 
Castile. Charles had broken the link of legitimacy between 
the town councils and their procurators. After the 
suppression of the revolt of the comuneros Cobos had the job 
of re-establishing Charles's influence on more 
independently-minded municipalities. The thesis will examine 
how he did this, as it exemplifies Cobos's modus operandi 
and has not previously been elucidated.
The sense of property and individual rights had been 
embodied in canon and civil law of the later Middle-Ages, 
emerging slowly from the ruins of the Visigoth monarchy. 
Treatises had been developed in the law schools outlining 
the theory of ownership with medieval canonists and jurists 
rejecting property sharing, community ownership, and 
believing that the individual and his property was the 
natural law. Thus kings had to tread warily if attempting to 
abrogate customary rights. There was, however, always a 
tension between customary laws and the laws the Crown 
introduced in order to standardise laws throughout their 
territories by reconciling contradictions. The Fuero Juzgo
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of the Visigoths was the first such attempt to apply 
territorial law rather than the law of each tribe. Yet the 
strength of the individual fuero lived on. Charles 
recognised the importance of customary law and in the 
aftermath of the revolt of the comuneros tried to address 
petitions — the traditional form of supplicating the monarch 
to redress grievances — to reform legal practice and satisfy 
some complaints. But the evidence from repeated petitions 
shows that, although redressing some grievances, he usually 
delayed and was reluctant to enforce his own pragmaticas and 
ordenamientos. He was often following the expected formality 
with no intention of complying.
Charles inherited much diminished 'domain' revenues in 
Castile due to the Catholic Kings and their predecessors' 
policies of alienation of royal lands in th eir need to
finance the wars of Granada. The Catholic Kings only called 
a Cortes in 1480 in Toledo, and not again until 1498, to
obtain extraordinary servicios for the wars of Granada and 
the Italian campaigns. These servicios were linked to the 
payment of loans from Genoese bankers, the Grimaldis and 
Centuriones. So Charles did not begin the process, but
certainly considerably expanded it until the 1530s when most 
of the servicios were absorbed in paying off debt. Charles's 
wars were continuous and he needed to resort to
extraordinary servicios by ordering frequent meetings of the 
Cortes to vote servicios beyond the traditional ordinary 
servicios, which paid for household expenses. He needed a 
permanent and high level of liquidity, which could only be
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obtained by resorting to credit from partnerships of bankers 
who risked their own capital. The key to raising credit lay 
with the servicios of the Cortes; it was reliable, regular 
and unrestricted as to use. Charles called fifteen Cortes 
during his reign and was always granted a servicio.
Carretero Zamora has shown that the importance of the 
servicio grew in scale from 155 million maravedies raised in
the last Cortes of Fernando, in 1515, to 453 million for
262Charles's last Cortes for 1555, a trebling in amount. 
Carretero Zamora has updated much of Carande's work in the 
Cuentas de Hacienda at the archives at Simancas, from the 
sections Escribania Mayor de Rentas, Contadurias Generales, 
and Consejo de Juntas de Hacienda.263 He has correlated the 
servicios to the repayment of itemised debts over the period 
1525 to 1554. He has included 'loans to His Majesty' 
(socorro a Su Majestad) by prominent individuals, like Cobos 
and Tavera, charged to future servicios, as well as personal 
loans from Spanish merchants and bankers. Some of the 
bankers' loans were secured in anticipation of the inflow of 
bullion from the Indies, but it was not until about 1545, 
with the discovery of Potosi, that this was a material 
factor. The municipalities also loaned money as advances on 
future servicios with the attraction of an 8 per cent rate 
of interest as well as certainty of collection that was in 
their hands. Nevertheless, the archives show that over 90
262 J. M. Carretero Zamora, ‘Fiscalidad Parlamentaria y Deuda Imperial,’ in Carlos V, ed. 
J. M. Millan (Madrid, 2000), p. 171.
263 Ibid, pp. 157-184.
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per cent of the servicios were assigned to lenders' asientos 
(contracts) in these years.
Financial stress was particularly acute from 1534 with 
Charles's foreign policy initiatives and wars compounding 
his need for extraordinary revenues. His Tunis campaign of 
1535 led to the first expropriation of individual silver 
cargos from the fleet of that year. Confiscation then became 
a regular event each year to 1538. After a lull, it was 
renewed in the 1540s. Bills were issued by the treasury, 
paying interest on the amounts seized and charging repayment 
against future servicios. Simancas manuscripts show amounts 
taken and named individuals . issued with juros (bonds) 
against the servicios from 1536 to 1537. Many were merchants 
from Seville, but the Welsers also had their silver seized.264 
These were desperate measures threatening to destabilise 
Cobos's credit mechanisms and he protested to the emperor.
Suarez de Figueroa, Charles's ambassador in Genoa, 
negotiated an asiento with the Genoese (Grimaldi and 
Centurion) for the Tunis campaign against Barbarossa and the 
Turks for immediate funds to equip the fleet. Each asiento 
specified revenue from particular servicios. The catalogue 
of debtors attached to the 1527 servicio shows the 
importance of Genoese bankers (Grimaldis and Centurion) ,266
The Welsers and Fuggers were also important creditors 
dating from their asientos for loans to Charles for his
264 AGS, Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda, leg. 486. 
265CDCV, II, pp. 150-160.
Carretero Zamora, p. 165.
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election to the imperial title. However, most of the major 
merchants and financiers of Castile prior to the 1530s were 
also creditors, according to the research of Carretero 
Zamora. The Contadurla Mayor de Cuentas lists by name and 
year the larger Spanish creditors and the percentage of the 
servicio assigned to them. The Escribania Mayor de Rentas in 
Simancas lists the asientos 'that is charged to the servicio 
of the kingdom and from which it will be paid.'267 Tavera, 
president of the Consejo de Castilla, and Cobos pressed the 
Church for taxes to defend Christendom. Bundles of folios in 
the Contadurla demonstrate that the cathedral chapters were 
contributing loans secured by the servicios to help 
Charles's brother, King Fernando of Hungary, in his defence 
against the Turks. Individual nobles and members of 
Charles's councils also contributed to this cause. Although 
juros were often issued and situado (assigned) to specific 
royal revenues, the main security was the future flow of 
servicios. Charles had anticipated these revenues and 
already spent them. Cobos thus pressed the Cortes for larger 
servicios. The servicio was the overwhelming support to 
Charles's dynastic policies. Why was the Cortes seemingly so 
supportive of Charles's increasing demands?
The crisis caused by the revolt of the comuneros 
demonstrated the importance of the traditional servicio, 
voted by eighteen cities of Castile in sessions of Cortes 
called 'by order of the king.' Colmeiro, who edited the
267 AGS, Escribania Mayor de Rentas, leg. 231.
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records of these sessions, shows that Cobos attended most of 
the meetings of the Cortes during the reforming years, 1522- 
1530, although in 1520, at the Cortes of Santiago-Coruna, he 
attended as a procurator representing the town of Granada. 
The official notary records his presence representing the 
emperor from 1522, and he sat at the head table together 
with Tavera and Garcia de Padilla, as members of the Royal 
Council. Contemporaries such as Alonso de Santa Cruz, 
Sandoval and Salinas also refer to his activities as an 
interlocutor between the emperor and various members of the 
Cortes throughout the meetings.
The implication and importance of his role with the 
Cortes has not previously been analysed. Cobos created a new 
administrative role for the Cortes in revenue collection, 
which was based on their traditional right of petition. The 
archive of Simancas (Estado) has various Iegajos showing his 
role here.268 He also authorised that the procurators should 
receive the proceeds of the servicio in receptorias (cash 
accounts) prior to payment to the royal Contadores Mayores. 
This was a royal privilege granted to those 'charged with
*) f\0collecting the servicios. ' It was a much-desired merced and
had been previously purchased by tax-farmers. In this regard 
he was implementing Charles's policy of reducing dependency 
on the nobility and establishing ties with the towns that 
had shown the dangers of their opposition during the 
comuneros revolt; this was a realignment of power.
268 AGS, E leg. 24, f. 167.
269 Colmeiro, IV, p. 86.
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The evidence from the petitions in Cortes and Charles's 
responses — counter-signed by Cobos — shows that he did this 
by negotiating towards the replacement of tax-farming with 
the encabezamiento of the alcabala (sales) tax. This was a 
gradual process that can be followed by reading the 
petitions from the Cortes and Charles's responses. Petitions 
for an encabezamiento had been made as early as 1512. 
Charles gave his support in response to a petition made at 
the Cortes of Valladolid of 1523, but it was not finally 
applied throughout Castile until 1535.
The encabezamiento was a composition of . a variable 
revenue for a lump sum. It was levied on each of the 
eighteen Castilian municipalities and allocated by them 
within their region. Although the petitions called for the 
encabezamiento to replace the 'onerous' system of tax- 
farming, the emperor's real concession was in granting the 
municipalities a more favourable encabezamiento. This gave 
Cobos patronage over the municipalities whose procurators 
voted the servicios, for the emperor. It also favoured the 
interests of groups of powerful citizens in the 
municipalities who wanted an encabezamiento lower than the 
alcabala transaction tax, but above all wanted control over 
its collection. To achieve this they were willing to vote 
increasing amounts of servicios, which met the emperor's 
needs for increasing extraordinary revenues.
Charles's royal domain revenues, rentas ordinarias, 
were supplemented by the servicios. These were fixed sums 
agreed by meetings of the Castilian Cortes every three
182
years. They were the key to raising revenue for Charles's 
ambitions and for his credit with the bankers. The 
municipalities collected the alcabalas (sales taxes) to meet 
the fixed amount, or encabezamiento, decided by the Cortes. 
The encabezamiento included both the alcabala and the 
tercias (a tax of two-ninths the value of the clerical 
tithes payable on produce or clerical income). Castile was 
divided into eighteen municipalities (provinces) represented 
in the Cortes. These in turn were divided into forty sub­
districts for apportionment of a quota of the encabezamiento 
of the alcabalas. This was referred to as the 'repartimiento 
of the servicio.' Amounts, less the estimated tercias, were 
apportioned to towns and villages within the municipality 
according to negotiation and estimated value of trade by 
various trading sectors or guilds within the districts. The 
municipalities were incorporated entities with a separate 
legal body, unlike a royal prince who could default with 
relative impunity. The alcabala, originally a 10 per cent 
transaction tax on sales and purchases of goods, was limited 
by agreement between the treasury and the municipal 
taxpayers to a fixed amount or encabezamiento to be paid 
after each meeting of the Cortes to satisfy the agreed 
servicio. The practice of establishing an estimacion global 
for each industry in Spain to allocate their tax liability 
among firms in the industry was the practice until the early 
1970s — based on the 16th century concept of encabezamiento.
Expedientes de hacienda (fiscal enquiries) were 
undertaken in 1533-34 by Cobos's treasury team and
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demonstrated that these fixed payments were a low assessment 
of actual trade and therefore of potential tax revenue. 
Charles also gave up the potential for growing revenues 
based on increased transactions and alcabalas in an 
expanding economy. In return he received a guaranteed sum, 
which could be assigned as security to the bankers, creating 
credit for his perpetual war-machine.
The revenue for the Crown had previously been raised by 
tax-farming and had been allocated through bids at auction. 
Thus the Crown was assured of a fixed sum. The activity 
involved enormous numbers of people in different 
professions, socially and politically connected. It was not 
just a means of tax collection but also the means of gainful
270employment for many powerful people. There were strong 
links between the merchant classes, tax-farmers and 
officials at court. The 'farmers' operated companies with 
networks of agents throughout Castile, which also included 
local officials. To change a system that benefited so many 
took time. The Cortes had been denouncing the abuses of the 
system since the Catholic Kings. The Cortes of Burgos of 
1512 complained to King Fernando:
So many irritations and problems are caused by the tax- 
farmers collection of the alcabalas and tercias of Your 
Highness, swearing falsely and other evils ... we request 
Your Highness that all the cities that wish to pay 
perpetually by encabezamiento, Your Highness permit
271them and grant a merced to encabezar.
270 David Alonso Garcia, ‘Poder financiero y arrendadores de rentas reales en Castilla,’ 
Cuademos de Historia Moderna, 31 (2006), pp. 117-13 8.
271 Colmeiro, IV, pp. 239-240.
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But although the Crown agreed, too many people in the 
commercial and financial fabric benefited to make the 
desired change possible. The procurators at the Cortes in 
Valladolid in 1523 stated, in similar terms, their objection 
to the system of collection of revenues through tax-farming 
by groups of merchants:
The tax-farmers cause many problems and damage to the 
people, we request that Your Majesty give to the cities 
and towns the right to collect income and alcabalas
• 272that they ask by encabezamiento.
The revolt of the comuneros now made possible a change 
in the system of tax collection as well as other reforms,
satisfying the demands of the comuneros, which various
Cortes had been petitioning. Tax-farming continued in 
parallel for some time but gradually the municipalities, took 
over the benefits, sharing with some of the same social and 
financial groups. The emperor conceded an encabezamiento of 
alcabalas for up to fifteen years, with certain provisions, 
including the need to pay juros situated on the servicio. 
The municipalities paid a lower level of encabezamiento of 
alcabalas (rather than the traditional 10 per cent
transaction tax) and the evidence suggests that in return he 
received increasing amounts of servicios. Charles's 
incessant requests for higher servicios did not meet
resistance from the Cortes because of this pact between the 
municipalities' representatives in the Cortes and the Crown 
— the towns received the concession of a favourable
272 Alonso de Santa Cruz, Chronica del Emperador Carlos V, 4 vols (Madrid, 1919), II, pp. 
43-66.
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encabezamiento and a higher servicio was approved at each 
meeting. Spanish merchants and bankers were also closely 
connected with the municipal elites and would not wish to 
risk undermining their credit, whose security depended on 
the certainty of the servicio.
Thompson has written about absolutism,
• • • 273constitutionalism and representative Government in Castile. 
Thompson is correct in asserting that the growing power of 
the Cortes resulted in a 'renegotiation of the political 
balance between the emperor and his kingdom. '274 But, contrary 
to what Thompson suggests, it did not limit the emperor's 
financial independence. This was instead due to Cobos's 
balancing of the forces of power and corruption, which theme 
is developed further in this chapter. The abuse of tax- 
farming was merely exchanged for that of the encabezamiento 
but, through the link between the servicios and the 
municipalities, Cobos was better able to ensure that the 
emperor benefited from the abuse. Thompson accuses Cobos of 
'administrative imperialism, ... which must have inhibited the 
full development of a specific secretariat for a specific
• 275 •function.' But Gattinara had suggested a system of separate 
councils with specific expertise and Charles rejected this, 
preferring personal contact with his secretary and the
273 I. A. A. Thompson, ‘Castile, Absolutism, Constitutionalism and Representative 
Government,’ in Fiscal Crisis, Liberty and Representative Government, 1450-1789, ed. P. 
T. Hoffman (Stanford, CA, 1994), pp. 181-225.
274 Ibid, p. 181.
I. A. A. Thompson, Crown and Cortes: Government, institutions, and representation in 
early-modern Castile (Aldershot, 1993), p. 8.
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ambiguity and room for manoeuvre that this provided. That 
suited Cobos.
Charles Jago also discusses the growing power of the 
Cortes over Habsburg policies, believing that prolonged 
international conflict decisively conditioned relations 
between the monarch and the Cortes. He states that the 
'internal politics of Castile was dominated by the efforts 
of the Crown to increase taxation, with the Cortes serving 
as the essential "point of contact" between the Crown and 
the regions of Castile. It managed to reconcile the 
ambitions of a chronically indebted monarchy consumed by 
dynastic self-interest and those of narrow urban oligarchs 
intent on . preserving and enhancing their wealth, prestige
277and power.' But the Cortes was more than a 'point of 
contact'; the Cortes itself represented these same 'urban 
oligarchs.' Cobos had created a Cortes commission, 
permanently resident at court to collect the alcabala to pay 
the servicio. They were complicit in the process of 
enrichment of the municipalities. This will be further 
developed later in the chapter.
Greater subsidies were needed to sustain dynastic 
policies throughout Europe. However, this did not develop, 
as Thompson and Jago suggest, into a trend to liberty and 
representative institutions. It meant mainly a reallocation 
of power among the unrepresentative elites and a slightly
OHfi Charles Jago, ‘Habsburg Absolutism and the Cortes of Castile’, American Historical 
Review 86 (1981), pp. 307-326.
277 Ibid, p. 326.
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different sharing of the spoils. Charles and Cobos's 
political system was not a grouping of connected 
institutions — although the various councils carried out 
bureaucratic tasks. It consisted of a network of personal 
contacts. For Charles it was his regents — mainly devoted 
f amily-members of his dynasty: Margaret, his aunt, and Mary 
of Hungary, his sister, and his brother Fernando, and 
ambassadors and viceroys. For Cobos it was a network of 
capable, obedient and loyal officials and highly placed 
noblemen such as Francisco de Borja and Hurtado de Mendoza. 
Cobos's network granted and were recipients of patronage and 
expected recognition for their services, sometimes by a 
public office and sometimes by a merced. They were inter­
connected and attached themselves to his service in the hope 
of their advancement and profit.
The Cortes of Toledo, 1538, gave momentum to Cobos's 
policy of encouraging the encabezamiento. This was an 
historic rejection by the nobility in refusing the emperor's 
new tax proposals to be imposed on all estates of the realm. 
The ensuing removal of the nobility from the Cortes meant 
that all negotiations with the emperor's councils lay with 
the procurators from the towns, lessening the representative 
nature of the Estates General and reducing the influence of 
the clergy and nobility in important areas of finance. This 
gave Cobos the opportunity to work with the municipalities 
from where he had risen, first as a procurator from Granada 
at the Cortes of Santiago-Coruna in 1520. From the 
dissolution of the joint Cortes of Toledo in 1538-39, the
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servicios increased substantially; Cobos's concession 
allowing the local elites in the municipalities to manage 
the encabezamiento general (rather than through tax-farmers) 
was key to this increase in the servicios. The Consejo de 
Hacienda could not effectively administer tax collection 
without a substantial increase in bureaucracy. It was easier 
to devolve this task to tax-farmers or through an 
encabezamiento collected by the town elites. There appear to 
be no references to the Contadores Mayores experiencing 
difficulties in the collection of taxes, which they had 
devolved by way of the encabezamiento} the debate in Cortes 
was more about-lessening the amount of the encabezamiento.
The Cortes had an increasingly political and 
legislative role connecting the Crown and Royal Councils
278 • • •with local elites. Their legislative role derived from the 
right of petition, although these were only presented after 
the servicio had been agreed. Cuadernos de Cortes (books of 
resolution) and capitulos generales (petitions submitted to 
the emperor at the end of the session) were issued with the 
emperor's responses. The records of procurators presenting 
petitions when ordered to attend meetings in Cortes are an 
important source to explore in establishing a connection 
between the servicios voted and issues that concerned the 
municipalities. It is important to note that the Cortes had 
no control on how the servicios were spent. These records 
have been extensively used in this thesis and it is probable
Manuel Colmeiro, ed. Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Leony Castilla (Madrid, 1883- 
1903).
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that the analysis showing the flow of petitions and the 
negotiation for the regular increase of the servicios
represents original findings. The Real Academia de Historia _ 
brought together these records from different municipalities
279 • ■and published volumes from 1883-1901. The petitions
sanctioned by Charles became law. The Crown legislated 
through issuing royal pragmaticas, but consultation with the 
Cortes was the Castilian custom for the imposition of taxes. 
Medieval canon law had established the ancient custom of 
consultation, with jurists ruling that kings could not 
impose new taxes without the subject's consent — they were 
'not lords of subjects' estates.'
Commentaries of the Jurists and canon and civil law of 
late-medieval times outlined theories of ownership and
property rights favouring the individual. They did not see 
property rights as a concession by a king to his subjects; 
an individual's right preceded justice and the audiencias 
(superior courts) and other apparatus of justice traced
their origin to the need for protecting an individual's
280 • • property rights. That Charles understood this is evident m
his speech to the Castilian Cortes at Toledo in 1525 about a
monarch's obligation to hear petitions from the Cortes. 'We
are obliged to listen kindly to the procurators and to
receive their petitions, and to respond to them and fulfill
279Ibid, ed. Cortes de los Antiguos Reinos de Leon y  Castilla (Madrid, 1861-1903), IV, pp. 
294-295.
280 John McGovern, 'Private Propery and Individual Rights in the Commentaries o f the 
Jurists, 1200-1500,' The Jurist 32 (1972).
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281 • • them justly.' This was included, with other pragmaticas, m
the 'Compendium of the Laws of the Kingdom' published by
Philip II in 1567. But the Cortes had~ no control over how
the servicio was spent, as is evident in the number of
petitions on this matter. Thus Charles could not impose a
new servicio without the approval of the Cortes and the
towns. The attempt by Charles, at the 1538-39 meeting of the
Cortes Generales (Estates General) in Toledo — clergy,
nobility and towns — to impose a sisa (tax on foodstuffs) on
all estates, foundered on the rejection by the. nobles, who
upheld their ancient right to be free of tax in return for
military service to the Crown. They wrote:
It was very damaging and prejudicial and against our 
honour and ancient privileges, because the difference 
between knights and peasants in Castile is that 
labourers pay the taxes and not.the knights, who serve
their kings by venturing their persons and wealth in
282war.
Despite the growing power of petitions, the Castilian 
Cortes was unable to withhold supply to influence policies 
in favour of Castilian interests. The exception to this was 
the effect of the comuneros revolt. A servicio had been 
agreed at the Cortes of Santiago to secure Charles's 
imperial title in 1519. However, it was never paid as the 
Comunero Junta (comuneros tribunal) diverted the Crown's 
ordinary revenues for its own use during the conflict of 
1520-21 and the servicios voted by the Cortes were never
281 Colmeiro, IV, p. 373. Ley 8, titulo VII, libro vi.
282 Sandoval ,Historia del Emperador Carlos I, (Madrid, 1922), VII, pp. 32-59.
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collected in the chaos of the conflict.283 The royal
corregidores (officials) in the towns had no power to 
collect the encabezamientos assigned to each region. The 
Fugger bankers provided the funds to acquire the imperial 
title based on the security of the servicio and this, 
therefore, had to be replaced by assigning to them the
collection of tax revenues of the Military Orders, with the 
agreement of Pope Adrian.
The traditional view about the causes of the comuneros
rising was stated first by Lopez de Gomara in his Annals of
the Emperor Charles V. He believed that their defeat 
'exalted the power of the king whom they desired to abase.' 
Among other reasons, they revolted 'because of the servicio, 
because of the foreign regent, because of the large amounts 
of money which were being taken out of the realm, and 
because of foreigners holding the chief offices in the 
realm, and being granted knighthoods in the Military 
Orders.'284 Recent historiography on this revolt views the 
causes as being related to failure by previous rulers to 
support the towns, including their own officials 
(corregidores), against depredations of the aristocracy who 
claimed sehorial taxes on royal towns through an illegal
• • 285expansion of sehorial territories.
283 AGS, E 1521, leg. 9, f. 127, consignacion del servicio de Castilla de los anos 1520- 
1521.
284 R. B. Merriman, The Rise o f the Spanish Empire in the Old World and the New (Oxford, 
1912), III, pp. 58-59.
285 Stephen Haliczer, The Comuneros o f  Castile: the forging o f a revolution, 1475-1521 
(Wisconsin, 1981).
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Although the comuneros were defeated in 1522, they had 
represented a threat to Charles's grip on Castile, the most 
valuable part of his empire. Their reform proposals included 
a requirement to overhaul the royal administration of 
justice and tax collection. Charles's own treasury officials 
also reported on the disastrous state of the royal treasury. 
Charles was, therefore, persuaded of the need to meet some 
of their grievances. This followed after some exemplary 
executions of those exempt from a general pardon and
sequestration of estates of the principal leaders of the 
revolt. Cobos drew up the list of those exempted. 
Additionally, he acquired for himself expropriated
properties from some of the rebels. A Consejo de Hacienda 
(Council of Finance) was also established to better 
administer the royal treasury. The growing prosperity of the 
towns made it expedient to have their support in Charles' s 
quest for more money and increasing servicios. To achieve 
this, local elites, officials, merchants, and artisans had 
to support his policies. Unpopular officials were replaced, 
including those in the Council of Castile. The audiencias 
(royal high courts) were given more independence over cases 
involving conflicts between the aristocracy and towns lying 
within the royal domain.
After the revolt of the comuneros it was essential to 
implement policies that would build alliances and cement 
loyalties beyond the nobility and enable monies to be 
quickly raised for imperial wars. Cobos clearly understood
that he had to negotiate in what Elliott called a
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'composite' state. He understood the limits of Charles's 
powers, which were more a hierarchy of personal authority, 
rather than an absolutist centralising of powers. Effective 
political persuasion was the tactical skill required to 
achieve his strategic goals. There were many layers of
overlapping and fragmented jurisdictions whose interests had 
to be balanced — Crown, Church, nobility and municipalities. 
Internal redistribution of revenues created strong,
centrifugal tendencies and organising transfers and
transport of funds created much scope for bribes to the 
individuals involved.
During -the reign of the Catholic Kings, a close 
network of merchants and officials had developed to provide 
a service of tax collection to the treasury. With tax- 
farming, merchants were private contractors who often 
combined lending to -the Crown with arbitrage dealings and 
private trade. Thus state finances were not controlled by 
the relevant councils of state and, through this policy of 
de-centralising tax collection as well as justice, local 
vested interests gained control over important parts of 
royal revenues. Hence local elites and the royal officials 
who colluded with them gained a strong bargaining position 
with the Royal Councils and the Crown. As previously stated, 
Spain was not a unitary state and did not rely on a large, 
centralised bureaucracy to levy and control royal revenues. 
It was a 'composite' state, with different territories
286 J. H. Elliott, 'Composite States,' Past & Present 137 (1992).
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preserving their own political and administrative structure 
and historic fueros, especially in matters of taxation.
Evidence of Cobos's central role in financing Charles's 
enterprises is found in his methods, which were applied 
consistently in his negotiations with the municipal elites. 
The municipalities and the sehorios were the basic 
administrative units of Castile. Cobos worked within the 
institutions he knew so well with the objective of rapid, 
even if not efficient, revenue collection. Outsourcing of 
taxation was necessary due to the small central 
administration. Cobos maintained links with municipal elites 
through the meetings of the Cortes. He negotiated to replace
• • 287the unpopular tax-farming with the encabezamiento. The 
concession of a favourable encabezamiento would benefit the 
interests of the municipalities and their groups of powerful 
citizens and encourage them to meet Charles's increasing 
requests for servicios. This capitation tax was the 
municipalities preferred method of paying the alcabala.
Tax-farming had for generations been the practical 
solution to tax collection and provided advance payment to 
the Crown. The Crown essentially devolved authority for tax 
collection and avoided a large centralised bureaucracy, 
which would have been a charge on royal ordinary revenues. 
The towns disliked tax-farming as it resulted in a higher 
burden of tax through additional levies for expenses by the
287 AGS, E leg. 24, f. 167, 1532.
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tax-farmer.288 Cobos negotiated to replace this system with a 
fixed capitation (encabezamiento) for each of the eighteen 
municipal towns represented in Cortes, which in turn could 
reallocate the burden within their groupings of towns and 
villages. Thus the amount of tax raised and the goods taxed 
through the alcabala — the sales tax underpinning the 
servicio — were still largely determined at local level. The 
only requirement was that the total amounts fulfilled the 
servicio agreed in Cortes between municipal procurators and 
the emperor's representatives, whose principal man was 
Cobos. This gave Cobos patronage over the municipalities 
whose representatives voted the servicios for the emperor.
A close network of municipal elites and officials 
appointed by Cobos developed to provide the servicio to the 
treasury. Funds were delivered more promptly than through 
tax-farming and the tax yields were more predictable. This 
extension of networks of patronage, at which Cobos was so 
proficient, underpinned the state administration but 
enhanced the opportunities for corruption of the political 
elites in the towns. They were thus essentially co-opted by 
Cobos and as a result voted for increasing amounts of 
servicios at regular three-yearly sessions in Cortes. Cobos 
ensured that privilegios and mercedes were dispensed to the
• ■ • • 290procurators who supported the increase in servicios. He 
also arranged for them to receive the servicios collected in
288 Santa Cruz, II, pp. 43-66.
289 AGS, E. leg. 24.
290 Ibid, MP. Legs. 1-58.
196
the receptorlas (collection posts) before paying out to the 
royal Contadores Mayores. This was granted as a royal 
privilege to the procurators rather than to other agents. 
The tax-farmers had previously purchased this right. Thus 
the procurators could delay payment and earn interest. This 
corruption made them more submissive and compliant to the 
emperor's requests. The comuneros had asked that Charles 
reform this practice:
That procurators could not receive monies to hold in 
receptorlas, nor receive merced from the kings of 
whatever kind; they must be free of desire for riches
■ • • 291and without hope of receiving any merced.
They feared that abuses of the mercedes would undermine 
the independence of the Cortes and reduce them to obedience 
to the emperor. Thus it was, with mercedes and habitos of 
the Military Orders growing in amount as the servicios 
increased. Surprisingly, although very respectful to their 
emperor, they still drew attention to unfulfilled petitions.
The principle of raising the servicio through an 
encabezamiento was the key to their corruption and 
identification with the administration. Tax-farming largely 
ended and the towns were given jurisdiction for apportioning 
and collecting taxes in return for increasing the servicio. 
Cobos's method was to have the emperor write to the 
procurators in Cortes to request them to persuade town 
councillors of the need to increase the servicio. Cobos 
required the entire town council to vote for the servicio to
291 Colmeiro, IV, p. 41
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avoid subsequent disapproval of the decisions of their 
representatives in Cortes. That had happened during the 
comuneros r with the resulting murder of the procurator for 
Segovia. The vote was then placed on record as support for 
royal policies and the necessary taxes to implement them. 
Cobos initiated a system of negotiating with the town 
representatives in the Cortes and working out proposals
jointly, then sending drafts back to the towns. This turned
292the Cortes' procurators into proponents of the measures.
As already noted, Cobos also created a Cortes commission, 
permanently resident at court. The commission was 
responsible for administering the collection of the alcabala 
to satisfy the amount of the servicio. Cobos was effectively 
channelling benefits and his patronage to these 
commissioners and thus increasing their dependence on the 
administration. The commission kept lists of towns subject 
to the taxes under the encabezamiento and recorded sums owed 
to the treasury from each of the eighteen towns of Castile, 
which were cabeza de partida (capitals of fiscal sub-
• 293districts) for the collection.
If communities refused to pay their allocation under 
the apportionment of the encabezamiento, they would be 
subject to the old system of tax-farming the alcabala and 
excluded from the benefits of administering the 
encabezamiento. The Cortes commission would auction off the 
estimated tax due to a tax-farmer. Cobos's purpose was to
292 AGS E 1523, leg. 11, f. 157.
293 AGS, PR, leg. 69, f. 86.
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shift the legal responsibility for tax collection to local 
elites. However, they had to work with more experienced 
officials from the Contaduria Mayor in the treasury. In this 
way Cobos indirectly controlled the Cortes commission who 
also paid themselves salaries from the encabezamiento,
Cobos had the emperor issue cedulas to favoured 
procurators giving them further benefits. Procurators asked 
for mercedes, appointments as royal corregidores and, of 
course, appointments to the Military Orders. Procurators who 
did not vote for servicio increases had their requests for 
mercedes refused. Salamanca had been particularly reluctant 
and Charles issued a document, counter-signed by Cobos, 
rejecting their request for mercedes and refusing 
appointment by their representatives to the Order of 
Santiago, on Cobos's recommendation: 'Salamanca was the same
in this Cortes (1542) as the previous one and the servicio
294was approved without it. ' Salamanca had also been one of 
the cities to refuse to attend the Cortes of Santiago called 
to approve an extraordinary servicio to pay for Charles's 
imperial throne, which Charles and Cobos would have 
remembered. This was Cobos's exquisitely developed system of 
rewards and punishments. He was always conscious of the need 
to provide higher servicios for Charles and to extend royal 
jurisdiction with control over patronage to achieve his 
dynastic objectives.
294 AGS, E 1542, leg. 58, f. 39.
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Cobos was successful in this policy of manipulating the 
towns and getting their support. He created a close network 
of merchants and officials to provide the servicios to the 
treasury. An ability to provide funds promptly and advance 
necessary monies increased an individual's chances of royal 
favours. The policy favoured the growth of commercial wealth 
in the larger towns where capital came from property, money- 
lending and trade. It also was a counter-weight to the 
political and military power of the nobility. Thus he did 
not control the Crown's revenues through a large hierarchy 
of bureaucrats with their royal edicts providing minute 
regulation of the economy. Instead, power was fragmented and 
Cobos's manipulation of the tax-regime illustrates his 
management of this process, and his understanding of the 
need to negotiate sharing of power with the Cortes.
The encabezamiento was a practical solution to tax 
collection and provided funds in advance of the tax 
collection, with the actual taxes on goods largely 
determined at local level. Given the small size of the state 
bureaucracy, perhaps he had no option but to devolve 
authority in this way. But like so many of Cobos's methods 
to obtain quick sums of money for his emperor, the longer 
term effect was to lose control of revenues and lose the 
increased revenues from a growing economy. Thus a fixed 
amount was received and the tax yield declined, as the 
alcabalas were no longer determined by market prices. 
Although the amounts of servicios increased with each Cortes 
— growing by three times the amount from 1516 to 1555 — the
200
system of a fixed encabezamiento kept revenues below the 
rate of inflation.
The Cortes would issue a list of petitions prior to 
voting, without actually withholding supply of finances 
until their petitions had been granted. However, the balance 
of insistence on redress moved towards the Cortes over time. 
This can be seen in the nature of the ordenamientos flowing 
from the petitions. At the Cortes of Toledo in 1525, Charles 
promised to deal fully with all petitions before the session 
of the Cortes ended. Although the Cortes had a traditional 
right of petition, they did not have a right of demanding 
redress of grievances before agreeing to supply revenues. 
The emperor wished to make concessions of his own free­
will. However, he ordered the Council of Castile to have the 
Contadores Mayores issue cedulas to implement approved 
petitions so that the procurators could return to their 
towns and 'obtain their cooperation in speeding up the
• 295 > ■collection of the servicios. ' This clearly linked the 
implementation of petitions to the collection of servicios.
Further information on the negotiations that took place 
to raise these servicios and the nature of Cobos's pact 
comes from a manuscript found in the John Carter Brown 
library collection of manuscripts in Providence, Rhode
296 * • ■Island. It consists of a repertono summarising laws and 
pragmaticas from 1523 to 1544 — roughly the years of Cobos's 
greatest influence. It was compiled in 1551 by 'lawyer
AGS, PR, leg. 69, ff. 69, 76. 
296 Providence, R. I., JCB Library, Ms BB/S7333-1551, Valladolid, 1551.
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Andres Martinez de Burgos, resident of Astorga' and sent to 
'the most high, most powerful Prince Philip.' It was 
acquired in the 19th century from the private library of Don
A. Canovas del Castilla. It also includes the leyes de Toro
and leyes de Hermandad and various papal bulls favouring 
royal Castilian jurisdiction. Its value lies in enabling an 
analysis over this period of the nature of the petitions and 
the weighting of importance of different issues, as well as 
the emperor's responses. This can be cross-referred with
297 •Sandoval's chronicles. The series Cortes de los Antiguos 
Reinos de Leon y Castilla, edited for the Real Academia de 
la Historia in the late 19th century by Colmeiro, is also an
298important source. This is a collection of reports by
Alonso Suarez de Mendoza, who attended the Cortes of Toledo 
(1538-39), and a review of manuscripts relating to meetings 
of Cortes in various municipalities around Spain. Another 
valuable chronicle on the Cortes is that of Alonso de Santa
• • 299Cruz, the emperor's principal cosmographer. This was based
on a manuscript discovered in Rome in the late 19th century 
by von Ranke. Santa Cruz had sailed with Cabot in 1525 and 
navigated Brazil's coast in 1530. He was appointed
cosmografo mayor de la Casa de Contratacion in 1536. Some of 
the bundles at Simancas were also consulted.300 These helped 
in cross-checking for inconsistencies and repetitions. But
297 Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, BAE, vol. 82, Historia del Emperador Carlos V, 3 vols 
(Madrid, 1956).
298 Colmeiro, ed.
299 Alonso Santa Cruz, Chronica del Emperador Carlos V (Madrid, 1919), II, pp. 43-66.
300 AGS, PR, leg. 70, ff. 9 to 51.
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first the thesis will consider the crisis of 1538, which 
increased Charles's dependence on the Cortes's servicios, as 
this will place in context the need for an accommodation 
with the Cortes, given the intransigence of the nobility.
Cobos had reported to the emperor that, due to the 
great needs of the emperor's enterprises, the servicio was 
insufficient and the pecheros (taxpayers) were burdened by 
past taxes. 1538 was a climax of imperial over-extension and 
Charles needed to raise enormous sums. The sense of urgency 
comes through in the royal cedula issued in Valladolid, 6 
September 1538, ordering a meeting of all three estates in 
Toledo from 15 October. It was refrendada (counter-signed) 
by Cobos. The historic nature of this meeting was the 
proposal for imposing a sisa general (excise tax on 
foodstuffs) throughout the kingdom, which was to be paid by 
all three estates. Juan Gijon, the emperor's notary, 
prepared a report explaining the reasons for a sisa and
301attached it to the cedula. This required that the poderes 
be unlimited and follow the draft submitted by the royal 
corregidores. Reviewing the state of the nation, it declared 
'the insufficiency of resources and incomes to provide for 
the expenses and extraordinary needs and to pay the enforced 
debts.' Accordingly it appealed for help:
To remedy public needs, .. that the royal patrimony was 
exhausted and consumed by great expenses that in prior 
years had been sustained in the defence of our 
kingdoms.
301 BN, Ms 3825, ff. 51-52v.
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The customary razonamiento followed, emphasising the 
responsibility and cost that went with empire. Castile 
benefited from the imperial throne and should incur the
expenses in defending Christendom against the Turk, the 
Lutherans, and Barbarossa. The procurators ironically 
replied, 'that there is no greater cause and that which 
pleases God than peace between Christians.'
Each brazo (estate) deliberated separately. The 
nobility asked to join the procurators but Charles denied 
their request. Tavera, the President, persuaded the clergy 
to accept the sisa as a temporary measure. But Cobos was
told by the Condestable de Castilla (Constable of Castile), 
representing the nobility, that, meeting separately, as 
Charles insisted, was not a Cortes, and thus:
We cannot deal with anything ... as we without the 
procurators and they without us, it seems to me
anything we did would not be lawful.
Cobos was the go-between with the nobility and Charles; 
indeed the record of the notary shows much coming and going 
between Cobos and the nobility. Cobos told them:
Some issues that have been dealt with up to now are
inadequate to fulfill His Majesty's requirements ... His 
Majesty asks for present help and not advice. It seems 
to His Majesty that the best means that could be had is 
through a general sisa.302
Colmeiro's edition of the Historia de las Cortes notes
that:
302 Colmeiro, V, p. 60.
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The nobility was expelled in punishment for their 
resistance to the wish of the emperor. After the 
dismissal of the nobles, the procurators remained alone 
facing the throne, more to concede servicios with 
humility appropriate to loyal vassals, than to moderate 
the royal power with reverent petitions. The people 
complained that they had been corrupted by promises and 
gifts; and when this was not the case, it was the Kings 
who were masters of the councils that were sent to the
303Cortes by means of the royal corregidores.
Chroniclers like Sandoval describe the meetings of the 
General Cortes of Toledo in great detail, sourced from the 
emperor's principal notary, licenciado Juan Giron, who also 
represented the emperor, together with Cobos and Tavera, at 
the Cortes. The emperor's reply to the nobility was 
sarcastic:
That your good wishes are much appreciated, and that 
this did not represent a Cortes: that help was asked 
for the present, and not advice for the future: that
solutions were sought, and those were not.
These may well be Cobos's words, as they are similar to 
the previous footnote, which was quoted in the Colmeiro 
version. The emperor concluded that, 'from now on there are 
no brazos ... that everyone goes home.'304 Sandoval relates a 
story that the emperor was so angry with the Condestable de 
Castilla, who represented the grandes y caballeros in 
defence of their privileges of hidalguia (nobility) that he 
threatened that he 'would throw him into the gallery from
303 Ibid, V, p. 99.
304 Sandoval, VII, p. 57.
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where he was.' The Constable replied: 'look better Your
305Majesty, although I am small, I weigh a lot.'
This dismissal with apparent anger and asperity has 
been interpreted as weakening the power of the Cortes. The 
comuneros had been defeated and the nobility dismissed. The 
procurators from the towns, therefore, had no support from 
the other estates. However, elimination of the nobility and 
clergy from a role in the Cortes moved the balance of debate 
and negotiation to the towns. Charles was more than ever 
dependent on their servicio. The evidence indicates that
Charles and Cobos had to negotiate with the Cortes to attain 
their servicios, even before the fateful General Cortes of 
Toledo, 1538-39. Cobos had, on 31 January 1539, recommended 
the dismissal, 'that everyone goes home,' which was probably 
a strategic error. Cobos's rubric is on the manuscript
306recording this decision. But after his experiences in
Toledo he probably concluded that it was easier to deal with 
the procurators; the nobility were not to be cowed. And he 
soon found other ways to tax the clergy and expropriate 
landed sefiorios. From then on, however, the number of 
petitions increased, as did the insistence of demands for
Charles to moderate his spending and the taxes that 'bore on 
the people, ' as well as demands that he fulfill previous 
agreements in Cortes.
Charles and Cobos worked with the Cortes to resolve 
some of the petitions and ensure granting of the servicios.
305 Ibid, VII, p. 58.
306 BN, Ms 11599, no. 9.
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Although the Cortes were called por mandado de Vuestra 
Majestad (by order of Your Majesty) and the procurators 
stated: 'pedimos y suplicamos en nombre de estos reynos' (we 
ask and supplicate in the name of these realms) it was clear 
that Charles was in no position to enforce his will and, 
given his enormous financing needs, he had to negotiate with 
the procurators. This he largely left to Cobos. The usual 
expedient, as at Valladolid in 1523, was a declaration that 
the emperOr could not grant the petitions until the servicio 
was given, but promised not to leave the assembly until all 
they asked for was granted 'if it benefited the realm':
I promise to you that the Cortes will not be disbanded 
without first being satisfied with all that is just and 
beneficial for these realms, and in this way whatever 
gracia or merced which is made to you will come from my 
liberality.307
When granted, laws would be promulgated as pragmatic as 
y leyes del reyno (royal commands and laws of the the realm) 
and pregones (town cryer) would be called in principal town- 
squares. Petitions at Valladolid in 1523 — after the
comuneros revolt — included requests that the emperor marry, 
should stay in his realm, should moderate the expenses of 
his household (which were excessive compared to those of the 
beloved Reyes), should have peace with Christian princes and 
war against the infidel, reform the judiciary, should not 
include as tax gatherers those who held royal posts or were 
in charge of libros de las Rentas Reales (tax books of Royal
307 Santa Cruz, II, p. 46.
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Income), only give to Spaniards encomiendas and senorios, 
and that His Majesty give details of monies leaving the 
realm to determine if in specie or bills of exchange (the 
former would greatly damage the community). There was also a 
request as early as Charles's first Cortes of 1518 to desist 
from selling hidalguias (knighthoods),'because they pay no 
tax, which is very damaging to the people, because all those 
who do not pay and who are the richest in the area, are a 
charge on the poor.'
However, Charles continues to be supplicated in 
subsequent Cortes for similar concessions and asked to reply 
to prior petitions whose laws should be collected and 
published. An important, repeated request is for an 
encabezamiento general and for diputados del reyno who 
administer the encabezamieno real to do so without fees. 
Previously, the thesis referred to the 1523 Cortes of 
Valladolid's complaint about tax-farming and the need to 
replace it with a perpetual encabezamiento. Charles 
responded:
That he was pleased to grant a merced to his realms for 
an encabezamiento to the cities that had a voice in 
Cortes, for fifteen years with certain conditions: that 
the said cities collect by encabezamiento all the 
income from the towns and provinces in their area, 
without leaving any excluded, and after paying the 
juros assigned in their regions, they would be obliged 
to pay these incomes in the third of the year and bring
the monies at their own risk to the Court of His
• _i_ 308Majesty.
308 Santa Cruz, II, p. 63.
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This was part of Cobos's negotiated settlement with the 
municipalities, which enabled him — by aligning their 
financial interests with those of Charles — to have the 
emperor ask for increasing amounts of servicios.
Now that the crisis of the General Cortes of 1538-1539 
has been discussed, we can turn to an analysis of the 
manuscript discovered in the JCB Library, referred to 
previously. The collection in the JCB Library of Martinez de 
Burgos is an attempt to clarify laws and contradictions, 
'ordered to administer justice and good government in these 
realms.' He organised his information by libros, titulos and 
leyes (books, titles and laws), putting all related data 
together with a list of contents 'for better consultation.' 
This was to be a 'working document' for lawyers and judges 
' so they can know all the laws and new pragmaticas made by 
Your Majesty.'
The titulos referring to encabezamiento are worth 
quoting at length, given that this became the main source of 
finance. The Cortes's approval of servicios were often 
susequently rewarded by a 'royal concession' of a time- 
extension of the fixed encabezamiento. At the 1534 Cortes of 
Madrid it was extended for ten years — which of course 
reduced the growth of royal revenues and was a major 
contributory cause of financial insolvency. It was again 
extended by ten years at the Cortes of Valladolid in 1547. 
This is fully quoted and translated from the manuscript, 
Folio LVIIIf Libro VI, Titulo III, Ley I, and Ley II, as 
shown in Appendix Two.
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Other books and titles such as Llbro VI, Titulo III 
contain various laws that state how the encabezamiento of 
the alcabala should be shared (the repartimiento) and
arbitrated if disputes arose. Thus:
Jurisdictional cities, justices and corregidores were 
to call procurators and six good pecheros (tax-payers), 
two of the richest, two of the average and another two 
of the lesser well-off, if there was doubt or debate 
over the repartimiento of the encabezamiento real. And 
all together see and verify in what manner the 
repartimiento has been made and paid ... and if some of 
the tax payers have been unfairly treated, they will
communicate and confer to determine how to resolve in
the future the repartimiento and payment, and all being 
in agreement they will send to our council so that it 
will be confirmed or amended and if it cannot be 
confirmed ... we will send an order from our council in
our letters and provisions. ,
Pragmatica de S. M . Valladolid, 1537.
Disputes could affect the timely advance of servicios 
to the emperor and/or his bankers. Thus the above mediation
process had to be enforced. Another pragmatica requires that
Cobos and other members of the royal council intervene to 
resolve a dispute in the repartimiento to ensure timely 
payment to the royal treasury. The pragmatica complains 
that:
And now you know that the procurators of the said 
cities that met in Valladolid in 1541 are obliged in 
accordance with my cedula to fulfill their agreement: 
and many cities do not pay that which they justly 
should ... and create disorder in the repartimiento: and 
they supplicate me to send the necessary papers to 
resolve this. That my cedula is registered and already 
effective I order that you together with Doctor 
Guevara, Licenciado Giron and the Comendador Mayor 
[Cobos] of our council review the list you must provide 
for the said encabezamiento: and hearing the opinions
of the people whom the procurators represent, amend the 
conditions that seem to us worthy of change in the 
encabezamiento so that all families of these realms 
enjoy the benefit, in equality, in conformity with the 
letters of encabezamiento, and that I exempt you from
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whatever charges or blame that by this you can be 
charged.
Pragmatica de S. M. Valladolid, 1547.
It has been shown that petitions were often repeated 
even though they were incorporated in royal pragmaticas. 
Analysis of both the Cortes Antiguos de Leon y Castilla and 
the manuscript of Martinez de Burgos demonstrate this. A
typical petition was:
That the royal servicio is not requested without just 
cause, and is spent in defence of these realms ... and it 
pleases us to spend the said servicio only in the
protection of these realms and resistance to their 
enemies, if they come against us: and in no other
particular need, nor in any other of our kingdoms and 
senorios.
This was first issued in the pragmatica of the
Valladolid Cortes, 1523; it was then repeated in a
pragmatica at the Toledo Cortes of 1525 and the Madrid
Cortes of 1528. The procurators kept trying and failing to 
restrict all spending of servicios to the defence of 
Castile. Charles had a different interpretation of his 
patrimonial territories. The French invasion of Italy in
1523 necessitated expenses for that campaign, and the fall
of Rhodes to Suleiman the same year necessitated naval
expenditure. The Genoese and Augsburg bankers required the 
security of the servicios to advance funds for these 
enterprises.
Many pragmaticas required that prelates and clergy live 
in their dioceses. But Charles needed many prelates for his 
royal service as they were trained in law and
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administration. Thus the pragmaticas of Valladolid 1523, 
Toledo, 1525, Madrid 1528 and 1534, and Valladolid, 1537 all 
repeated:
We order that the prelates that are not occupied in our 
service, and offices and positions indicated, reside in 
their churches and bishoprics.
It was unrealistic for the procurators to expect a 
wholesale replacement of the emperor's councils. Other 
pragmaticas dealt with administration of justice and 
training of judges.
The JCB manuscript of the pragmatica at Valladolid, 
1523 (Libro VI, Titulo V, Ley XV) is particularly
interesting because it responds to the procurators' concern 
on the outflow of specie:
That the pope does not receive monies from these realms 
other than bills. Because the amount of money received 
by the very sainted pope from these realms is enormous; 
taken out in money creates great damage to the
republic. We order that he takes bills.
This issue comes up often with payments in gold coin to 
mercenaries. The increasing use of bills of exchange drawn 
on the bankers avoided the direct outflow of specie. The
'barbaric relics' of gold and silver were equated with a
kingdom's wealth in the mercantilist tradition before the 
coining of the term. This will be further discussed in a
later chapter.
The JCB manuscript, with the prominence given to the 
many pragmaticas by Charles over a decade or more to 
establish the principal of encabezamiento, provides insight
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into the critical importance to Charles and Cobos of 
achieving timely payments of servicios. The amount of 
detail, including arbitration and enforcement procedures, 
bears Cobos's signature. Also, Cobos's role is emphasised in 
Charles's various cedulas in the manuscript, which required 
consultation between the procurators and Cobos over the 
implementation of the encabezamiento and granted authority 
to the Contadores Mayores, under Cobos, to collect the 
proceeds.
Cobos's Influence in the Council of Finance
After the defeat of the comuneros Charles had to 
restore order and his finances. To this end he remained in 
Castile from 1522-1529. He needed to ensure the security of 
his patrimony and dynasty, partly by placing loyal retainers 
in key institutions. During the revolt of the comuneros he 
had been unable to pay his creditors.309 It has been shown how 
Cobos worked with the municipalities to co-opt their support 
and to raise servicios while responding to petitions, many 
of which had been requested by the comuneros. Charles needed 
the town's elites and therefore had to favour them in their 
struggle to resist noble pressure on their territories.
The audiencias were given more independence in reforms 
introduced by Tavera, President of the Council of Castile, 
and especially unimpeded jurisdiction over cases involving 
conflicts between the aristocracy and towns lying within the
309 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602 
(Madrid, 1996), pp. 34-48.
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royal domain. The purpose here was to address a common 
complaint that nobles tried illegally to assert their 
senorlos, and litigation with the nobility was often 
suspended. Tavera's agreement with the towns after the 
comuneros was to have the town's royal corregidores act to 
keep them free of noble encroachment.
Cobos and Tavera were the principal architects of 
reform. Their rivalries were discussed in the previous 
chapter. They had ' un paso comun fernandino' (a common 
connection), having worked in Fernando's councils and, 
therefore, were at first able to work together and share
310different spheres of influence. But institutional reform 
was not about efficiency for Charles, as suggested by some 
historians; it was more about dynastic preservation.311 Tavera 
was appointed President of the Council of Castile (1524-39). 
Together with Cobos, he expanded the existing system of 
councils and established new specialised councils to oversee 
the expansion of trade with the Indies and to administer 
royal finances. Thus, the Consejo de las Indias was created 
in 1524, with Cobos as secretary.
The Indies was beginning to be recognised as an 
important source of royal revenues and a new council was 
deemed necessary to manage this development. The Casa de 
Contratacion at Seville had, from 1503, exclusive control
310 Ibid, ‘El regimen polisinodial bajo la egida de Cobos y Tavera,’ in La Corte de Carlos 
V, ed. J. M. Millan (Madrid, 2000), II, pp. 43-49.
31 !A. Espinosa, ‘The Spanish Reformation: Institutional reform, taxation and the 
secularisation of ecclesiastical properties under Charles V ,’ The Sixteenth Century Journal 
XXXVII, no. 1 (2006), pp. 3-24.
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over the administration of all trade and navigation with the 
Americas, with all goods being registered and receipts
maintained at the Casa, and the pilotos mayores (principal 
pilots) being appointed and their skills tested in the pilot
o n  , , • • • • •
school. This rigid monopolistic system of administering
trade, which was described in detail by a 17th century 
treasurer of the Casa, Jose de Veitia Linaje — one of 
Haring's principal sources — was later extended to register 
all gold and silver at Seville to avoid dispersal and
unregistered flow through to other countries. Yet Charles 
permitted foreign cargo-ships to trade with the Indies — and 
by agreement with Henry VIII in 1523 — on the same terms as 
Spanish vessels. This caused the Cortes of Valladolid of 
1523 to petition:
That foreign vessels cannot be loaded as this is 
prohibited by law, and if some merced has been granted 
it should be revoked.
The Cortes continued to blame the shortage of Spanish 
vessels on Charles not complying with the laws and
313 • • •pragmaticas. The detailed records in Seville's Archivo de 
Indias formed the basis of Earl J. Hamilton's research into 
the relationship between the quantity of silver arriving in 
Spain and the so-called 'price revolution', which will be
discussed later in Chapter Five, under the sub-heading 
'Cobos, Juros and Silver.'
312 Clarence Henry Haring, Trade and navigation between Spain and the Indies in the time 
o f the Hapsburgs (Gloucester, Ma, 1964.)
313 Valentin Vazquez de Prado, Aportacidnes a la Historia Economica y  Social de Espana 
y  Europa: Siglos X VIy XVII (Pamplona, 2000), pp. 131-133.
The Consejo de Hacienda was established in 1523. This 
became the main instrument for negotiating loans. Cobos was 
secretary to both this council, and the Consejo de las 
Indias. The Presidents of these councils were both close to 
him, and he was responsible for their ordinances and 
advising the emperor on jurisdictional cedulas. When the 
Presidents changed they were invariably tied to Cobos 
through obligation. He always preferred the role of CEO 
rather than Chairman of the Board. He named his favourites, 
Gonzalo Perez and then Francisco Eraso, to follow him in the 
post. Prior to the Consejo de Hacienda, financial and 
treasury affairs had been divided between two Contadurias 
Mayores: the Contaduria Mayor de Cuentas which authorised
payments, registered revenues and checked the expenses of 
officials (a controller's office) and the Contaduria Mayor 
de Hacienda, which administered and collected royal income. 
The distinction is important and is reflected in the 
archival organisation of the massive holdings of manuscripts 
at Simancas relating to records of finance. Each was staffed 
with book-keepers and escribanos (clerks). Gattinara had 
suggested a reform that resembled the Flemish Conseil des 
Finances and to supervise both Contaduria Mayores to ensure 
their functions were well defined. Martin Salinas, in his 
letters to Fernando, Charles's brother, makes the first 
reference to Charles's intention to establish this consejo 
in his letter of 8 February 1523: 'His Majesty wishes to
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create a Consejo de Hacienda, I believe in the form of 
Flanders. '314
The Consejo de Hacienda effectively replaced the 
Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda and met daily to examine 
budgets on income and expenses. Cuentas continued to 
function examining expenses and helping the new Consejo in 
arranging the enormous numbers of asientos (credit 
contracts) essential for maintaining the solvency of the 
empire. The ordenanzas establishing the Consejo de Hacienda, 
setting out its functions and naming its members are in the
» 315 • •Simancas archives. Royal domain income and expenses 
continued to be administered by the Contaduria Mayor. This 
included responsibility for collection of 'ordinary' royal 
rents, and payment of royal fixed expenditures. Francisco de 
Vargas, a friend of Cobos, was appointed as special 
treasurer to receive the Crown's ordinary and extraordinary 
revenues from Castile and to avoid the multiplicity of 
treasurers collecting and making payments from the various 
revenue accounts. Vargas sent monthly financial reports to 
the Consejo de Hacienda, which oversaw these accounts. 
Salinas writes that the new Consejo had little support when 
created in 1523. Cobos as secretary of this Consejo was 
charged with countersigning all payments. Salinas writes to 
Fernando again in 1524:
314 A. Rodriguez Villa, ed., Martin de Salinas, embajador del infante Don Fernando, 1522- 
39 (Madrid, 1903), p. 149.
315 AGS, E, leg. 12, ff. 4-6.
Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, Carlos V y el credito de Castilla: El tesorero general 
Francisco Vargas entre 1516y  1524 (Madrid, 2000), pp. 37-49.
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I wish you to know who are the Secretaries at present 
in the ascendancy ... Cobos has all responsibility for 
Castile, and truly he is in this court, quite 
verifiably, in favour with His Majesty and everything 
of these kingdoms passes through his hands. You can 
well believe, Your Majesty, that he triumphs; the lives 
of the other Secretaries do not count ... Cobos also
317delivers all the mercedes.
By then most of the members had been changed. The 
Simancas archives, seccion Estado, has a document signed by 
Cobos, writing to Charles, recording some of the changes and 
referring to the Consejo as 'concerned with all the
• • ' • 318extraordinary things of Hacienda.'
It seems that rivalries had been resolved and as 
Salinas says, 'Cobos was in control.' The President of the 
Consejo was changed from Enrique de Nasau to Francisco de 
Mendoza, who owed his ascent to Cobos. Cobos's role was 
pivotal here: he communicated to the Consejo the emperor's 
orders and set the agenda for their meetings. Imperial 
policies required such a new institution to manage
extraordinary income and expenses as Cobos had said in his
letter to Charles (cited above). The ordenanzas from 1523-25
make it clear that the Consejo should manage royal finances. 
Its main role was to obtain resources for imperial policies. 
Although this was limited to Castile, the war policies of 
empire involved expenditure beyond Castile's frontiers, a 
constant source of friction in the Cortes. Responsibilities 
included raising loans and new forms of taxation. The
Archivo de Simancas has many ordenanzas between 1523 and
317 Salinas, p. 210.
318 AGS, E leg. 12, f. 3.
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1525 granting jurisdiction to the Consejo de Hacienda for, 
among other items: tax-farming; clerical rents; income from 
the maestrazgos (masterships) of the Military Orders, which 
had been assigned by the popes to King Fernando; the cruzada 
(an indulgence and contribution from the Church to crusade 
against Islam); and ensuring payment of the servicio, which
319was administered by the towns on behalf of the Cortes. All 
these were areas within Cobos's competence.
The Consejo was in charge of raising the cruzada but, 
during Cobos's absence with the emperor from 1529, Tavera 
dealt with these negotiations directly, as President of the 
Royal Council of Castile and principal advisor to the 
regent, Queen Isabel. There seems to have been a challenge 
to Cobos's monopoly of the royal ciphers that had to 
accompany the emperor. Tavera did not have access and thus 
could not read all the correspondence. He complained to the
320 •emperor and to Cobos. His letter to Cobos stated that:
In matters of common interest, Cobos should heed his 
recommendations, under conditions existing between us,
• ■ 321and that Cobos could rely on him doing the same.
Juan Vazquez de Molina, Cobos's nephew, acted as royal 
secretary to the regent in Cobos's absence. He wrote to 
Cobos that Tavera, overwhelmed with detail and work, lacked
• 322the ability and will to delegate tasks. Charles's 
'Instructions' of 8 March 1529, on the conduct of the
AGS, E, leg. 12, ff. 4-6.
320 AGS, E 20, f. 205-207.
321 AGS, E 24, f. 191.
322 AGS, E 25, f. 224-228.
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regency, had defined Isabel's competences, limiting her 
poderes, reserving to himself the power to make 
appointments, and insisting that she heed the advice of her 
councils, particularly that of Tavera who was responsible 
for drafting official correspondence for the empress and
• 323 •Cobos on matters of finance. One can detect her uncertainty 
in a letter to Cobos asking him to speak to the emperor on 
her behalf to clarify certain poderes:
Ask the emperor to state what powers the empress has in 
the Kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia and Cataluna ... on the 
difficulties to pay for supplies in the current year 
and the impossibility next year, ... the bad condition of 
the coastal fortresses and the lack of means to repair 
them.324
In this she is clearly reflecting Tavera's views on the 
need to protect the coast from Moorish invasions and 
strengthen the North African garrisons. Cobos wrote to 
Vazquez de Molina: 'do not dispatch anything from the
empress without the President (Tavera) seeing it.'325
Imperial policy required a wholesale reform to finance 
dynastic projects and increase available resources. Cobos 
pursued this in a number of ways, using patronage networks 
to underpin the state administration, and incorporating city 
and ecclesiastical elites to support Charles's enterprises. 
Cobos understood that the municipalities were the basic 
administrative unit of Castile and that he had to co-opt 
them. Conciliar arrangements for tax-collection and judicial
323 CDCV, I, pp. 148-151.
324 CDCV, I, p. 156.
325 AGS, E, 42, f. 118.
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changes could be reformed in Valladolid, but to be effective 
the consent of municipalities was indispensable. Tax-farming 
had gradually been replaced by the municipalities after the 
comuneros revolt. The Cortes pressed for an extension of the 
encabezamiento tax-system to facilitate their involvement in 
the allocation of tax obligations in their regions and the 
resulting benefits to their network of interests. Although 
devolving the collection away from the royal treasurers, the 
Crown was assured of a certain sum while favouring social 
groups away from court and the older aristocracy.
Institutional reform from the top was inadequate; the 
political system worked through networks of personal 
contacts, which Cobos knew very well. Developments such as 
the growth of bureaucracy and administrative institutions 
have been well researched, so the thesis will not specify 
these changes. But such changes should not be viewed from 
the modern concept of reforms or efficiency improvements; 
they were undertaken to protect the emperor's patrimony and 
attain imperial objectives relating to that patrimony. While 
the administrative changes in councils have been well 
researched, the political decisions in the municipalities 
and their connection to Charles's conciliar system need 
further investigation to deepen understanding of the process 
of implementation of financial policy. Most municipal 
documentation is contained in the notarial archives of local 
communities and this represents a massive task of research. 
Some local historians, such as those in tJbeda, have provided 
me with valuable information from that municipal archive.
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What is clear is that the towns maintained much of 
their autonomy, despite changes in the institutional 
councils and attempts to restrict town privileges. In a 
fiscally fragmented society Cobos had to bargain with 
favoured groups, such as the nobility and clergy, who were 
largely tax-exempt. Their successful resistance to a 
universal tax — proposed at the joint Cortes of 1538-39 — 
such as the slsa to be applied equally across groups, meant 
that Cobos had to negotiate with these groups separately. In 
particular, it meant that .he had to co-opt the procurators 
from the 18 towns represented in meetings of the Cortes on 
issues of apportioning the servicios voted by the Cortes. 
His tax policies involved co-operating with the cities of 
the Cortes to ensure that both monarchy and the emerging 
power of the urban elites benefited. This probably best 
defines Cobos's skill: his ability to move with the tide and 
recommend policies that would work. Gattinara designed 
institutions, but Cobos knew that men's self-interest would 
determine success.
Cobos, Tavera and Taxes on the Clergy
Charles's President of the Council of Castile, Tavera, 
worked to reform administrative procedures and 
jurisdictional fragmentation, after the defeat of the 
comuneros in 1522. He strengthened the audlencias by 
transferring litigation from the Council of Castile appeals 
court, which also enabled the Council to concentrate more on 
royal administration. He restored the power of the royal
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corregidores in the towns, which had been weakened during 
the comuneros revolt and he instituted visitas (official 
inspections) to the chancery of Granada and the audiencia of 
Seville. The visitador (inspector) was empowered to audit 
the judges and replace them where necessary.326 He appointed 
judges and oidores (court officials) with legal training 
from the universities and church; and letrados clerigos — 
ecclesiastics with law degrees. This class of prelates had 
been active in royal government since the Middle Ages, and 
Charles's Burgundian appointments were a departure from this 
clerical tradition. Tavera also enforced clerical residency. 
All these measures were requested in petitions of the Cortes 
of Valladolid in 1523, after the comuneros revolt. He built 
a network of prelates and jurists to serve in the various 
councils, educated in canon and civil law. Tavera prepared 
the emperor's address to the ecclesiastical estate at
327 •Granada in 1526. This outlined proposals for
ecclesiastical tax-reforms.328
Charles sought justification from the pope and Spanish 
clergy to tap Church revenues and impose financial 
obligations to support military expenditures in defence of
the faith. He saw the Church as an integral part of his
patrimonial jurisdiction. Indeed clergy presided over the 
appellate court system and were indebted to the emperor for 
benefices, appointments and promotions. Tavera also
AGS E leg. 15, f. 20.
327 AGS E leg. 14, ff. 59-91.
328 Santa Cruz, II, pp. 246-247.
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implemented petitions of the Cortes of Toledo, 1525,
329requesting term-limits for judges as well as auditing. The 
audiencias were given jurisdiction over cases involving 
conflicts between the aristocracy and the towns within the 
royal jurisdiction to avoid the custom of suspending 
litigation involving the aristocracy. This followed the 
emperor's and Cobos's policy of reducing dependence on 
nobles and establishing closer ties with the towns by 
involving the urban elites in maintaining royal justice and 
public order.
Tavera was also appointed archbishop of Santiago in
1524 and, as such, chaplain to the emperor. He became
archbishop of Toledo in 1534 and Inquisitor General in 1539.
330Here was a man in every sense positioned to rival Cobos. 
Indeed, until 1530, he probably was in the ascendancy. 
During the absence of both Charles and Cobos he placed his 
own men at the Inquisition after the disgrace of his enemy,
331Inquisitor General Manrique. It was the custom to replace 
members of the Consejo de Inquisicion when a new Inquisitor 
General was appointed. He also introduced his favourites 
into the Consejo de Indlas, which may have been a challenge 
to Cobos, as the President of the Consejo de Indias was 
Garcia de Loaysa, absent in Italy, and a close confidant of 
Cobos. His position in the ecclesiastical hierarchy enabled
329 AGS PR leg. 70, f. 98.
330 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, El Consejo de Hacienda de Castilla, 1523-1602, 
(Madrid, 1996), pp. 34-48.
331 Jose Martinez Millan, 'Las elites de poder durante el reinado de Carlos V, 'Hispania 
(Madrid) 48 (1988), pp. 103-167.
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him both to dispense privilege and strive to increase the 
Church's monetary contribution to Charles's imperial 
policies, in the name of defending universal Christianity. 
He also wished to translate the occasional papal grants of 
cruzada to a more regular stream of revenue, which would be 
more attractive to secure bankers' contracts and thus 
increase his influence with the emperor.
Tavera and Cobos seem to have worked together on 
increasing Church taxes and selling the lands of the 
Military Orders. While Cobos was travelling with the emperor 
from 1529-1533, Tavera negotiated with the clerical 
establishment, as President of the Council of Castile, to 
tax the cathedral chapters and begin the expropriation of 
the Military Orders. -Cobos negotiated with the pope for his 
approval of these measures. They both had networks of 
clients and the ability to dispense privilege that made it 
easier to accommodate supporters. Both men were empowered by 
the emperor to ensure the stability of his patrimony and 
dynasty. The original placement of Burgundians in key 
positions, which had been so much resented, was gradually 
reduced. Their exchange of letters seems to indicate a 
harmonious relationship. Tavera seems to have been confident 
enough of Cobos to write to him criticising the emperor for 
spending too much time on Italian and French business:
The emperor was better in Spain where he could apply 
his great thoughts, and Africa, that war with these 
Moors is necessary and still hard, and reject all that 
of Italy and France.
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There was much opposition to the emperor's Italian trip 
of 1529, and Tavera's view of empire was more prevalent in
332Castile than support for Charles's European ambitions.
We have seen that Cobos worked with the cities of 
Castile through their representatives in Cortes to negotiate 
an increasing amount of servicios in return for more 
independence in the allocation of their burden. It proved to 
be much easier to deal with the towns's representatives than 
with the clergy. The clergy's representatives had to agree 
an allocation of a new tax on their revenues, which had been 
authorised by the pope. Negotiations were protracted; the 
bankers complained and the emperor had to threaten the
. . . 333prelates with confiscation. Juan Vazquez de Molina's 
letters to Cobos describe the process. Perhaps Cobos was 
happy to leave the clergy to Tavera. He seems to have had a:n 
instinct for where he could be most effective in the 
emperor's service.
Cobos and Tavera needed to exploit ecclesiastical 
property and revenues. This meant confronting the pope. 
Later in the chapter, the thesis will examine how Cobos 
dealt with Clement VII. The Cortes continually sent 
petitions complaining about clerical abuses and so Charles 
had sufficient reason to press the pope to call an 
ecumenical council 'for the health, peace and tranquilty of 
the Christian republic.'334
BN, Ms, 1778, f. 155.
333 AGS, E 12, leg. 169-170.
334 Santa Cruz, II, p. 43.
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He issued a royal cedula ordering clerics to join his 
councillors (including Cobos and Tavera, named on the
x  , 3 3 5
cedula) m  a meeting m  Granada in 1526. The clerics 
stressed Charles's ancient imperial powers of ‘gracia, 
merced y  patronazgo real' (royal privileges and patronage). 
The Church, they believed, was an integral part of Charles's 
patrimonial jurisdiction. This justified the emperor's
3 3 5
taxation rights in defence of Christendom. Of course, the 
clerics were widely present in Charles's judicial and 
conciliar system, and were indebted to him for benefices, 
appointments and promotions. Having squared his own clergy 
Charles could now deal with the pope.
Cobos and Tavera worked to increase the cruzadar the 
guarta subsidy from the cathedral Chapters — eliminating 
papal privileges — and, most importantly, the proceeds from 
the sale of lands and villages of the Military Orders. 
Charles/wrote to Tavera from Mantua on 4 April 1530:
The pope must quickly seek to force the prelates and 
indeed the entire ecclesiastical estate, the Castilian 
and Aragonese monastic houses and the Military Orders, 
force them all to susidise a substantial number of 
galleys, and by doing this soon the quarta negotiations
337will not be compromised.
This is a reference to ongoing discussions with the 
pope about taxing the cathedral chapters. Difficulties in 
getting his way with the clerical establishment seem to have 
cooled Charles's relationship with Tavera, but he continued
335 Ibid, pp. 44,45.
336 AGS, E, leg. 14, f. 228, Granada, 1526.
337 AGS, E, leg. 21, f. 269.
227
as President of the Royal Council until 1539, when he was 
relieved of this position and replaced by his enemy, 
Fernando de Valdes. Tavera had written to Charles in 
December 1529 worried about the:
Rumours and negative talk in this court ... taking money 
outside the customary way ... the Consejo de Hacienda 
that should help more in these things ... some tell me 
that as President of the Council I am obliged to advise
and ask Your Majesty that you do not destroy these
338realms nor exhaust your subjects by so many demands.
This was a querulous letter, shifting the blame for 
failure to deliver sufficient funds. Charles replied:
As to the rumours that there have been and there are
against you for the way the asiento of Alonso
Gutierrez, Vozmediano and Enciso, was dealt with, do
not pay attention to this, that I know that in
everything you do is for our service ... as to Hacienda,
I believe that there are not the funds necessary ... but
I will be served that you, although you have so many
burdens and work, look well and understand what is
needed and that you provide what is necessary for the
good financing of the realm, and that you make no
339excuses m  any way.
Charles smoothes Tavera's feathers, but then makes it 
clear what he expects. He also seems to be encouraging 
rivalry with Cobos who was the Secretario de Hacienda and 
whom Charles knew was annoyed by Tavera's involvement with 
the asiento negotiated by Gutierrez, Vozmediano and Enciso, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. But this was 
his style of balancing power in his councils.
338 AGS, E, leg. 20, num. 204.
339 CDCV, I, p. 198.
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In 1539, after the death of the queen, Tavera had to 
share the regency, with Cobos and Valdes — the President of 
the Consejo de Castilla and intimate of Cobos — thus 
lessening his power and that of his followers. The emperor
wrote to him on 10 November 1539 restricting his poderes
generalesi he must consult with Cobos and Valdes; Cobos
would choose the secretary to the Royal Council (this was 
his nephew, Vazquez de Molina); Tavera could not issue 
cedulas to make payments from the Contaduria; he could not 
grant mercedes without consulting with Charles; he could not 
appoint people to consejos without consulting with the 
emperor; neither could he give juros perpetuos (non-maturing 
bonds) from the royal income.340 This seems intended to cut 
him down to size and to emphasise Cobos's importance in 
matters of finance — the need of which was assuming crisis 
proportions. He also issued a separate command to his 
ministers — perhaps Cobos's hand can be discerned here — 
detailing his "Instructions' on Tavera's poderes generales
and emphasising that everything to do with Hacienda must be 
directed to Cobos: y
That everything that you write to me and send to 
consult in business, is with the intervention of the 
Comendador Mayor, of my Council of State. 341
Valdes's closeness to Cobos is confirmed in Charles's 
'Secret Instruction' to Philip, 6 May 1543, where he writes:
CDCV, II, pp. 50-53.
341 CDCV, II, pp. 53-55.
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The President is a good man ... and although I commend 
him greatly for his agreement with Cobos, it seems to 
me that he is much subject to him, and that he would 
remain with Cobos and for him would do things that 
might not be legal, just to please him.342
Valdes was indeed Cobos's creature, and Charles was 
asking Tavera to consult with his enemy Valdes!
Meanwhile, Cobos was appointed Contador Mayor de 
Hacienda, in addition to his secretaryship of Hacienda. This 
made him administrator of all the emperor's finances. 
Carande writes that he became:
Absolute master of Castile's finances; no other 
councillor of Charles V dealt with so many business 
people and rich European bankers as the hidalgo from 
Ubeda.343
But Tavera had been elevated to Archbishop of Toledo in 
1534, in part with Cobos's support, in return for agreeing 
to Cobos's sehorlo de Cazorla, which was within the gift of 
the archbishopric. He was also Inquisitor General, so in 
matters religious he was very powerful. But this seems to be 
the point where Cobos achieved supreme power in secular 
matters of finance.
Control and communication were used by Cobos to 
maintain and strengthen his position. Juan Vazquez de 
Molina, his nephew, and other members of his network kept 
him well-informed on Tavera. Tavera often had to guess at 
the emperor's wishes or use his judgment, which could be
342Ibid,p. 115.
Ramon Carande, ‘El atrayente y ambicioso Francisco de los Cobos (14707-1547),’ in
Siete estudios de historia de Espana, (Barcelona, 1971), p. 104.
230
misinterpreted, as can be seen from their voluminous 
correspondence in the first two volumes of the Corpus 
Documental.344 His letter to Charles, written as the primate 
of Spain, 25 April 1539, is an important analysis of the 
social and economic problems of Castile. He complains of 
false reports about the encabezamiento and diezmo raised in 
Toledo and hopes that he doesn't give 'anger and annoyance' 
to the emperor by his reports of 'the poverty and pestilence 
in the land.'345
The Chinese saying that 'the mountains are high and the 
emperor is far away' captures what happened to Tavera and 
the difficulty of reaching decisions agreeable to the absent 
emperor. Power resided in being at the side of the emperor 
and not deviating from his wishes. It also avoided the 
dangers of factionalism at court, where rumour could 
undermine power. Tavera always had to respond to Charles 
over some accusation or other from the clergy or nobility. 
Above all, however, it was control over the financing of 
Charles's ambitions that counted. To be able not only to 
deliver bankers' credits but also to create new forms of 
financing to expand the credit base earned Charles's praise. 
By facilitating regular increases in the servicios Cobos 
repeatedly proved his indispensability to the emperor, as 
the servicios were the means by which credit was created.
To expand ecclesiastical sources of revenue, Charles 
sought direct negotiations with the pope. Cobos played an
CDCV, I-II, Tavera.
345 CDCV, II, pp. 545-546.
influential role in Italy. Italy Was usually the province of 
those in charge of Aragon, such as Gattinara and 
subsequently Granvelle. It has been shown that Cobos's 
responsibilities were principally in Castile with the Cortes 
and the servicios. This, therefore, needs an explanation. 
Clearly it was a necessary step to go over the head of his 
clerical rivals, particularly Tavera. In addition, he had to 
help his master obtain the coronation in Bologna after the 
demise of Gattinara. But it also formed part of the need to 
raise more clerical revenues, which were not voluntarily 
forthcoming from the establishment in Spain. He needed the 
papacy to provide the authority to appropriate the land of 
the Military Orders, issue bulls for a cruzada, and levy 
taxes on cathedral chapters: all strongly resisted by
Toledo. It was also the road to Cazorla, always his subtext; 
the key to gaining a papal bull, which would authorise his
acquisition of the sehorio of Cazorla and Sabiote, and a
consistent theme in his actions. Toledo was not going to 
grant this and he had, therefore, to go directly to the
pope.
His circle in Italy was important in extending his 
influence on the pope. Hurtado de Mendoza, first in Venice 
and then as ambassador to Rome; Francisco de Borja and his 
brothers who were cardinals; Garcia de Loaysa as ambassador 
in Rome, whose correspondence with Cobos has been discussed 
previously; and the painter Sebastian del Piombo, as the
guardian of the pontifical lead-seals. Piombo (whose real 
name was Luciano) was named ‘Piombare' (lead) in 1531 by the
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pope after painting his portrait in 1526. Commissioned by 
Clement, he also painted Andrea Doria, another important 
convert to the emperor's cause. Piombo was possibly an exact 
contemporary of Cobos (1485-1547). His access to papal 
correspondence, through his guardianship of the papal seals, 
made him a useful contact for Cobos. He had presented Cobos 
with a religious painting — La Piedad. This has been moved 
from El Salvador chapel in Ubeda to the Prado Museum. It is 
a donation from the Fundacion Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, the 
family who inherited Cobos's family title — Camarasa. 
Ferrante Gonzaga, Piombo's patron and general of the 
imperial armies in Italy, had commissioned the painting for 
Cobos, and his comment about 'devout Christians' was quoted 
in the Introduction to this thesis.
These people were all in Cobos's circle and influential 
with the pope; a mixture of artists, generals and admirals, 
ambassadors, cardinals, and diplomats. The secretary to 
Charles's viceroy in Naples, Juan de Valdes — younger 
brother of Alfonso, Charles's Latin secretary — wrote to 
Cobos from 1539 complaining about the depredations of 
Spanish troops. They had been unpaid due to Neapolitan 
resistance to imperial taxes. He also outlined his political 
views about the need to defend the propriety of local 
jurisdiction, criticising the viceroy's tendency to: 
' llevara las cosas de Valladolid' applying the standards of 
one imperial jurisdiction, Valladolid, to Naples. Cobos's 
surviving letter to Valdes indicates his high regard for
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Valdes's administration and his interest in separate 
jurisdictional policies for the provinces of empire:
bien se que vuestro consejo e industria no puede dejar
de ayudar mucho a llevar con menos fatiga el peso de
los negocios (I well know that your advice and industry 
has lightened the burden of business).346
This exchange of ideas shows Cobos's involvement in 
policy and debate about jurisdictional differences. He was 
not the one-dimensional man, depicted by Keniston, as only 
being concerned with his privileges and network of 
patronage. Valdes, like his brother, was a prominent writer 
on Erasmian humanism and whose book Dlalogo de las Lenguas
was written in 1538 while in Naples.
Cobos, perhaps encouraged by Hurtado de Mendoza — as 
indicated in the latter's letters to Cobos discussed in the 
previous chapter — was also part of a circle actively 
Considering the possibility of a General Council. The 
medieval legacy of General Councils terrified the papacy, as 
such a Council would be superior to the pope. The emperor 
repeatedly called for this to resolve the schism in 
Christian unity. The Council of Trent was finally summoned 
with Hurtado de Mendoza representing the emperor, but this 
was after Cobos's death. Cobos perhaps preferred the threat 
of calling of a Council, as a weapon to use, rather than the 
Council itself.
In 1523 Pope Adrian required Charles and Francis I to 
unite against the advancing Turk. Rhodes had just fallen.
346 Daniel A. Crews, ‘Juan de Valdes and the Comunero Revolt,’ Sixteenth Century 
Journal 22 (1991), p. 251.
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Francis procrastinated and instead invaded Italy. Adrian 
then supported Charles's wish to take control of the 
Military Orders to obtain funds to defend Christendom. 
Francis I was defeated at Pavia and taken hostage. However, 
in 1524 Cardinal Medici was elected pope, as Clement VII, 
and the Medicis of Florence were traditionally France's 
bankers and, more important, bankers of the papacy. The 
League of Cognac, in 1527, was organised by Clement:
To forge the hatred and revenge of the French King and 
the riches of the English and Venetians into a weapon 
with which to break the power of the Emperor.347
Charles's response led to the sack of Rome, Clement's 
retreat to Orvieto and the lifting of the siege of Milan. 
Santa Cruz, writing in the 1550s, quotes the pope's protest 
and the Spanish general's reply:
Sehor Pope, understand things of Your Church, and leave 
war to those who must make it; and I tell you we will 
speak about an agreement only when Your Sanctity 
removes your people from Milan.348
This must have been difficult for a military pope to 
swallow, but his troops were forced to retire from Milan. 
How, then, did Charles and Cobos obtain the financial 
support of this hostile pope?
The Medici control of Florence was crucial to papal 
finances; Florentine revenues provided financing for the 
League of Cognac's military campaigns in Lombardy. But
347 Ehrenberg, p. 86.
348 Santa Cruz, II, pp. 222-223.
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Clement lost Florence during the sack of Rome in 1527 and 
the republicans took over. He had a strategic need to 
recover Florence for Medici rule. Like Charles, he thought 
of himself as heir to the Roman imperium and each had their 
dynasties. Five of the Renaissance popes had been Medici 
family members, as their papal uncles had named them 
cardinals. Pope Adrian was a mere two-year break in this 
sway of the Medici. Charles had already suborned the 
'Church's captain of the sea,' Andrea Doria, in 1528 — so 
vividly portrayed by Piombo in the portrait commissioned by 
Clement in 1526. So Clement signed the Treaty of Barcelona 
with Charles in 1529. Charles restored some of the Papal 
States and agreed to help recover Florence.
The pope agreed to a league of mutual defence, to grant 
Charles censo (tribute) from the King of Naples and a 
cruzada tax to collect indulgences paid to the Church for 
three years. Clement also agreed to the coronation of 
Charles as emperor in Bologna in 1530, and to help with the 
election of his brother, Ferdinand, as King of the Romans. 
The Fuggers advanced most of the money for this election, 
backed by the cruzada. The Fugger 'court' book itemises
349loans to Ferdinand. The provisions of the Bologna 
contracts between the emperor and Clement VII allowed Cobos 
to negotiate terms with the bankers to collect clerical
349 Ehrenberg, p. 92.
236
subsidies. They included all the cathedral chapters in
350
Castile and Aragon.
Pope Adrian had already in . 1523 issued a bull 
sanctioning the perpetual incorporation of the maestrazgos 
(masterships) of the Military Orders into the Crown. This 
allowed bankers to collect revenues from the Military Orders 
to repay the loans made to buy Charles's imperial title in 
the absence of servicios during the comuneros revolt. Given 
the shortfall in revenues from the servicios and the 
increasing military expenses, Cobos worked to obtain papal 
approval to permit the sale (alienation) of the land of the 
Military Orders. The manuscripts in the Archivo de la Casa 
de Osuna in Madrid's Biblioteca Nacional illustrate Cobos's 
role in papal negotiations. The papal bull states: 'granting
• 351gracias to Cobos.' Clement gave many gracias to Cobos, 
including a bull sanctifying the chapel of El Salvador in 
Ubeda and giving Cobos permission to appoint all the
352capellanes (chaplains). He also issued a bull granting 
Cobos's son Diego, underage at seven years, all the 
prerogatives and privileges in the Order of Santiago in 
August 1529. This was highly unusual.
The overall result represents the careful negotiation 
with Clement for the emperor to access clerical wealth, 
balancing carrots and sticks. Help would be given to restore 
Florence to the Medici, and Charles's army was omni-present
350 AGS, PR, leg. 62, f. 66.
351 BN, Archivo de Osuna, Mss 8446, 8447, leg. 4039, 1, 2, c. 1570, Clemente, Breve 
expedido por S. S. El Papa Clemente VII a Don Francisco de los Cobos, 1530.
Seville. Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Section Sabiote, caja 3, leg. 3, ff. 46-68.
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to remind the pope of the sack of Rome. Cobos needed the 
pope's support to legitimise the collection of clerical 
taxes. The result was that Cobos could offer the bankers the 
security of the cruzada and collection of clerical subsidies 
given by the cathedral chapters, all blessed and endorsed by 
the pope. A substantial loan followed from the Fuggers and 
was secured by an asiento to collect the tax on the 
cathedral chapters.353
There had been strong resistance, especially by the 
episcopate of Toledo, throughout the 1520s, to the 
imposition of this tax. Adrian, when acting as Charles's 
regent in 1520, had written about the impossibility of 
collecting clerical tribute.354 Although collection of 
clerical revenues could have been forced, papal canonical 
authorisation was better. Negotiation was everything. Cobos 
had skill in knowing his opponents' interests and 
motivations, and seldom failed his emperor. He did, however, 
make one irreconcilable enemy — Siliceo — the future 
archbishop of Toledo. The stripping of the Toledo chapter 
revenues and much of their ecclesiastical lands was 
something for which he held Cobos accountable, as we saw in 
the previous chapter. The appropriation of the Military 
Orders, engineered by Cobos, led directly to Cobos's 
purchase from Toledo of the land of the Order of Calatrava 
in Cazorla; Cobos's future sehorio of Cazorla and Sabiote.
353 AGS, E leg. 20, f. 72.
354 AGS, PR, leg. 1, f. 193.
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The Military Orders were divided into encomiendas 
(estates) administered by comendadores (commanders) who 
controlled municipal districts, which paid them taxes. Towns 
and villages in these domains paid sehorial annuities to 
their ecclesiastical lords — commanders of the Military 
Orders. The masterships of these 'orders' had already been 
incorporated into the Crown in 1523. In 1530 Pope Clement 
VII issued a bull allowing the emperor to transfer the 
property of the Military Orders to his royal domain so that 
he could auction the property to private investors and use 
the proceeds on religious wars. The commanders of the Orders 
received juros (bonds) in compensation. Cobos's treasury 
team appraised the value of the encomiendas before 
auction.355
The nobles and clergy were exempt from the servicio 
but, by selling the property of the Military Orders, Cobos 
found another way to make them pay, and with papal approval. 
Cobos also purchased for himself the sehorio of Cazorla and 
Sabiote from the Order of Calatrava. Alvaro de Bazan, 
Marques de Santa Cruz, victor of Lepanto and, after Cobos's 
death, Comendador Mayor del Leon, bought his estate at Viso 
del Marques from the Order of Calatrava. The Marques de 
Mondejar (a Mendoza, and Cobos's relative through his 
marriage) bought lands from Calatrava contiguous to his 
properties at Guadalajara. The sehorio of Cazorla and 
Sabiote gave Cobos the independence he sought to establish a
355 AGS, E leg. 24, f. 5.
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lineage. Thus church property was transferred into secular 
jurisdiction, sometimes royal, often sehorial, with the 
newly enriched becoming lords with the purchase of sehorios 
and encomiendas of the Military Orders and receiving 
annuities from their towns. The alcabala tax was still paid 
to the royal treasury in most cases. Increasingly, however, 
former Military Order jurisdictions were sold to include the 
alcabala on transactions within the sehorio. Thus the royal 
treasury not only alienated the landed property, but also 
lost the annual revenue from the alcabala. Cobos received 
alcabala revenues for his sehorio of Cazorla for his own 
account.
The historical tax-exemption of the cathedral chapters 
had been abolished and the combination of these new taxes, 
together with the co-option of the municipal elites to 
provide increased servicios, raised revenues for the 
imperial enterprises. Tracy shows an increase in clerical 
taxes from 1523 to 1540 of from 10 to 15 per cent of royal 
revenues. Thus Cobos and Tavera had substantially
broadened the fiscal base for Charles's enterprises. But the 
next chapter will show that this would not be enough, as a 
liquidity problem morphed into a solvency crisis.
356 James D. Tracy, ‘War Finance and Fiscal Devolution in Charles V ’s Realms,’ in World 
o f Emperor Charles V, (Amsterdam, 2004), p. 104.
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The Finance of Empire 
From Liquidity Crisis to Solvency Crisis
The certainty of credit from servicios was deemed to be 
essential. Bankers understood the municipalities as similar 
to medieval cities in Italy, which were incorporated, and 
whose credit was rated higher than that of princes. Hence 
their preference for servicios, "The bankers were as one in 
preferring fixed and predictable sums which could not be
357 • • • •concealed or falsified' The municipalities did not 
undertake the bankers' debt directly in order to pay their 
share of the servicio, but through allocation to trade 
guilds within their jurisdiction. It was not until the 17th 
century that the municipalities burdened themselves directly 
with debt, entering into contracts with local guilds and 
investors, with disastrous consequences for the old 
population-centres of Castile. Ruiz Martin has researched 
this issue.358
It has been shown in the previous chapter how Cobos 
broadened the empire's fiscal base and the thesis will now 
examine how Cobos maintained the bankers' confidence in the 
face of deterioration in their perception of the 
creditworthiness of the emperor. Cobos produced a cascade of
357 James D. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, impresario o f war: campaign strategy, 
international finance, and domestic politics (Cambridge, 2002), p. 102.
o r o
F. Ruiz Martin, ‘Credit procedures for the collection of taxes in the cities o f Castile 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,’ in The Castilian crisis o f the 17th century, 
ed. A. A. A. Thompson (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 169-181.
241
expedients and, despite defaults and acts of expropriation 
of private capital, he kept the system going, ramshackle 
though it may appear. The issue of liquidity rather than 
solvency was his concern. Recognising the latter would have 
required policy changes — what economists call fiscal 
consolidation — which would have been in conflict with 
Charles's dynastic policies.
By the end of Charles's reign, more than 90 per cent of 
the servicios were consigned to repaying the bankers, 
especially the Fuggers and Welsers of Augsburg and the 
Genoese. By then interest rates had risen to 13 per cent 
plus, indicating the increase in perceived risk.359 They had 
been around 4 per cent at the beginning of his reign. There 
are various estimates of the percent of royal revenues (i .e . 
non-royal domain revenues) derived from the servicios. 
Estimates for 1521 to 1530, calculated in an unpublished 
doctoral thesis, show that the Crown received from the 
servicios and tercias (royal share of the diezmo clerical 
tithes) between 80 and 90 per cent of its income. Most of 
these revenues were assigned to the bankers. All this was 
reason enough for Cobos to concentrate on the servicios and 
the municipalities that provided them.
Ingenuity, which often appeared as improvisation, was a 
necessary requirement for Charles's financial secretary. But 
most important was access to merchants and bankers who could
359 AGS, Escribania Mayor de Rentas, leg. 372.
Charles Hendricks, ‘Charles V and the Cortes o f Castile: Politics in Renaissance Spain’ 
(unpublished PhD, Cornell, 1976), p. 222.
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make loans immediately against the security of the emperor's 
resources. Charles was considered a better risk than Francis 
I because his territories were diverse and prosperous. 
Repayment of credits could be made through a variety of 
markets and fairs around Europe, all within his territory. 
In Castile alone, principally at Medina del Campo, fairs 
(the ferias de pagos) were held during Lent, May, August and 
October when bills would become due for payment.361 In the Low 
Countries payments could be made and funds raised in 
Antwerp; similarly in Italy, in Genoa and Naples. These 
fairs differed from the later bourses in the infrequency of 
their dealings, with only two or four fairs a year. It had 
been the characteristic form of business concentration for 
commodities and bills of exchange since the Middle Ages. But 
given the wide spread of the fairs within his territories, 
Charles was better able to access funds and handle the 
payments than his enemies. The bankers who allowed him to 
accumulate enormous debts — the Genoese and the German 
Welsers and Fuggers — and the Spanish merchant bankers 
sustained Charles financially during the 1520s. The Genoese 
were probably more involved in loan contracts (asientos) 
from the mid-1520s, as the Fugger's capital was tied up in
'if*)
the loans for the imperial title. Individual merchants and 
bankers wielded considerable influence. This was only
o/'i
F. Ruiz Martin, ‘Las finanzas del Emperador,’ in El Imperio de Carlos V, ed. M. 
Fernandez Alvarez (Madrid, 2001), p. 175.
362 Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Carlos V en una encrucijada financiera: las relaciones 
entre mercaderes-banqueros alemanes, genoveses, y espanoles en los asientos de 1529- 
1533,’ in Carlos V y  la quiebra del humanismo politico, 6 vols (Madrid, 2000), IV, pp. 
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reduced by the later development of bourses, such as
Antwerp, which brought together large amounts of capital, 
more widely held and collectively better able to meet the 
huge demands for funds.
Charles was indebted to the Fuggers for the large loan, 
which helped him to win his imperial title in competition 
with Francis I. He was unable to repay under the original 
terms and therefore granted them a three-year lease to 
collect rents in money and kind from the maestrazgos (the 
masterships of the Military Orders) from 1524 to 1527. Jacob 
Fugger had written to the emperor complaining about
Charles's failure to honour his solemn promise to repay 
loans:
It is well known that Your Imperial Majesty could not
have gained the Roman Crown save with mine aid.
Carande, Ehrenberg, and Kellenbenz are the classic 
sources on the role of the Fuggers.364
The maestrazgo lease, whose anticipated rentals had to 
be pre-paid in advance, formed the basis of the Fugger's 
enormous Spanish business. They moved a large retinue of 
agents and factors to Almagro, centre of the maestrazgos. 
Carlos wrote to the empress:
We must fulfill the maestrazgo asiento so that the 
lease-holders do not complain.
363 Ehrenberg, p. 80.
364 H. Kellenbenz, Los Fugger en Espaha y  Portugal hasta 1560 (Madrid, 2000).
365 CDCV, I, pp. 267-268.
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Almagro still shows south-German architectural 
influence. The Fuggers also acquired the management of the 
nearby quicksilver (mercury) mines at Almaden, and would 
later ship this to the mines at Potosi to process the
crushed silver ore and create ingots to be shipped back to 
Seville.
The, Fuggers' ownership of Habsburg mortgages (dating 
from Emperor Maximilian) on silver mines in the Tyrol had 
given them access to mining skills. It was the process of 
amalgamating silver ores with mercury that unlocked the
potential of the American mines and the Fuggers were 
familiar with this from their mines in the Tyrol. Anton
Fugger inherited the business on Jacob's death in 1525 and 
the Fuggers continued to advance funds to Charles and his 
brother Ferdinand and to Philip II, until the 1557 
moratorium-bankruptcy. Ehrenberg's figures from the Fuggers' 
'courtbook' show the enormous debts due from Ferdinand, 
incurred to help in the defence against the Turk.
Despite Charles's treatment, the Fuggers were loyal to 
the emperor and his son until brought down by over-extension 
of loans, first to help the emperor extract himself from
encirclement by the Schmalkalden League at Innsbruck in 
1552, and finally by large dealings on behalf of the emperor 
on the Antwerp exchange. Anton Fugger considered that 
Cobos's successor as Secretario de Hacienda, Francisco 
Eraso, 'did ill service to his master, who, however, will
366 Ehrenberg, p. 88.
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have it so.'367 By then the Fuggers had lost all trust in 
Philip II and his advisors. Imperial and Fugger bankruptcies 
followed in 1557. Cobos had kept credit flowing by rolling- 
over loans and changing the terms of the asientos. Once 
again Cobos7s intervention was decisive and of the greatest 
importance. He had maintained the bankers7 confidence — the 
essential criterion of credit. After Cobos there was a 
crisis of confidence.
Recent work in the archives of Simancas by Carlos 
Morales and Ruiz Martin has highlighted the importance of 
the Genoese, particularly in the 1530s, when Charles was 
concentrating on Italian policies. 368 Indeed, they were 
intimately connected with Charles7 s military activities in 
Italy. Andrea Doria7s family were Genoese bankers and money 
was always needed for his galleys.369 Doria was commander of a 
squadron of Genoese galleys who, in 1528, had switched 
allegiance from the king of France to Charles. For decades 
after, his galleys were an important part of Spain7s naval 
forces. Charles's ambassador in Genoa was Suarez de Figueroa 
— later to be ambassador to England's Queens, Mary and 
Elizabeth. He was active in discussions with the Genoese 
bankers and was aware of the negotiations in Rome for the 
Bula de Cruzada. His letters and accounts in Simancas show
370the extent of loans he negotiated with the Genoese bankers.
367 Ibid, p. i 10.
Ruiz Martin, ‘Las Finanzas del Emperador’; Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Carlos 
V en una encrucijada financiera.’
369 A. Pacini, La Genova di Andrea Doria nell’Impero di Carlo V (Florence, 1999).
370 CDCV, III, pp. 59-61.
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Carande also describes Suarez de Figueroa's activities with 
the bankers of Genoa and quotes him as writing to Philip on 
11 April 1552, recommending fulfilling the bankers' contract
• 371terms as soon as possible. The new papal bull encouraged 
the Genoese to negotiate an asiento, backed by this cruzada, 
when Charles was in Bologna in early 1530. The cruzada was 
an attractive security — a three-year concession to collect 
indulgences from the ecclesiastical revenues — and often 
resulted in competition between the bankers for access to 
its collection. It involved collection fees, often at 15 to 
20 per mil, as well as the interest on the advance. They 
also discounted sums when charging for conversion of income 
received into gold, their medium of exchange.
Spanish merchants and bankers often also served as 
officials in the administration. Thus Vozmediano was a 
secretary in the Comisaria de Cruzada, and his brother was 
in the Contadurla Mayor de Cuentas. Juan de Enciso was also 
a contador in the Cruzada and maintained a merchant-banking 
business in Burgos. In 1528 he succeeded Cobos in the office 
of Tomar Razon de las Mercedes (accountant for royal gifts). 
Vozmediano, Enciso and the treasurer Juan Alonso de 
Gutierrez all acted as intermediaries for the Fuggers in 
negotiating a large asiento (contract) in 1530. This was to 
be assigned to the new cruzada, then in process of receiving 
Clement VII's bull. But they hid their role from the Consejo 
de Hacienda, whose task it was to arrange these asientos and
371 Ramon Carande, Carlos V y  Sus Banqueros: Los Caminos del Oro y  de la Plata 
(Barcelona, 1987), III, pp. 374-378.
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analyse the terms and conditions. It appears that they were 
trying to take commissions from both sides, as well as 
demanding mercedes for themselves and their families. When 
it was known that the source of this asiento was the
Fuggers, the Consejo cancelled the negotiations, on Cobos's 
instructions, and then re-opened them directly. Carlos
Morales, who has written extensively on the Consejo de 
Hacienda, gives details of the conflicting role of 
Vozmediano and Enciso in negotiating the asiento in 1530. He 
describes the process of negotiation of this large asiento, 
based on documents at Simancas. He vividly shows the
complexity of the security offered, terms and conditions 
demanded, and the rivalry between the Consejo de Hacienda 
and other treasury departments.372 Cobos was travelling with
Charles during these years, but was in close touch with his
\
department at the Consejo. When he saw the proposals, he 
drafted a reply for the emperor with annotations setting out
• 373 • •their defects. He seems to have been particularly anxious 
at Tavera's role in supporting Vozmediano who was
undermining the Consejo's role in secret, independent 
negotiations with the Fuggers. Cobos wrote to Tavera, in 
response to his letter, 'the mercedes they demanded were not
• • • 374merely a few things for themselves and their families.' 
This letter tries to portray Tavera as naive in trusting
Carlos Javier de Carlos Morales, ‘Carlos V en una encrucijada financiera,’ pp. 405-429.
373 AGS, E 21, f. 247-249.
374 BN, Ms 1778, ff. 214-220.
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these intermediaries. The Consejo had analysed the terms and 
found them wanting.
Negotiation of loan terms and conditions bear a 
striking resemblance to modern loan-contracts. The officials 
had presented themselves to the Fuggers as intermediaries 
connected to Hacienda who could negotiate better terms from 
Hacienda. To Tavera they presented themselves as loyal 
officials who had convinced the Fuggers to offer a large 
asiento. They would earn commissions from the bankers and 
mercedes from the emperor. The Fuggers would also realise 
that they needed their services for future negotiations.
Tavera's letters to Charles, writing as President of 
the Royal Council, agonised over the state of Castile's 
deficits:
I have communicated with those of the Consejo de 
Hacienda urging them to use all possible means to 
procure money. They complain much that although they 
are most diligent they cannot raise the amounts 
needed.375
This seems to have been a criticism of the Consejo, 
Cobos's department. After the rejection of the terms of the 
Fugger's asiento by the Consejo, Tavera wrote to Charles 
that the 'asiento was appropriate and most advantageous as 
much in its amount as in its terms.'376 He later wrote to 
Charles, that 'Vozmediano and Enciso have incurred many 
expenses to move the negotiations forward to a successful
^  AGS, GA, leg. 2, ff. 57-58.
376 AGS, E, leg. 20, num. 203.
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conclusion.'377 Charles's letter to Tavera, 9 March 1532,
refers to having received a memorandum from Encisa on how to 
arrange a large asiento and encourages Tavera to follow up 
on this approach.378 Tavera asked Alonso de Baeza at the 
treasury to reopen negotiations with the Fuggers and 
Charles, then with Cobos in Bologna, finally accepted the 
resulting asiento. But the rivalry between the Consejo de 
Hacienda (Cobos) and Tavera, who supported Enciso and 
Vozmediano's negotiations, delayed the asiento. The intrigue 
of all parties is revealed in letters from Tavera to Cobos 
in the Biblioteca Nacional, Ms 1778 (footnoted above on page 
247).
Vozmediano wrote to Charles in February 1530 
complaining about the role of the Consejo de Hacienda in
'5HQ
impeding his negotiations with the Fuggers. He insisted
that he was a loyal servant of the state and had no other
interests. Tavera subsequently recommended that Charles
grant mercedes for their efforts. Vozmediano and Enciso had 
bypassed the Consejo, going directly to Tavera as President 
of the Royal Council, behind the backs of the Consejo de 
Hacienda and Cobos. This seems to have been the beginnings 
of an enduring enmity between Tavera and Cobos. Vozmediano 
and Enciso negotiated on behalf of Tavera and the regent, 
Isabel, again in 1532, this time with the Genoese.
377 AGS, E, leg. 20, num. 62.
378 CDCV, I, p. 271.
379 AGS, CJH, leg. 9.
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When Charles's ordinary revenues were exhausted, the 
practice developed to defer paying expenses and instead to 
accrue them to the following year's income, which simply 
compounded larger deficits as the expenses spiralled. The 
nature of these expenses is detailed in a 'report of 
everything that is necessary,' prior to Charles's
embarkation for Italy in 1529. The report included, among 
other things, military expenses for the army; for Andrea
Doria'sgalley squadron, and the coastal fleet of Alvaro de
Bazan (the future admiral of Lepanto); the armed transports 
for the emperor's voyage; the continuing costs of the 
Pyrenean frontier defences — Fuenterrabia, San Sebastian and 
Pamplona — and the garrisons in Africa.380 This deferral of 
expenses put more pressure on the need to negotiate fresh 
asientos to cover the gap. No sooner had the Fugger contract 
been signed than the huge expenses of the coronation at
Bologna necessitated further funds. Thus, in Cobos's 
absence, Alonso de Baeza acting as tesorero general, was 
instructed to negotiate again with the Fuggers to make
further advances on incomes projected for 1532. The Fuggers 
did this by deducting the amounts due from the previous 
asiento and thus making a reduced advance through a new
asiento. Further asientos were also negotiated with the
Genoese. This necessitated further recourse to extraordinary 
revenues from sales of the land of the Military Orders,
380 AGS, CJH, leg. 7, ff. 169-170.
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sales of town charters, and further issuance of jurosf among 
other items. Juros (bonds) will be discussed later.
More and more future revenues were either alienated or 
pledged to asientos with the bankers. Financial problems 
were merely pushed forward into future years. Tavera wrote 
to Charles in 1532:
The interest rates that the merchants charge are so 
great that it would be wrong not to inform Your Majesty 
of how the amount of these exchanges and interest that 
is being charged is so great that it could sustain the 
estate of another prince in addition to that which Your
381Majesty consumes m  this.
This seems a very undiplomatic letter that could well 
have irritated the emperor; it was in the style of 
Gattinara. Nevertheless, a new gracia of cruzada was 
negotiated with the pope and a servicio from the Cortes. 
Tavera wrote again to Charles, this time complaining about 
the harsh effects of the increase in servicios on the
382Castilian economy.
Tavera and Isabel permitted Vozmediano and Enciso to 
negotiate an asiento in their own name (to be negotiated and
383syndicated with other bankers). It was opposed by Hacienda. 
This asiento of 1532 contained provisions granting penalty 
rates of 14 per cent if any payments were delayed at the 
biannual fairs in May and October at Medina del Campo. 
Vozmediano and Enciso negotiated this clause again without 
the review of the Consejo de Hacienda. Delays on other
381 AGS, E, leg. 24, f. 178.
382 Ibid.
383 AGS, E, leg. 25, ff. 194,195, and 199.
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asientos arranged by them caused even higher penalties, 
bringing protests from Hacienda, and led to the disgrace of 
the two intermediaries who had Tavera's patronage. These 
activities of officials and individuals in the 
administration were not unusual and were rarely penalised.
As the emperor's financial needs grew more desperate, 
new unorthodox methods for raising money were sought. Thus 
the arbitrios developed, a practice 'in creative means to 
procure money for Hacienda.' The arbitrista would offer his 
advice on a method to increase royal revenues, which he 
would then develop in detail on receipt of some merced 
established by a royal cedula. This would give him a certain 
percentage of the revenue raised by his scheme* Most schemes 
involved selling public offices, creating new royal 
positions or selling royal jursdictions to towns and 
alienating royal property. Various Cortes had to remind the 
emperor of his promise not to alienate crown lands and 
rents. Various memos, letters and suggestions on raising 
revenues can be found in the section Consejo y Juntas de 
Hacienda at Simancas, directed to the Consejo de Hacienda
384 •and often to Cobos himself. These would be discussed and 
sometimes forwarded to the emperor for approval.
Charles, and probably the bankers, confused liquidity 
with creditworthiness — not dissimilar to to-day's practice 
where governments seem to believe that increasing liquidity 
in the banking system will create the necessary growth to
384 AGS, CJH, leg. 9, ff. 138-147.
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redeem or service debt. The bankers believed that they had a 
liquidity risk to their loans — hence they took control off 
or had assets pledged — when in reality solvency was the 
problem. Credit and liquidity are intertwined and lack of 
the latter soon leads to credit difficulties. The servicios 
and other extraordinary revenues, such as the cruzada, were 
used to provide the liquidity of bankers' loans to Charles. 
These loans contained clauses in the asientos requiring 
payment principally from future servicios, or sometimes from 
rights to collect revenues from specific royal assets. These 
servicios were the financial innovation of the time that, 
along with the asiento, facilitated an enormous expansion in 
credit. Rather than an asset being the basis of liquidity, 
liquidity became synonymous with easy borrowing from future 
cash flows.
Tracy has shown how the bankers monopolised the 
mechanism of credit transfer through a network of remittance 
agents, or correspondents, thereby avoiding the slow and 
uncertain transfer of cash to the armies.385 The banks agreed 
to pay money through an agent against a bill of exchange to 
Charles's representatives abroad. The bills backed by 
asientos were short-term loans and were reimbursed at the 
Antwerp exchange or at one of the fairs held at Medina del 
Campo in spring and autumn. Antwerp in particular developed
385 James D. Tracy, Emperor Charles V, Impresario o f  War (Cambridge, 2002), p. 309. See 
also the discussion on this in Geoffrey Parker, The Army o f Flanders and the Spanish 
Road, 1567-1659 (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 146-156, which usefully brings out the 
difficulties in the asientos and the payment of soldiers in precious metals in the reigns of 
both Charles V and Philip II.
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a market in bills connecting payments and credit mechanisms 
to other centres. This was often needed for the payment of 
Spanish soldiers, at their points of assembly, in gold, 
through bills converting Castile's silver, which backed the 
asientos. Charles had ordained in 1537 that bills could only 
be paid for in gold. The bankers, therefore, exchanged 
silver into gold. Braudel describes the role of Genoese 
bankers in controlling the currency exchange of gold and 
silver. Many of them were resident in Seville and in 
Charles's court where they negotiated the terms of the 
asientos with Cobos. Like their rivals, the Fuggers, they 
formed a 'merchant state within a state.'387 They had 
constituted the largest group of foreigners resident in 
Seville since the late 15th century, looking for new 
investments with the emerging trading opportunities in the
388New World. Charles's constant deferral of repayment made 
the asiento a costly form of financing. Penalties for delay 
were added, and this sometimes doubled the original 
principal amount of the loan. Future revenues were mortgaged 
into the distant future. Cobos wrote to Charles on 17 April 
1532 complaining about the excess interest charges.389
But the international banking service was a vital 
requirement for Charles's widespread empire. Through the 
asiento and bills of exchange he could have funds speedily 
transferred to the locality of immediate need. Giovanni da
386 F. Braudel, Civilisation and Capitalism, 3 vols (New York, 1979), III, pp. 160-170.
387 Ibid, p. 169.
388 A. Collantes de Teran, Sevilla en la baja edad media (Madrid, 1977), p. 216.
389 AGS, E, leg. 24, f. 178.
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Uzzano compiled a notebook in 1442, showing the times taken 
by couriers to travel between various places, which give an 
idea of the time needed between the drawing of a bill and 
its presentation for payment. 390 Raymond de Roover has written 
extensively about the bill of exchange as a form of quasi­
money, mostly developed by the Medici bankers in the
391 ■ • • •previous century. Without the facility of bills of 
exchange, Charles, with his fragmented empire, would have 
had great difficulty in paying his troops.
Thus, on the expectation of future funds for repayment, 
Charles gained an immediate advance and agreement to deposit 
monies in the principal centres of recruitment of 
mercenaries. This immediacy and certainty gave him an 
advantage over his enemies, who were not so well endowed 
with the security that the bankers required and the great 
patrimonial wealth that was the basis of Charles's credit. 
The financing of empire depended on financing arrangements 
that were backed by such contracts; without this resource he 
could not have pursued his imperial idea and his political 
objectives. The emperor and Cobos were fully aware of the 
importance of these asientos but, paradoxically, they were 
to take measures to undermine the sanctity of the law of 
contract, the very basis for the credit on which they 
relied.
390 P. Spufford, Handbook o f  medieval exchange (London, 1986), pp. 35-40.
391 Raymond de Roover, Business, Banking and Economic Thought in Late Medieval and 
Early Modem Europe (Chicago, 1974).
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Much has been written on asientos. The importance of 
contractual rights was well understood and documented in 
detailed clauses within the asiento, much like today's loan 
agreements. The asiento was a contract from the Consejo de 
Hacienda formalised by means of an escritura (registration 
with a public notary) and issued by order of the emperor, 
who authorised the contract. Today we would term this a 
documentary credit. It is interesting how the more formal 
and all-inclusive a legal contract, the less the trust 
between the parties. The archive of Simancas conserves 
thousands of these asientos, which have solemn texts 
illustrating the initiation and tramites (stages) of each 
asiento, the parties involved and conditions of issuance up 
to the final escritura. Some of the asientos in the 
Contaduria Mayor and Escribania Mayor files at Simancas have 
been sampled for this thesis and a few of their 
characteristics are described below. Although Carande and 
others have researched the asientos, Cobos's involvement in 
drafting their detailed clauses has not been investigated. 
The manuscripts in the Contaduria Mayor follow in great 
detail the drafting of proposals and their negotiation and 
amendments. Many of these are annotated in Cobos's hand. The 
only catalogue is that by Cuartas Rivero on the Consejo de
392 ■Juntas de Hacienda. There are some letters m  the 
Contaduria Mayor from the emperor stating:
The urgency in finding money, and need for care and 
diligence ... that which has been agreed with the bankers
392 M. Cuartas Rivero, Consejo de Juntas y  Hacienda (Madrid, 1987).
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be strictly fulfilled, however much it pains to 
sacrifice my subjects; that we agree to everything
• • 3 93asked m  order that my credit does not suffer.
In his letters to Philip, the emperor continually 
emphasises the importance of trust and confidence for 
maintaining his credit with the bankers.394
Cobos's letters are full of amendments and additions in 
his pen. He followed every detail and change in the 
asientos. Vazquez de Molina, his nephew, also writes to 
Cobos on the asientos, in reply to Cobos's requests for 
detailed information as he travelled with the emperor. There 
are also letters to Charles from Suarez de Figueroa, his 
ambassador to Genoa, about the Genoese banking contracts. 
The ambassador was very concerned about fulfilling the terms 
of the asientosi
Your Highness should order that the agreements with the 
merchants be complied with ... sending me proof of how 
things stand, so that I can collect from those that
still owe ... because they do not wish to pay in any 
other way.
He also writes:
As Your Highness will have seen from the asiento that 
we have with them, they have paid me the first third, 
and the second they will pay me at the end of this 
month; the third they do not wish to pay until they
learn how that which has been promised has been
fulfilled. I therefore humbly request that Your
• 395Highness send funds to comply with the asiento.
393 AGS, CJH, leg. 18, ff. 189-190. 
m CDCV, III, pp. 585-586.
Ramon Carande, ‘Carlos V: viajes, cartas y deudas,’ in Charles Quint et son temps, ed. 
Renouard (Paris, 1958), pp. 222-223.
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The Genoese were innovating and introducing staged 
drawdowns on loans to lessen their risk, which one can find 
in today's syndicated loan contracts. For non-bankers this 
means monies were drawn down according to a schedule, thus 
reducing the average outstanding loans.
Charles gave authority to Suarez de Figueroa to make 
payments from the Casa Real:
To pay the merchants from royal revenues, the best and 
most certain guarantees that we might have in order 
that we can fulfill and anticipate payment ... in a way 
that gives sufficient security ... and that conforms with
• • 396that agreed in the asiento.
He also wrote to him requesting that he arrange more 
credits in such a way that the total amounts would be 
disguised by spreading them among many bankers.397
The formal conditions of the asientos guaranteed their 
payment at maturity; the cedulas de aprobacion promising to 
fulfill the clauses and conditions with the full faith and 
royal word — Charles duly signing with Cobos's refrendada 
(counter-signature). The Contaduria Mayor archives have a 
series of documents acknowledging a moratorium on some 
asientos, and accounts attached to cartas de pago (receipts) 
of creditors show a chronic delay in payment. Excess 
formality of documentation was one thing; enforcement of 
contract would be another matter. The Fuggers fared better 
with their collection or factoring rights on income from the
™CDCV, III, p. 265.
3Q7 Ramon Carande, Carlos VySus Banqueros, vol. Ill, p. 280.
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maestrazgos (masterships) of the Military Orders. This was 
specifically tied to credit for Charles's imperial title.
Our contemporary financial situation has shown how 
governments act to breach contract rights in a crisis. A 
part of the Fifth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution prohibits the taking of private property for 
public use without just compensation. But that is what the 
U.S. Congress has recently done in connection with 
bondholders in the car industry; traditional capital 
structure priorities were ignored with Trade Union pension 
funds receiving priority over secured lenders. Similarity, 
Charles was forced to expropriate private silver shipments 
and issue low-yielding, long-dated juros (bonds) in 
compensation. Thus the bankers looked to the municipalities 
for security on their asientos, not Charles. But by placing 
too much reliance on future servicios Charles and Cobos were 
eroding the value of Castile's prime asset: the municipal
servicio.
Military expenditures vastly exceeded royal 'domain' 
revenues. As we have seen, the cities controlled much of 
Castile's revenues and granted servicios every three years 
to the emperor through meetings in Cortes. Up to 1530 
servicios were tied to a variety of Charles's expenses 
including the upkeep of his household. But from 1530 almost 
all servicios were assigned to repay asientos.398 Spanish
398 J. M. Carretero Zamora, ‘Liquidez, deuda y obtencion de recursos extraordinarios en 
tomo a los servicios de Cortes en epoca de Carlos V ,’ in Carlos V y  la quiebra del 
humanismo politico (Madrid, 2000), IV, pp. 443-461.
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bankers and merchants were most active in syndicating loans 
for the emperor until the mid-1530s, and many of the elites 
in the towns benefited from these financial services. Their 
role in managing the allocation of quotas of tax payments 
for the servicios enriched them and enabled them to 
participate in loans to the emperor. The Church, through the 
cathedral chapters, also made loans, particularly to help
• • 399Fernando in his defences against the Turk. By the late 
1530s most of the servicios were assigned to the asientos of 
foreign bankers.
The Fuggers and Welsers dominated from the 1540s. By 
then more than 90 per cent of the servicios were regularly 
pledged to bankers' loans through the asiento, and such 
loans were granted in anticipation of the servicio. The 
bankers considered this a predictable and quantifiable 
security. They would, therefore, accept bills of exchange 
drawn on their agents, say in Milan, for payment of 
Charles's troops against the security of the servicios. The 
Simancas Escribania Mayor de Rentas, legajo 281, shows a 
payment order signed by Cobos relating to an asiento with 
the Genoese banker Jacome Centurion, dated 8 December 1534. 
This, he writes, was to be repaid from the servicio to be 
granted by the Cortes in 1535 and would include an 8 per 
cent rate of interest for any delays. He ordered the 
Contadores Mayores to have Charles's ambassador in Geneva, 
Suarez de Figueroa, receive 100,000 escudos in gold against
399 AGS, Escribania Mayor de Rentas, leg. 231.
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a cedula de cambio (bill of exchange) to pay for the arming 
of a fleet against the Turk and Barbarossa. This prepared 
for the Tunis campaign of 1535.
The 1535 Cortes needed to vote a servicio to meet 
Charles's accumulated debts — all previous amounts had been 
committed to debt repayment. Charles had recourse to
advances on future servicios, offering a discount on the 
encabezamiento. He also sought help from members of his 
consejos and loans from merchants and the political 
oligarchy, which Cobos encouraged with promises of mercedes. 
These loans are categorised as socorro a Su Majestad (aid to 
His Majesty) in the Escribania Mayor de Rentas. The interest 
rate was 8 per cent and repayment was secured.against future 
servicios. Charles also began in 1535 the fateful
sequestration of the silver fleets, which would damage his 
credit irretrievably and substantially raise the cost of 
financing. Carretero Zamora lists the names of individuals
who had their gold and silver confiscated, including the 
amounts and source of repayment. Most were merchants from
Seville, but a Welser is also on the list.400
Cobos and Alienation of Royal Rights
Analysis of Cobos's method of operation is revealing. 
He first worked with the existing tax-system of alcabalas to 
obtain lump-sum payments of servicios from the towns. This 
met the emperor's criterion of immediacy. He then looked for
400 J. M. Carretero Zamora, ‘Fiscalidad extraordinaria y deuda: el destino del servicio de 
las Cortes de Castilla, 1535-1537’Espacio, Tiempoy Forma, 8, (1995), pp. 34-39.
262
new sources of revenue from tax-exempt bodies. But the 
process of sale of jurisdiction and alienation of royal 
patrimony eventually undermined royal finances. The 
fragmentation involved meant a loss of control and loss of 
the cash-flows from future revenues. In the sale of the 
Military Orders, Charles received immediate funds but lost 
future streams of revenues that would normally have grown 
with the increasing wealth of the country. The 
encabezamiento supplied by the towns created a close network 
of merchants and officials to provide a tax-raising service
to the royal treasury and deliver funds more promptly. But
the extension of networks of patronage, at which Cobos was 
so proficient, and which underpinned the state 
administration, enhanced the corruption of the political
elites in the towns, giving them more opportunities for
self-enrichment. Tavera wrote:
Those who must pay the servicio were those who are the
least able to afford it, the most in need, and yet
merchants and people of means end up paying nothing.401
Tavera and Cobos were both concerned that the tax
burden on the towns would encourage depopulation, as people 
moved to senorial jurisdictions to escape royal taxation.402
Helen Nader researched how Charles increased his income 
in part by the sale of royal town charters to villages
wishing to escape onerous burdens of the church, senorios or
401 AGS, E, leg. 24, ff. 233-35.
402 AGS, E, leg. 16, ff. 334-35
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overweaning town councils.403 This antagonised the 
municipalities from whose jurisdiction these villages were 
often escaping — it undermined their fiscal strength — it 
also violated the royal founding-charters granting all land 
within the municipal territory to the city.404 The sale of 
royal charters could significantly reduce the tax base of 
the municipalities. Many petitions to the Cortes complained 
about the undermining of royal jurisdiction by this process, 
and frequently expressed themselves against royal 
alienation. The comuneros had petitioned to repossess 
alienated royal estates. Charles would promise not to sell 
more municipal territory — until the next time.405 But many 
villages were escaping a disproportionate tax-burden imposed 
on them by their municipality, which collected taxes from 
the villages within its territory. The collection of the 
alcabala through an encabezamiento gave the municipalities 
fiscal autonomy enabling them to vary taxes within their 
regions. The villages, therefore, bought townships from the 
emperor to secure autonomy in their tax collection.
For Charles the sale of royal charters was another 
source of income and an offsetting increase in the royal 
domain, as well as additional security for bankers' loans. 
It did, however, further fragment the administration of tax 
collection that had been devolved to the large towns as 
cabeza de partida (principal tax collector). Creating more
403 Helen Nader, Liberty in Absolutist Spain: the Habsburg Sale o f  Towns, 1516-1700 
(Baltimore, 1990).
404Colmeiro, V, p. 155.
405 AGS, E, leg. 41, f. 76.
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self-administering towns and more independent senorlos 
increased the numbers of entities responsible for justice 
and tax collection. Nader shows the fall in numbers of 
villages throughout the 16th century. The large medieval 
territories belonging to a few hundred towns were carved up 
into many smaller territories belonging to new towns that 
formerly had been villages.406
Charles had inherited jurisdictional fragmentation, 
with strong independent regions and territories, but he 
greatly increased fragmentation and overlapping 
jurisdictions by the policies he pursued. To some extent the 
contradiction of the long-term alienation of royal property 
with the need to raise revenues was offset by the sale of 
town charters, extracting ecclesiastical wealth and 
confiscating the lands of the Military Orders. Charles 
inherited a reduced royal domain. Much was sold by the 
Trastamara kings to pay for their wars, resulting in the 
creation of independent senorlos. Enrique IV, on ascending 
the throne in 1455, had granted the higher nobility the 
right to collect royal rents in their senorlos and deduct 
the value of any mercedes (royal favours) that had been 
granted, passing on to the king any remaining income. This 
'imprudent policy' was compounded by an increase in mercedes 
resulting in an 'inexorable reduction' in royal incomes and 
the 'constitution of an aristocratic State, although with a
406 Nader, p. 124.
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monarchic head. '407 In his testament of 1554 Charles 
instructed his son Philip:
To be diligent in conserving the royal domain, ... and 
not to sell, alienate, or encumber any of the cities, 
towns, jurisdictions, income, or taxes, of their 
kingdom.408
He had no such compunction in alienating Church 
property — by diminishing its domain — despite the 
traditional prohibition on such alienation. What he wrote 
and what he did, however, were often different.
Most importantly, Charles began a process of alienating 
his own right to collect alcabalas. This he did through 
sales to the new senorlos created by the auctions of land 
from the dis-established Military Orders. Often these sales 
included the right to collect annual alcabalas. Treasury 
officials estimated the value and thus the purchase price of 
these alienated rights, based on past collections from 
specific towns. But in areas of commercial growth, 
individuals would often pay the treasury more for the 
alcabala than the senorlal land and jurisdiction.409 The 
alcabala was a 'royal right' of the senorial regime. By 
foregoing this high-yielding income the treasury damaged 
future revenues, and alienation of these royal rights was a 
serious matter for which Cobos must share responsibility. As 
the Cortes became aware of this erosion of their powers of
407 M. A. Ladero Quesada, ‘Instituciones Fiscales y Realidad Social en la Baja Edad Media 
Castellana,’ Revista deHistoria delDerecho (1976), p. 138.
408 BN, BAE 82, Fray Prudencio de Sandoval, Historia del Emperador Carlos V, (Madrid),
III, pp. 533-551.
409 AGS, CG, legs. 281-284,251-362.
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tax-collection, they petitioned to deduct from the 
encabezamiento the value of the alienated alcabala, because 
the tax burden had to be increased for the remaining towns, 
given the fixed quota of the encabezamiento. Additionally, 
Charles had to respect juros that were situado (secured) on 
alcabalas from towns whose alcabalas were sold. This could 
greatly reduce the sale value to the treasury. It is 
therefore uncertain if this expedient was wise, as it 
undermined the tax base. By the early 1550s sixty per cent 
of Charles domain income (renta ordinaria), that is, before 
the collection of servicios and clerical contributions, was 
committed to paying juros.410
By alienating alcabala revenues he also lost future 
revenue from the growth in trade, but it certainly 
strengthened the senorial regime and the incomes of 
comendadores such as Cobos. Cobos ensured, when he purchased 
Cazorla and Sabiote from the Order of Calatrava, that the 
sale included rights to collection of alcabalas from his 
towns and villages. The Medinaceli archive in Seville 
conserves manuscripts of the sale of Sabiote alcabalas to 
Cobos, along with the associated privilegios, signed by 
Cobos's treasurer, Alonso de Baeza, on behalf of the 
emperor.411 The archive of Simancas conserves records of many
410 Manuel Torres Lopez, and Perez-Prendes, Los Juros: aportacion documental para una 
historia de la deudapublica en Espaha (Madrid, 1963), p. 32.
411 Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Section Sabiote, caja 3, leg. 1, nums. 14 B and C.
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of the indvidual senorlos acquiring royal alcabalas, 
including those of Cobos.412
Although compromising the emperor's future revenues by 
selling off an important part of his tax-base — and thus 
undermining public finances — the sales of alcabalas may 
have been necessary, given the immediate 'urgent' needs of 
war. It was yet another quick way to provide for these needs 
and, as ever, Cobos met his emperor's demand for immediacy. 
Cobos and Granvelle had negotiated a peace treaty with 
France at Fitou in 1537-1538 that could have stabilised 
imperial finances. It required Charles to grant the Duchy of 
Milan to the Duke of Orleans (the future Henry I). But 
Charles gave the duchy to his son Philip, so causing another 
war with France. Cobos's work was often undone by Charles's 
dynastic decisions, indicating where Charles's real interest 
lay. There was a financial crisis, but family came first.
A document signed by Cobos and directed to the royal
treasurer, Alonso de Baeza, dated 20 July 1539, seems to 
have begun the process of alienation. It authorises him to
sell alcabalas up to a fixed annual amount of 4,500
ducats.413 It follows on from the failed Cortes of Toledo of 
1538, which had rejected Charles's appeal for a sisa (excise 
tax). Charles and Cobos were facing another financial crisis 
with huge debts and the need to raise more. Other remedies 
had to be found. The manuscript reveals the purpose of the 
sale: to cover expenses of occupying Tunis; and the need to
AGS, CG, legs. 281-284 and 899-904.
413 AGS, CG, leg. 899, doc. 1.
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maintain naval and military forces to contain the Turk after 
a recent naval defeat off Prevesa. Charles needed to borrow 
large amounts at very high interest rates:
That menaces with serious damage the public finances, 
as royal revenues and help from the kingdoms are 
insufficient to meet such costs.414
Thus the treasurer, Alonso de Baeza, was authorised by 
Cobos to sell alcabalas to ecclesiastical bodies and/or to 
individuals, like him. The amount of this authorisation was 
further increased in 1543.
The alcabalas had for centuries been the key to royal 
wealth in Castile. The historical importance of the ancient 
regalian right to alcabalas was such that not even the 
Trastamaras had sold this right when granting towns and 
villages to their noble supporters. This was an important 
policy change that shows the deterioration in Charles's 
credit. Charles and Cobos began the injurious process of 
alienating these rights and probably undermined royal 
authority and prestige among the elites. It certainly made 
the bankers raise their interest rates on his credit. It was 
yet another example of the long-term consequences of short­
term expediencies. Everything was sold for today's needs and 
to pay for short-term bankers' loans, instead of developing 
a cheaper longer-term market in juros. But Cobos did keep 
the wheels of credit turning for his master, his principal 
objective.
414 ibid.
269
Cobosr Juros and Silver
So far the importance and role of the juro in Castile's 
system of finance has not been fully explained. A juro was a 
legally recognised right for the title-holder to receive 
periodically from the royal treasury a certain sum. 
Traditionally, they were granted through a royal merced, a 
merced regia (a royal act of grace), as part of the kings' 
patronage to loyal retainers, and represented participation 
in royal incomes, principally the alcabala. They therefore 
represented an annuity, sometimes perpetual, handed on to 
heirs. But the main thing to note here is that there was no 
exchange of capital in return for the annuity. The exchange 
was more one of an intangible 'service' to the Crown. This 
therefore was perpetual debt, effectively de-capitalising 
the royal domain.
The juro was a security based on the income stream from 
the alcabala. They were issued with typical Castilian 
formalism: in leather, with lead seals and silk ribbons,
naming the holder; the principal amount; the royal income 
(often by named town) on which it was secured; granting 
royal guarantees that the annuity would not be reduced; the 
right to sell the juro and the right of the king to redeem 
it at call. A juro therefore had many features of a modern 
treasury bond, including a secondary trading market for 
pricing irredeemable bonds, the juro por vida. Merchants 
considered the juro a negotiable instrument and speculated 
on juro prices between fairs at Medina del Campo. As the 
prices fell with over-issuance, so they bought up juros at a
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discount, hoping to redeem them at face value on maturity. 
For Charles and Cobos the juro was less expensive than 
bankers' asientos, which were only for short-term loans and 
carried increasingly heavy interest-rates. However, despite 
the formal promises of repayment, it was too tempting to
expand their use and flood the market in juros. This
undermined the secondary market in negotiable juros and so 
excluded the possibility of the juro substituting financing 
by asientos. A market in long-term juros could conceivably 
have lessened the financial pressure on Charles and Cobos by 
creating a treasury bond market. Throughout his financial 
experimentation Cobos sacrificed duration of credit for
ready availability. This is a major criticism of his work. 
But he was responding to his emperor's needs for immediacy. 
In modern finance a shortening of debt maturities usually 
implies credit problems. In Cobos's case that was the 
starting point, and thus insolvency would come sooner.
The need to compensate the Military Orders and the
expropriated silver fleets caused a growing issuance of 
long-term juros assigned or situado on royal alcabalas, 
which added to creditor's pressure on that unique instrument 
of Spanish tax. Increasingly, issuance exceeded the value of 
the security — particularly with the royal sale of alcabalas 
as described above. The juros had to be converted or 
consolidated with a reduced rate of interest and deferral of 
capital repayments, in the manner typical of defaulting 
governments in crisis. When, eventually, the juro income 
could not be collected, due to insufficient alcabalas, the
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treasury had to resort to a 'hierarchy' of repayment. There 
were juros of primera, secunda and tercera payment, (first, 
second and third mortgages). Charles and Cobos had created a 
complex instrument of debt destruction without the benefit 
of modern-day credit derivatives and banking 'quantitative' 
analysts. Juros were closely tied to the alcabala and this 
interconnectedness, or high correlation, as the 'quants' 
would say, undermined the credit of both. Ehrenberg's 
conclusion that finance and credit of the empire rested on 
'the hopelessly deranged finances of Spain' is still a valid 
judgment, as it all collapsed with the bankruptcies of 
1557.415 The German and Italian merchant bankers, who were so 
essential to Charles's policies, became themselves dependent 
on the emperor. The Fuggers' commitments were particularly 
concentrated on the Habsburgs; that led to their ruin.
Privileges of juros were principally granted as a royal 
merced. The Consejos y Juntas de Hacienda at Simancas 
records juros by grants of mercedes and the value of annual 
income promised. The Escribania Mayor de Rentas in the 
Simancas archive classifies juros and mercedes to 
individuals in alphabetical order. Cobos is named as a 
beneficiary of many juros. There were different kinds of 
juros, such as inheritable, perpetual juros, juros por vida 
(life annuities) and juros al guitar (fixed-term annuities.) 
The holder could trade juros al guitar. The juro por vida 
could be exchanged for juros al guitar to lengthen debt
415Ehrenberg, p. 101.
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maturities and therefore reduce the cost of servicing debt. 
There is an immense amount of information on juros in the 
Archivo Historico Nacional, the Biblioteca Nacional, the 
Archivo General de Simancas, and the Real Academia de 
Historia (Seccion Salazar) in Madrid. Some of these 
manuscripts/ such as the concession of a juro for the 
expropriation of the Order of Calatrava's land in 
Guadalajara, have been examined in order to understand their 
particular form.416
Many of Spain's foremost historians have worked on this 
vast body of material, but it is a daunting task. The papers 
are scattered through many archives and the palaeography is 
particularly difficult. Antonio Matilla Tascon worked on 
much of this material for the earlier reign of Isabel and 
Fernando, and catalogued some of the information.417 Torres 
Lopez and Perez-Prendes have partly catalogued documents 
relating to juros in Charles's reign and brought some system
418to the classifications. The juro was too easily granted as 
a royal merced, entitling the holder to a claim on royal 
income — generally the alcabala. It has been criticised as 
encouraging the holder to live off the high interest rates 
instead of engaging in 'wealth creation' so engendering a 
nation of rent-seekers. This is a classic criticism of 
Spanish economic development, or lack thereof, in its Golden 
Age.
416 Real Academia de Historia, Seccion Salazar, Ms 6.
417 A. Matilla Tascon, Declatorias de los Reyes Catdlicas sobre juros y  otros mercedes 
(Madrid, 1959).
A 1 O
Torres Lopez and Perez-Prendes.
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There were other forms of decapitalisation, such as the 
effects of perpetual, heritable entailment (mayorazgos) on 
capital formation. This issue will be discussed in Chapter 
Six. In part, such dependency related to the silver inflows 
which raised costs while stimulating domestic demand, which 
could not be supplied competitively by local manufactures, 
so that imports undercut domestic manufacturing and 
agriculture, leaving rent and services as the main economic 
activity. This thesis will not further research the juro. 
The Archivo Historico Nacional alone has over 2,000 legajos 
in thirteen books from the 15th to the 19th centuries. Sanchez 
Belda's book is a helpful introduction.419
Cobos was running out of room to manoeuvre in deploying 
Castile's credit. We have seen how Ambassador Suarez de 
Figueroa wrote desperately from Genoa 'that terms agreed 
with the merchants be fulfilled.'42° The continual defaults 
on asientos made bankers demand stricter 'conditions 
precedent' to lending. New loans would be issued after 
deducting part-payment of old loans. Clauses were introduced 
into asientos, suspending loans until the bankers' agents in 
Castile were satisfied that the conditions of the contract 
could be met.
The Genoese also introduced delayed draw-downs on 
loans; tranches of loans only being advanced when 
'conditions precedent,' formally stated in the texts of
419 Sanchez Belda, Gula del Archivo Historico Nacional (Madrid, 1958), pp. 85-98.
420 Ramon Carande, ‘Carlos V: viajes, cartas y deudas,’ in Charles Quint et son temps 
(Paris, 1958), pp. 222-223.
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asientos, had been satisfied. Such prior conditions are a 
feature of most present-day loan-contracts. Among these 
conditions, they sought to ensure that the treasury had 
available funds in some defined proportion to the debt 
incurred — an early test of financial leverage. The Genoese 
insisted that their asientos had attached licencias de saca 
del oro y de la plata (export licenses for specie) to export 
from Castile the equivalent specie of the sums they had 
loaned.421 They were anticipating exchange controls. The 
asientos incorporated sophisticated banking terms and 
conditions, but they were essentially dependent on the 
sanctity of the law of contract. Already, in previous 
reigns, there had been strict laws prohibiting the export of 
specie and the Cortes frequently petitioned against the 
export of gold. Ehrenberg describes the difficulties the 
Fuggers had in exporting gold via the Pyrenean frontier at 
Fuenterrabla for the election of Charles's brother, 
Ferdinand, as king of the Romans in 1530.422 Salinas wrote to 
Vazquez de Molina, on 2 October 1530, seeking his help in 
getting gold to Charles's brother, Ferdinand, who once more 
was being menaced by the Turks. His letters tell how he had 
to smuggle the gold out of Spain. He repeats the story at
great length in a letter to Cobos dated 19 October 1530. He
informs him of the secret dispatch of precious metals:
I being so well known, I could not avoid being suspect
in this business. Your Grace can believe that I had a
421 Ruiz Martin, F., ‘Las finanzas del Emperador,’ in El Imperio de Carlos V, ed. M. 
Fernandez Alvarez (Madrid, 2001), p. 175.
422 Ehrenberg, p. 92.
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lot of problems in this business ... trustworthy people 
had to be found to carry the goods to a suitable 
place.423
Salinas is quite tedious in his pretension to secrecy 
and the difficulties of the transfer; he was clearly looking 
for a reward of mercedes. Gold was the main means of paying 
soldiers, and difficulties in moving bullion out of Spain 
were a constant problem. There continued to be a reluctance 
to issue export licenses and a wish 'to avoid the blood 
drain of gold and silver from the kingdoms of Castile. ' The 
Fuggers often had to smuggle gold secretly out of Castile, 
as it was extraordinarily difficult to obtain permission. 
But Charles also allowed his favourite bankers to ship 
bullion from Spanish ports and sell it at a premium in 
foreign markets, in exchange for more loans.424 It was not 
until the 1550s that precious metals were frequently sent to 
make payments in Genoa and Antwerp, and to the recruiting 
centres.
The growth of silver remittances from the Americas 
provided a new source to pay bankers' loans and was perhaps 
the reason bankers continued to lend, despite the 
renegotiated contracts. Silver was effectively Charles's 
printing press with new currency entering the financial 
system to provide bankers' collateral, rather than being 
used to make productive investments. But the increase in 
sequestration of the fleets made this less reliable as a
423 Salinas, pp. 502-505.
424 J. Lynch, Spain under the Habsburgs, Empire and Absolutism (New York, 1964), p. 56.
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source of bankers' security. Thus credit and solvency were 
further endangered as private shippers diverted cargos, and 
the finely tuned system of registration at the Casa de 
Contratacion was not working because of diverted and 
smuggled silver. The Bancroft library in Berkeley has a 
privately printed monograph by Engel Sluiter analysing gold 
and silver shipments from New Granada and the viceroyalty of 
Peru, from 1540 to 1590.425 He produced tables showing 
bullion declared for taxation, and the taking of the royal 
quinto (royal right to a fifth of precious metals mined) 
after smelting and refining in the royal foundries. He then 
compared specie declared with that arriving in Spain, using 
Earl Hamilton's figures based on documents in Seville's 
Archive of the Indies. As the silver flow increased so did 
the gap between the quantity declared in the Indies and that 
arriving, indicating a very large leakage through smuggling 
and privateering.
After the dismissal of the 1538 Cortes General, all 
private silver was confiscated from the fleet of that year 
in exchange for low-yielding, long-maturity juros. This is a 
form of expropriation also practised today, as in Chavez's 
actions in Venezuela and the 2001 bond defaults in 
Argentina. The confiscation followed on from the fleet 
expropriation of 1535 to pay for the Tunis campaign. Carande 
states that Charles paid for the Tunis campaign entirely 
from the silver confiscations 'without requesting bank
425 Sluiter, Engel, Gold and Silver o f Spanish America (Berkeley, CA, 1998).
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426loans.' Cobos counter-signed Charles's cedula for the 1538 
fleet confiscation:
To seize all the gold and silver from the Indies fleet 
of Blasco Nunez Vela ... because there are no other means 
in these realms that can help and succour us.427
Nunez Vela was the first viceroy of Peru, who 
subsequently died fighting the rebellion there. His fleet
had also brought Cobos's share of treasure from his rights 
as 'assayer of specie' in the New World, which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. There is evidence in the
Archive of the Indies that this confiscation may also have 
been due to Cobos's wish to protect his share, which was in 
dispute. His mayordomo and contador (personal administrator 
and treasurer) in Peru, Verdugo de Henao, had discovered 
that some of Cobos's treasure had been improperly consigned 
to the royal treasury during the confusion caused by the 
revolt of Manco Inca. It was registered in Seville, arriving 
with Nunez Vela's fleet. The Indie's archive shows demands 
by Cobos to the emperor for restitution, resolved in his
428favour by a royal cedula of 25 August 1540. Once again
. . 429Cobos's private and public interests are fully revealed.
The thesis will examine how Cobos protected his American
wealth in the next chapter.
Various Cortes petitioned the emperor to desist from
seizing private treasure. Charles's cedula in 1538 promised
426 Carande, III, p. 183.
427 Ibid, p. 180.
428 AGI, Lima, leg. 566, lib. 4, f. 88.
429 AGI, Lima, leg. 25.
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not to repeat the practice 'even in times of great
necessity,' but he continued to do so. Charles was warned by 
Cobos of the resulting distress to merchants in Seville and 
of the damage to trade. Effectively he was de-capitalising 
the merchant trade and destroying his credit and solvency. 
The Cortes of 1538 stated that:
Taking the Indies money from merchants in Seville, and 
giving them juros causes much damage. There are those 
from whom it is taken who can no longer do their
business and, little by littler trade will decline, 
because they cannot make payments, and also royal
revenues will decline because of the cessation of 
trade.430
Here was a clear understanding of the consequences of
confiscation. The seizure of private capital further
undermined an already shaky system of finance capitalism, 
which above all calls for certainty in ownership and the law 
of contract. Cobos wrote to the emperor on 7 August 1543, 
reviewing, among other issues, the state of finances.431 This 
is an important letter from Cobos to Charles, and is 
possibly the one most openly critical of the emperor. This 
letter is a thorough review of the financial crisis and the 
'scarcity of money.r He almost swamps Charles with detail in 
an effort to convince. His custom was to summarise issues
for Charles's information and approval, so this is a
departure from his normal style. He also refers to a
possible need to call a Cortes General of all estates to 
consider a slsa. Cobos knew that the emperor had sworn never
430 Colmeiro, V, p. 141.
431CDCV, II, pp. 150-160.
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to ask for a slsa again, although clearly it was in his 
thoughts, as revealed in his 'Secret Instruction' to Philip 
of 6 May 1543.432 This indicates how serious Cobos considered 
the situation. He also warns that, 'if the war lasts, 
everything will be bankrupt, because there is no money in 
the entire realm. ' This may be a reference to the civil war 
in Peru, between the forces of the viceroy and the 
encomenderos, led by Gonzalo Pizarro, which was impeding 
silver flows, rather than the future bankruptcy of Spain. It 
is interesting that many of Cobos's most important letters 
are written shortly before his death and when he was no 
longer travelling with the emperor — including his long 
reply to Charles's enquiry about Philip in 1543, which has 
already been discussed. These surviving letters seem to show 
an urgency to influence the emperor to attend to policy at 
home. Tavera and Suarez de Figueroa had also tried to do 
this. But even when peace was signed with the French, at 
Crepy in 1544, Charles moved on to other conflicts. There 
were always the Lutherans and the Turks and other imperial 
projects.
Although only 18 years of age, the emperor's son, 
Philip, showed his growing maturity in a series of letters 
to Charles in 1545.433 They support Cobos's concerns about 
the financial crisis and the 'exhaustion of the kingdom.' 
His letter of 25 March 1545 summarises the kingdom's 
financial resources in similar detail to Cobos — possibly in
432CDCT, II, pp. 106-120. 
433 CDCV, II, pp. 355-372, 373-374,382-385.
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part drafted by Cobos — and he pleads for the 'humilde 
pechero Castellano' (the humble Castilian taxpayer). He also 
warns, on 4 February 1544, about the effect on credit of 
silver sequestration and is quoting back his father's advice 
that 'without credit you can do nothing.' He resists 
Charles's demands for sequestration:
One should not seize gold and silver, to avoid greater 
damage ... the owners were many people, merchants, and 
poor people. Renouncing sequestration would avoid 
business problems with the bankers and the ruin of
434some.
He suggested raising voluntary loans from the nobility, 
clergy and merchants and most importantly recommended 
negotiating peace with France. Carande suggests that Philip 
was assisted in writing this letter 'by advisors such as 
Cobos.'435 Carande calls the silver seizures 'un secuestro
43 fidisfrazada'(a disguised sequestration). L
Charles replied, agreeing with Philip but ending by 
asking him to raise money for Doria's galleys and defences 
against the Turk. He would like to:
Ease and relieve public finances, but needs are so 
great and ineluctable that we must help ourselves from 
all sources ... news of the arrival of the Turks outside
• • • 437Vienna ... we have obligations.
Charles places his policy in context for his son: money 
must be found; peace would be nice but events were crowding 
in, and the financial condition of Castile was unimportant
434 Carande, III, pp. 250-251; CDCV, II, pp. 187-204.
435 Ibid, p. 252.
436 Ibid, p. 284.
437 CDCV, II, pp. 336-343.
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in this context. His 'Instructions' were always a series of 
dynastic commands and were often in conflict with the 
economic interests of the realm.
The Casa de Contratacion formally registered the
embargoed silver treasure. Consequently a detailed record of
438each seizure is available in the Archivo de Indias. When 
the fleet arrived in the summer of 1546 it carried 600,000 
ducats of specie for private owners; only 50,000 ducats 
belonged to the Crown, and the merchants of Seville were 
convinced that the entire cargo would be seized. Cobos wrote 
to Charles on 17 August 1546:
God knows how much I am weighed down, and I wish to
439have these ducats for the needs of the realm.
During Cobos's time the silver shipments were only a 
small part of the treasury's revenues. It was not until the 
enormous flows arrived from Potosi in the late 1540s that 
the texts of the asientos show silver as the new, 
predominant form of security. By then most other royal 
revenues were fully committed to pay the asientos and juros. 
According to Haring:
In spite of the volume of silver from the American 
mines, the Habsburgs could not have played the 
political role to which they aspired in the 16th century 
without the help of foreign capitalists. These were the 
ubiquitous Genoese and German bankers, who received 
assignments of royal revenues.440
438AGI, 139, 1, 6, lib. 9, f. 186. 
439 Carande, III, p. 284.
440 Haring, p. 24.
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The silver was largely transferred from Castile to pay 
bankers throughout Europe, with a transformational effect on 
the societies and economies receiving the silver. Silver was 
shipped to Italy and Flanders to pay mercenaries to defend 
against French invasions. The silver windfall increased
borrowing (the elites felt richer) which the banks
encouraged by taking their security from the revenues of 
next year's fleets. But there was always a tendency to over­
estimate these future revenues and thus further over-extend 
the Crown's credit. The bankers were also basing their
credit evaluation on anticipation of future tax revenues — 
the servicios — thus emerging insolvency was continually 
postponed. This is similar to municipal bond financing in 
the U.S. where bankers and investors lend against next
year's taxes — so-called tax-anticipation bonds. The quality 
of collateral was too often based on future revenues rather 
than credit analysis of an operating business. It was what 
we today call 'sovereign risk financing' with all the 
attendant false assumptions of default protection.
Many contemporaries blamed price increases on 
international trade and the Cortes attempted to restrict 
exports of grains and cloth. This only reduced the overseas 
market for Castile's tradable goods and made for further 
reliance on rents and services. The increase in revenues 
from silver raised the exchange rate, making exports even 
less competitive in international markets. Castile's 
principal exports were wool, leather goods, oil and salt but 
these all declined in value due to the effect of silver on
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the exchange rate. Much has been written about whether such 
an increasing quantity of silver had inflationary 
consequences or whether a rise in population was the primary 
cause. The latter would have increased food (grain) and 
energy (charcoal) prices, as is shown by the statistical 
series by Phelps-Brown and Hopkins.441 Similarly, the data 
presented by Braudel and Spooner also show these 
relationships.442
Current historiography seems to dispute Earl J. 
Hamilton's classic argument for a causal connection between 
prices and silver inflow.443 It is more probable that silver 
imports powerfully reinforced an existing trend caused by 
population growth and scarcity of food and energy, as well 
as an earlier large increase in silver production in central 
Europe. Jordi Nadal's statistical research has shown that 
the proportional increase in prices was higher during the 
half century before American silver arrived in quantity 
(1501-1550.) So this was less likely to have been an initial 
cause of inflation.444 He shows how grain, livestock and wood 
prices soared and how farm wages stagnated.445 Thus money- 
wages lagged behind the rising cost of living and real wages 
fell sharply, while sehorlos (like Cobos) increased their 
rents and charges on rights of passage, (pasture, tolls, and
441 Phelps-Brown and Hopkins, A Perspective o f  Wages and Prices, (London, 1981).
442 Spooner and Braudel, ‘Prices in Europe from 1450 to 1750,’ in Cambridge Economic 
History o f Europe (Cambridge, 1959), IV, pp. 374-486.
443 Earl J. Hamilton, American Treasure and the Price Revolution in Spain, 1501-1650 
(Cambridge, MA, 1934).
444 Jordi Nadal, ‘La revolucion de los precios espanoles en el siglo XVI,’ Hispania 
(Madrid), 19 (1959), pp. 503-529.
445 Ibid, Espaha en su Cenit (1516-1598) (Barcelona, 2001), pp. 157-159.
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bridge crossings). Social inequalities worsened. The 
chronicler, Alonso Santa Cruz's plea to the emperor to 
escape Seville because of the 'high cost of living in 
Seville, caused by the immense inflow of money,' is a 
contemporary reference to the hardship.446
It is unnecessary for the purposes of this thesis to 
follow this controversy or that of the so-called 'Dutch 
disease' or 'resource curse' in great detail.447 Yet the fact 
that both Cobos and Tavera were aware of such a dearth in 
the daily lives of the pecheros (tax-payers) is clear from 
their letters to each other and to Charles.448 There were 
always fears of another revolt of comuneros. But Cobos had 
co-opted the town elites and they were largely insulated 
from these economic trends. Mauricio Drelichman of the 
University of British Columbia gave a paper, at the annual 
meeting of the Atlantic History Seminar at Harvard in 2005; 
it was subsequently published.449 His is probably the most 
current work on this vexing question about silver and 
inflation. He constructed a price series and consumption 
basket from the account books of Castilian hospitals, royal 
households (Juana, Charles's mother) and monasteries from 
1531-1600. This showed a sharp rise in prices of the chosen 
series from 1545-1555, coincident with the discovery of 
Potosl.
446 Santa Cruz, II, p. vii.
447 Term coined by the Economist, 28 November, 1977, pp. 82-83.
448 BN, Ms 1778, ff. 1-97. Papeles tocantes al Emperador Carlos V.
449 M. Drelichman, ‘The Curse o f Montezuma: American Silver and the Dutch Disease.’ 
Explorations in Economic History, v ol. 42, (2005), pp. 349-380.
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This chapter has dealt in detail with the various 
financial credits and forms of raising money to meet 
imperial needs. What seems clear is that the overwhelming
percentage of total output of goods and services did weaken 
incentives for more productive economic pursuits and 
strengthened rentier activity as the principal economic 
objective, causing a decline in traded goods and a drain on 
the real economy from the growing burden of debt. The state 
absorbed more and more resources from the private sector, 
including seizure of private bullion and the preference for 
investment in juros over productive manufacturing. Thus 
output of goods was insufficient to meet peoples' needs and 
this also was inflationary. It is noteworthy that in our 
contemporary crisis of finance capitalism, in most advanced 
economies financial sector turnover is many times larger 
than total gross domestic product. In the United States six 
banks alone in 2010 controlled assets amounting to more than 
60 per cent of the country's gross domestic product, an 
unhealthy concentration and overdependence on one source of 
wealth.450 The financial instruments described above and the 
nature of the contracts (asientos) bear a resemblance to 
contemporary methods of credit creation, although in a form 
which Marx called 'primitive capitalism.' The juro was an 
incipient long-term bond-market; bills of exchange were 
actively discounted in various markets — without the market-
influence of financial activities on the economy as a
450 Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers, the Wall Street Takeover and the Next 
Financial Meltdown (New York, 2010), pp. 202-203.
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making activity of bourses; bankers used foreign exchange 
transactions to enhance yields; and there was an 
appreciation of the value of gold in uncertain times. 
Perhaps the markets and instruments were primitive compared 
to the exotic instruments of today, but we can see the 
shoots of modern finance-capitalism with its benefits and 
risks — this may well have been the first crisis of finance- 
capitalism.
Cobos was faced with a perpetual need for liquidity — 
cash to pay mercenary troops, among other things — which 
became a series of crises. These liquidity crises progressed 
to a solvency crisis as credit dried up in anticipation of 
default. Today, we would call this 'a systemic breakdown of 
the credit mechanism', where no one is willing to lend. This 
became the inherited crisis that Philip II and his advisors 
— many trained by Cobos — faced on his accession to the 
throne. Cobos and his network were fully occupied in raising 
money and extending terms of defaulted payments when 
necessary. Charles's regents, viceroys and ambassadors were 
similarly involved. It was only when Cobos died that the 
machine broke-down, leading to the first bankruptcy. In his 
book on Charles's funding of war, Tracy supposes that 
restructuring of principal and interest payments did not 
represent a default. In this he is wrong. It was a default 
on the bankers' terms and Spain's future cost of money and 
credit rating would reflect the greater risk.451 The terms of
451 Tracy, p. 309.
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the note or contract required payments to be made as they 
became due. Failure to meet the conditions of the contract 
and the re-writing of its terms would be considered as a 
default and a sign of a serious credit problem. The bankers 
continued to lend for a while but shortened maturities — a 
classic response — and raised the interest rates. It was 
therefore not only a dynastic inheritance that Charles left 
to Philip, but a legacy of financial ruin.
Cobos adapted finance to support the political 
objectives of his master. He needed to raise revenue largely 
from the Cortes, representing the pecheros, as the 
aristocracy rejected all attempts to levy a general tax on 
them. This allied him with the towns. He developed the 
market for juros to raise revenue from all classes, 
including the aristocracy. This, to some extent, got around 
their refusal to be taxed. The eventual depreciation of the 
juro was a form of tax. He then secured bankers' loans on 
assets (the silver fleets and the servicios) , which were 
again secured on issues of juros. A pyramid of debt was 
created where no one knew the underlying credit risk. Today 
we would call this 'a Ponzi scheme', named after a 1940s 
U.S. swindler of postage stamps. Everyone assumed that the 
sovereign would not default.
Over-optimistic expectations for a continuing windfall 
of silver fuelled current and sumptuary consumption. The 
juro became a political tool and a popular blend of saving 
and speculation. What economists term 'predatory rent- 
seeking' became the economic system. Its purpose was to
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generate rents for those with political power, such as 
Cobos. The state became a vehicle for competitive rent- 
seeking — income for those whose support was needed for the 
elites to maintain their power. These concentrations of 
political and financial wealth were self-reinforcing: riches 
being used to enhance political influence and strengthen the 
economic* power of the elites. This is familiar in the Russia
of today's oligarchs. But it can also be seen in the growth
of Capitol Hill lobbying in the U. S. and the explosion of 
executive remuneration, especially in financial services, 
which diverts huge sums from the risk-takers — the 
shareholders in the businesses. Preference by elites for 
appropriating wealth — rent-seeking — rather than creating 
it through entrepreneurial activity was paradoxically 
intensified by the resource curse of silver.
Thus financial collapse would come from a mix of
imperial policy, financial process and social attitudes — 
the ease of investing in juros as opposed to engaging in 
demeaning commerce. There was always a preference for 
entailing land through endowing perpetual mayorazgos — las 
manos muertas (the dead hands) of land. This will be 
discussed in the next chapter when describing how Cobos
created his own mayorazgo. Of course, soaring commodity 
prices, an overvalued exchange rate, and unwinnable wars 
provided the macro-economic background to what seems an 
inevitable collapse — the fate of debtor empires. A 
financial crisis on this scale would eventually bring a 
major geo-political shift in power, as perhaps is now
occurring between the U. S. and East Asia. Charles 
Kindleberger, the late economic historian, identified 
several causes of decline in nations, among which were 
resistance to taxation by the elites, inequality, 
corruption, mounting debt and finance becoming dominant in 
the economy. He saw a long-term correlation between wealth 
creation, the capacity to raise revenue and military 
strength. This he believed constituted a life-cycle of an 
imperial power.452 All of these factors, including an 
unsustainable imbalance of revenues and expenditures, were 
present in Cobos's Castile.
452 Kindleberger, C., World Economic Primacy, 1500-1990 (Oxford, 1996).
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Property, Testament and M a yo ra zg o
The emperor's secret 'Instructions' to his son, Philip, 
written from Palamos before embarking on another campaign on 
6 May 1543, perhaps contains the best assessment of the 
emperor's opinion of Cobos. It is therefore worth quoting a 
lengthy extract. It is one of a series of 'Instructions' 
giving fatherly advice, in the form of dynastic commands, to 
a son on the governance of Spain in his absence. Brandi 
considered that these political testaments are 'the best 
source of our knowledge of Charles's character and 
intentions.' Juan March thought they were 'a synthesis of 
the art of government of that time, and rules for actions of 
a good prince.'453 There are many versions of these 
'Instructions' and Berthold Beinert has judged the 
authenticity from, among other things, stylistic comparisons 
with other documents and selected versions found in 
Granvelle's papers.454 This thesis has primarily consulted the 
text included in Fernandez Alvarez's compilation of 
letters.455 The 'Instruction' of 1543, written when Philip was 
sixteen, is an attempt to review the qualities and defects 
of the principal counsellors who would advise the young
453 Karl Brandi, Carlos V: Vida y  fortuna de una personalidad y  de un imperio mundial 
(Madrid, 1943), p. 486; J. M. March, ed., Nihez y  Juventud de Felipe //, 2 vols (Madrid, 
1941), II, p. 8.
454 Berthold Beinert, ‘El testamento politico de Carlos V. Estudio critico,’ in Carlos V: 
Miscelanea de estudios en el IV centenario de su muerte, ed. by Manuel Fernandez 
Alvarez (Granada, 1958), pp. 401-438.
455 CDCV, II, pp. 110-111.
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prince. It was also written at a time of extreme financial 
difficulties; that perhaps accounts for the central role 
given to Cobos in the document. Charles first praises Cobos:
He has experience of all my business affairs and is 
very well informed about them; I well know that you 
will not find anyone that will serve you better in 
these matters. I know that he will do it well and 
cleanly [honestly].
He then seems to revoke the mercedes of greatest importance 
to Cobos and his family:
I have granted him many mercedes, but sometimes he 
would hint at a desire for more; they were granted to 
honour him, as with others. You should treat him with
all respect and assure him that I did not do more for
fear of making others grumble. One great and too big a 
privilege is the income for assaying, smelting and 
weighing of specie in the Indies. He has this for 
himself and his son. You should compensate the son in 
other ways. He has received some bulls from the pope 
granting him the Adel ant amiento of Cazorla. I have 
issued a cedula, co-signed by Granvelle, that if the 
bulls are made effective and his son receives the 
Adel antamiento, his appointment as fundidor (assayer of 
Indie's bullion) can be removed. Granvelle has the 
cedula and, if I die, you can ask him for it and use it 
to revoke the merced. He also has a merced for salt- 
mining in the Indies, which at the moment does not
amount to much but might with time become of high
importance. When I die, it would be well that you 
revoke this and also from any others that hold similar 
privileges and any regalian rights you should keep for 
yourself and not confer them on your counsellors. I 
know they will be asked for and it would be better to 
leave them to enjoy the mercedes I have already given 
them.456
Charles clearly links the removal of the precious 
metals 'privilege' from Cobos's son, Diego, to the newly 
acquired cedula for the Adel antamiento of Cazorla, which 
would be extended to Diego. The post of fundidor, marcador y
456 Ibid.
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ensayador was transferred to Diego by a royal cedula signed 
in Augsburg on July 8 1548 but Charles reserved the right to 
change its terms.457 This apparent stripping of Cobos's 
honours is against Charles's own estimation of the 
importance of reputation and authority, which he continually 
wrote was synonymous with honour. Cobos considered honour as 
the product of the emperor's esteem. And the emperor 
recognised this in his second approval of Cobos's mayorazgo:
To enable you and your wife to be more memorable and 
your descendants to be more honoured and better to 
serve the Crown ... we give license ... to create a
458mayorazgo.
The emperor even acknowledged here that the mercedes granted 
to Cobos during his life would be included in the mayorazgo 
even after the death of Cobos.
Whoever of you remains alive after the death of the 
other can place in the said mayorazgo all goods and 
mercedes acquired and leave them to the beneficiary of
459the mayorazgo,
Charles was clearly violating the terms of the 
mayorazgo. A fuller abstract and translation of the 
emperor's granting of the mayorazgo privilege has been 
included as an appendix to better understand its definitions 
and the limitations imposed. Royal mercedes were the source 
of Cobos's wealth, unlike the great nobility who had 
accumulated property over the centuries. But, for Cobos,
457 Archivo General de Indias, Patronato Real, leg. 170-71.
Seville, Archivo de la Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Seccion Sabiote, caja 3, leg. 1, num.
16.
459 ibid.
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only two mercedes constituted the largest part of that 
wealth: the post of fundidor mayor in the Indies and the
rents and taxes from the Adel ant amiento of Cazorla. The 
second of these will be discussed later. But it is clear 
that Charles was striking at the root of Cobos' s wealth 
endowment by linking these two privileges in his 
'Instructions' to Prince Philip.
The concept of hidalguia (knighthood) was measured by 
the opinion of others. A removal of favours would therefore 
constitute a lessening of esteem and a loss of honour. Was 
this to be Cobos's ultimate reward for loyal service? He had 
married into a noble lineage — the Mendozas — and by 
marrying both his children into the great nobility he did 
give his descendants a noble name. It is time to discuss the 
nature of mayorazgo
As it was important to maintain noble status it was 
thought appropriate for the head of a family to restrict 
sales of his land after he had passed it on to his eldest 
son. Various legal devices were used to prevent descendants 
selling land or using it in a way that might reduce the 
family's status. The amount of land owned was a form of 
index of status. Nobles therefore engaged in entailing 
property through mayorazgos, which were used to consolidate 
wealth through a property regime favouring stability over 
conquered territory, and granting a privileged juridical 
status ,as well as encouraging permanence and defence of a 
moving frontier during the Reconquista. Property within a 
mayorazgo could not be confiscated through litigation if
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awarded as a royal edict; it was perpetual, inalienable, and 
indivisible among heirs. Such a perpetual right was 
desirable to consolidate the Reconquista. The laws of Toro 
in 1505 had regulated the mayorazgos forbidding alienation 
of patrimonial property, but allowing the newly enriched to 
establish mayorazgos. Nobility, of course, also had goods 
and revenues which were not tied to a mayorazgo and were 
therefore freely available — bienes litres — as personal 
property. The assets and revenues in mayorazgos tended to be 
a drag on economic development given the legal limitations 
on the availability of these assets. They were not allowed 
to be sold and thus could not be pledged as collateral; 
therefore capital for improvements could not be released.
The system was transferred to Spanish colonies and 
large mayorazgos gave noble status to the newly wealthy 
conquistadors. The 'dead hands' of the mayorazgo lasted
until the 1820s when the Ley de Desvinculacion
disestablished senorios. Trust law in the British colonies 
in North America restricted heritable land transfer to one 
generation. Estates could thereafter be pledged, sold or 
freely transferred. The right to transfer land title was 
encouraged through laws making unreasonable restrictions
unenforceable. 'Unreasonable', for example, in the colony of 
Virginia, was defined as beyond the life of a then living 
person plus 21 years. Trusts or wills that provided
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otherwise were not enforceable.460 Land was therefore a 
productive asset, enabling the accumulation of capital based 
on the wealth of land and debt using land as security. This 
was an extension of English common law from Shelley's case 
of 1581, which limited the term of entailment. Given the 
restrictions of the mayorazgo, the nobility in Spain often 
had recourse to specific clauses in their mayorazgos to ask 
their king for a royal licence to release some of these 
frozen assets, indicating economic pressure on the nobility.
Cobos wanted wealth and honour but he also considered 
duty and sacrifice for his emperor. Above all he sought to 
establish a legacy, a permanent and indivisible entailment 
of property: a mayorazgo. This would give him the needed
social status to deal with the higher nobility, and enjoy 
juridical privileges that came with his senorlo of Cazorla 
and Sabiote. Keniston has analysed the document of 
inventory, including the property and incomes, establishing 
the mayorazgo under royal privilege in 1541. The emperor, as 
requested, confirmed the document of mayorazgo. Keniston's 
translation states that:
Cobos's wish is to enhance his home and lineage ... a 
desire of all men to perpetuate and renew their being 
by committing temporal wealth, and entailing in 
perpetuity such wealth, so that it cannot be dissolved 
or diminished, to his eldest son (primogenitus), Don 
Diego de los Cobos, Adelantado de Cazorla.461
460 1 am indebted to Mr. G. C. Seward o f the eponymous New York law firm, Seward &
Kissel, for this information.
461 Keniston, p. 241.
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Inheritors therefore had no dominium over the property, but 
could exchange or substitute assets with other noble 
mayorazgos, which was sometimes done to make estates 
contiguous. When he wrote to Charles — possibly his last 
letter — on 25 January 1547, he spoke of his illness:
I am at the point of death, the illness has lasted five 
months and I have no strength to sign letters.
But he writes mainly about finances and asientos and ways to 
raise money for his emperor.462 To the last he is acting as a 
dutiful servant and the emperor appears to view him as such, 
willing to shower him with honours during his lifetime, but 
not to elevate him to the ranks of a grandee, nor to accept 
the permanence of privileges beyond Cobos's lifetime. The 
emperor, then on military campaign in Germany, replied to 
Cobos's letter on 20 March 1547. He expressed his concern 
for Cobos's health and informed him of new asientos arranged 
by Eraso, Cobos's successor, and Maria in the Netherlands. 
He also writes about various appointments and mercedes and 
thanks Cobos for giving him details on the increased 
expenditure on the royal infantas and the figures on new 
cargoes of gold and silver, which Philip had also provided. 
Clearly, despite his illness, Cobos is still on top of 
things.463
To Cobos the importance of entailing a dynasty was the 
very crux of his actions. This was to be funded in many 
ways, but the 'privilege' of revenues from assaying American
462 CDCV, II, pp. 512-515.
463 CDCV, II, pp. 518-526.
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treasure was a very important part. This amounted to one- 
per-cent of the assayed value. Mines and metals had always 
been considered a source of wealth and Cobos had already 
acquired mercedes for mines in Spain.464 The thesis will now 
assess how valuable this was to Cobos and how he ensured 
collection, accountability and detection of fraud through 
his network of clients. Mendiburu referred to these 'rights'
4
as 'the derecho of Cobos,' or Cobos's tax, considering it a 
tax on the smelter of the gold and silver delivered at the 
foundries in Peru, similar to the emperor's derecho of 2 0 
percent or royal quinta. When the Cobos levy was revoked it 
became part of the Crown's treasury revenue.465
Already, in a cedula of 1 November 1539, the emperor 
had persuaded Cobos to accept a reduction in these 'rights' 
in return for the perpetual Adelantamiento of Cazorla, which 
Charles had supported.466 So Cobos may have had some suspicion 
of the emperor's ultimate intentions. In Chapter Three, the 
thesis showed how Cazorla was eventually lost — through 
litigation with the Church in Toledo — to Cobos's heirs. So 
Cobos's tragedy was to come full circle — finis origine 
pendit, the end depends upon the beginning. Soon after 
Cobos's death litigation also began over his one-per-cent 
'rights,' and in 1549 a petition was made to the Council of 
the Indies, which ordered finance officials in the Americas 
to investigate all payments made to Cobos from 1524 until
464 AGS, E. leg. 13, no. 128, leg. 14, ff. 85-86. Mines in Murcia, Lorca and Cazorla.
465 Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario Historico-Biografico del Peru (Lima, 1932), vol. 4, 
pp. 194-196.
466 AGI, Patronato, 170, no. 51.
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his death, particularly in view of the practice of 
collecting the one- per-cent before the royal quinta. 
However, before the case could be decided, a royal decree 
was issued in 1552 revoking the privilege granted to Cobos 
and his successors, as Charles had suggested in his 1543 
'Instruction' to Philip.467 The amounts received by Cobos's 
heirs were simply too great to be permitted. Charles had not 
envisaged the riches of Potosi, which were coming on-stream 
in the late 1540s, and his financial needs were even more 
critical. The amounts destined for Cobos's heirs were far 
greater than Cobos had received in his lifetime.468
Royal cedulas were sent to the governors in the 
Americas to place all funds from Cobos's 'rights' into the 
royal treasuries for the Crown's account. Cobos's son, the 
Marquis of Camarasa, had to sign an escritura renouncing 
these 'rights' in favour of the emperor. In return Charles 
agreed to pay an annual stipend, eventually converted to a 
juro assigned on the Casa de Contratacion.469 However, Cobos's 
wife, Maria — whom Charles had believed to be 'too fond of 
gifts ... and who led Cobos astray' — pleaded with the emperor 
against the royal cedula. She alleged that the agreement in 
1539 was only about a possible reduction of the 'rights' and 
not their elimination. Further, it was linked to the grant 
of a perpetual sehorio on Cazorla. This was now compromised 
through litigation by the Toledo archbishopric pending in
J. M. March, II, pp. 23-34.
468 AGI, Indiferente General, 1802.
469 Archivo de la Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Section Sabiote, leg. 4.
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the Roman Curia. Maria even persuaded members of the Council 
of the Indies to petition — unsuccessfully — the monarch to 
increase the mercedes to Cobos's heirs in lieu of the loss 
of the 'rights.' The emperor agreed to assign from the 
'rights' an amount he deemed sufficient to compensate both 
Dona Maria and the Marquis of Camarasa.
Cobos's last will and testament is dated, in tJbeda, 8. 
May 1547 (he died on 10 May 1547). The testament has been 
transcribed from the Sabiote section in the Medinaceli 
archives in Seville.470 Its condition is very poor. An 
abstract is included as Appendix Four. Cobos named Hernando 
Verdugo de Henao executor and trustee, a measure of his 
esteem for that individual. He acted as a major-domo to 
Cobos's household and kept order in his affairs. Cobos 
declared his last wishes to him in his capacity as an 
escribano publico. Verdugo de Henao also drafted the 
financial statements from Cobos's account books on 18 May 
1547. The emperor issued a cedula to the legal authorities 
permitting Verdugo de Henao, in the name of Maria de 
Mendoza, to collect rents and debts owed to Cobos.471 As 
Keniston has used these papers to estimate the value of 
Cobos's estate, with an inventory of his property and income 
at the date of his death, it need not be repeated here. But 
the original manuscript, in the ducal archive, was
472consulted. There are many contemporary estimates of Cobos's
470 Ibid., 1, pieza, 17.
471 Archivo General de Andalucia, microfilm no. 463.490-498.
472 ACDM, Section Sabiote, 1547, leg. 6,26. List of Cobos’s assets and income.
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wealth and income, but given that not all his papers were 
sent to Simancas nor remain in the Medinaceli archive, it is 
impossible to know the precise sums. Keniston's methodology 
for valuing gold and silver received from Cobos's post as 
fundidor may, however, be questioned. He takes this as one- 
per-cent of Hamilton's estimates of the yearly average of
Al'X
all specie from the Indies from 1541 to 1545. But we know 
that much of Cobos's share was uncollected, subject to 
litigation or simply deferred by a note payable.
With Cobos's usual precision, uncollected debts were 
listed, some from the various royal treasuries in the 
Americas that had been stolen by corrupt treasury officials, 
particularly Alonso Riquelme as treasurer of Peru who had 
been empowered to collect Cobos' s 'rights.'474 Cobos never 
realised the bonanza of Potosi and as we have seen this 
benefit was removed from his heirs before they could cash 
in.
Cobos included in his mayorazgo all payments that might 
be made after his death: he took care to foresee
contingencies and was a master of detail. He wished to 
preserve and build on his wealth for future generations. He 
even foresaw possible litigation against his mayorazgo, such 
as a contesting of accountings. This did happen after his 
death. His daughter's husband, the Duke of Seso, Gonzalo
Keniston, pp. 315-318.
474 ACDM, 18, no. 1. Relation hecha por Verdugo de Henao de los bienes, rentas y deudas 
que poseia el comendador mayor de Leon al tiempo de su muerte (list made by de Henao 
of the goods, incomes and debts of Cobos at the time of his death).
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Hernandez de Cordoba, son of the El Gran Capitan who had
driven the French out of southern Italy, tried to access the 
mayorazgo. Diego counter-sued for the return to the 
mayorazgo of part of his sister's dowry. The Royal Chancery 
of Granada ordered the duke to appear before it.475 An 
escritura de concordia was finally agreed.476 Cobos had 
provided for protection of his assets from any future
claims. This he did in part by receiving royal cedulas from 
the emperor approving the mayorazgo, which made it very 
difficult to challenge. Cobos was aware of challenges to 
mayorazgos in other families, particularly the various 
branches of the Mendozas, where different parts of the 
family had tried to detach wealth from the mayorazgo of the 
properties in Guadalajara and Santillana through litigation 
or illegal seizures of property.
Cobos had appointed Verdugo de Henao in 1536 — on
receiving a report of accounting irregularities in the royal 
Peruvian treasuries — to travel to Peru and verify the
accounts with especial relevance to his 'rights.' He managed 
to extract large sums from the treasurer Riquelme to carry 
back to Spain, after establishing deficiencies in his 
accounts.477 His arrival in Seville and the amounts of the
• • • 478cargo is registered in the archive of the Indies. However, 
not all was paid in specie, and Riquelme signed a mortgage
475 AGA, microfilm, 194.005-053.
476 AGA, microfilm no. 463.500-559.
477 The Harkness Collection in the Library o f Congress. Calendar o f  Spanish Mss 
concerning Peru, 1531-1651 (Washington, DC, 1936), pp. 95-96, doc. 400.
478 AGI, Indiferente General, 1801.
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to Cobos which was still unpaid at the time of the latter's 
death and is included in Verdugo de Henao's accounting of 
Cobos's wealth. The Peruvian historian, Teodoro Hampe 
Martinez, has cross-referred the sums relating to Cobos's 
'rights' with various records in the Indies archives, for 
example, the section in the AGI, Indiferente General 1801- 
1802, on shipments arriving from New Castile (Peru) and
■ 479marked as consignments of gold and silver for Cobos.
Cobos's 'rights' were calculated at one-per-cent of the 
value of gold and silver, prior to deposit in the royal 
foundries. Thus it was levied before the royal quinta. The 
practice established early was for all metals (mined or 
resulting from ransom, such as the booty from Inca 
Atahualpa) to be deposited in royal foundries where they 
would be assayed, taxed and stamped with the royal seal, 
weighed and valued, reserving a fifth of the value for the 
royal tax. Treasury officials kept detailed accounts of all 
gold and silver passing through the assay office and sent a 
statement each year to the Casa de Contratacion in Seville. 
The form of Cobos's collection prior to the royal quinta was 
finally changed after Cobos's death, but by then the royal 
privilege of Cobos's 'rights' was about to be removed. 
Cobos's 'right' was granted in 1522, initially for New Spain 
(Mexico). This was previous to his appointment in 1524 as 
secretary of the newly created Council of the Indies. In
479 Teodoro Hampe Martinez, ‘Incidencia de los “Derechos de Cobos” en la Hacienda 
Peruana. ’ Anuario de Estudios Americanos, Tomo XL, pp. 253-295.
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1527 it was extended to all the discoveries.480 The document 
footnoted below (AGI, J. 1020) deals in great detail with 
these 'rights.' Cobos was given the additional privilege of 
ensayador in 1535. His 'rights' of fundidor y marcador were 
collected by the royal treasurer, but that of ensayador by 
his own nominated representatives. These were additional to 
his 'rights.'
Cobos ensured that . powers of attorney were issued to 
the various viceroys in the Americas to collect his
'rights.' They obliged, in the hope of mercedesf and to 
maintain influence at court. He also had his clients sell 
offices in the various audiencias throughout the Americas, 
even arranging for the appointment of Pedro Alvarado as 
Adelantado of Guatemala. Alvarado had married a niece of 
Cobos and was a business partner, agreeing to share in any
481new wealth, including slaves shipped from Africa. When a 
'jurist of accounts' was finally appointed in 1543, after 
Peru's civil war, Cobos ensured that Agustin de Zarate who 
was an escribano of the Council of Castile received the post 
and acted as his tax-collector. His official title was
Contador General del Peru and he was charged to examine the 
royal treasury accounts, inspect collection practices, check 
balances (alcances) of royal officials and remit monies due. 
This was part of the implementation of the New Laws of 1542
to establish more efficient government in the colonies and
480 AGI, Justicia, 1020, no. 1, pieza 5.
481 Antonio de Herrera, Historia General de los Hechos de los Castellanos en Tierra Firme 
(Madrid, 1591).
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to safeguard the Indian population from some of the 
practices of the early colonists who had established their 
own feudal organisation for exploiting labour and tribute. 
In Valladolid, Bartolome de las Casas had successfully 
lobbied with the emperor for better treatment of the 
Indians. Cobos had warned that this would create dissent 
among the colonists who would lose some of their rights to 
divide (the repartimiento) up the Indian population as 
vassals within their encomiendas. Cobos therefore supported 
the encomenderos against Las Casas.
There is a manuscript in the Lilly Library of Indiana 
University describing how Zarate arranged for the collection 
of Cobos's 'rights./ It names the various people delegated 
to this task for defined periods in different districts of 
Peru. Proceeds from the 'right' as ensayador (official 
valuer of precious metals) for gold and silver would be 
shared equally between Cobos and the collector, with all 
expenses paid by the collector. However, the one-per-cent 
'rights' corresponding to the office of fundidor (royal 
furnaces where metals were smelted) and marcador (function 
of measuring, weighing and stamping of precious metals) 
would all be paid to Cobos, 'in the same way as the taxes 
collected by the treasurer for His Majesty.'482 It was only 
after his death that Cobos's tax was questioned and finally 
withdrawn.
482 Lilly Library, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Protocolo Notarial de Diego 
Gutierrez, 1543-45, f. 129-131.
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Cobos' s network — his agents and notaries — was so
widespread that he was able to monitor developments in the
New World, at least as they affected his interests. That
this was known to influential people in the Americas is 
shown by Lopez de Gomara's comments, writing about an event 
in 1522 in his biography of Cortes. He writes that Cortes 
spared members of a faction who had killed his cousin and 
stirred up civil strife, 'as the saying goes, the magistrate 
was their father-in-law.' They were henchmen of Francisco de 
los Cobos 'whom Cortes did not wish to offend, lest he
suffer in other and more important matters'.
According to Lopez de Gomara, Cortes became a close
■ • 483 •friend of Cobos on returning to Spain. On another occasion, 
Francisco Pizarro shipped Inca Atahualpa's booty to Seville, 
arriving in 1534 — from the Cajamarca Inca defeat in 1533. 
Cobos wrote to the conquistador, on 27 February 1534, noting 
that the officials in the Casa de Contratacion had observed 
a shortfall in the accounted weight of gold contained in the 
forty large amphoras or storage jars (tinajas). These had 
been made in the potteries of Seville and shipped to the 
Americas. The weight on arrival in Seville was not the same 
as the notarised shipment at the port of Callao (Peru).484 A 
notarial transcript had been made by an escribano de camara 
on the division of booty. Any false accounting would affect 
Cobos's share, and he made clear that he was well-informed.
Francisco Lopez de Gomara, Cortes, the life o f  the conqueror by his secretary, 
Francisco Lopez de Gomara, ed. by Lesley Byrd Simpson (Berkeley, 1964), pp. 385-386.
484 Harkness Collection, Documents from early Peru, 1531-1578, pp. 165-167.
If he did not already know the likely practices of 
peculation and fraud, the first archbishop of Mexico, Don 
Fray Juan de Zumarraga, who wrote to him from Mexico City in
• ■ 4851530, warned him about it. The letter, probably written to 
Cobos in his capacity as secretary of the Council of the 
Indies, contains serious complaints about abuses in the 
administration of oidores (judges) in the audiencia (court 
of appeal). The Indians were being destroyed and robbed; 
fewer miners were working the mines and His Majesty's quinta 
was suffering with the fall in output — that would affect 
Cobos's collection 'right.' His Majesty's cedulas were 
disobeyed; the cost of paying salaries to so many oidores 
and their assistants was prohibitive and their power was 
absolute. They refused to pay the diezmos (tithes), saying 
that they had seen no papal bulls of authorisation and they 
were the patrones (bosses). He pleads for His Majesty and 
the Royal Council to remedy the disastrous situation: 'the
Indians were exhausted and destroyed and each day fewer in 
numbers.' This letter is of importance because it shows that 
Cobos was fully informed of the situation in the New World 
as early as 1530, that is, before the advent of wealth from 
Peru. Zumarraga emphasised the economic as well as the human 
damage, perhaps more likely to appeal to Cobos's cupidity. 
Cobos' s reaction was to ensure that his network was well 
placed to monitor his interests, in particular as we have 
seen, during the conquest of Peru. As stated above, he
485 BN, Ms 1778, ff. 334v-347r. Una carta de Fr. Juan de Zumarraga, arzobispo de Mexico 
al secretario Francisco de los Cobos.
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opposed Las Casas's wish for reform of the treatment of the 
Indians.
Cazorla was important to Cobos, as previously 
described, because the Adelantamiento granted him the status 
of a sehorio with the associated privileges and 
jurisdictional independence. But the wealth this unlocked 
was also important. A manuscript in the Archivo Historico 
Nacional illustrates the nature and approximate amounts of 
revenues that were raised in Cazorla for its Adelantado 
between 1515 and 1518, prior to Cobos.486 This was divided 
between that due to the archdiocese of Toledo and that paid 
directly to the Adelantado appointed by Toledo. But through 
the royal merced, when Cobos purchased Cazorla and Sabiote, 
he received all the revenues, including the indirect taxes 
of the alcabalas and terclas when transferred from Toledo to 
his jurisdiction.487 His only requirement was to pay an annual 
tribute to the archbishop of Toledo, as described in the 
appendix abstract on the founding of the mayorazgo.
It is worth describing in some detail the nature and 
different kinds of revenue Cobos received. Firstly, he was 
paid an annual income from the inhabitants in recognition of 
his rights over the land: the marzazga. This amounted to
one-tenth of the harvest. He also received lease payments 
for the use of the land: the terrazgo. Then there were
payments relating to sales of produce: cereals, wine and
486 AHN, Consejos Suprimidos, legs. 28254 and 28255.
487AGA, microfilm, no. 463/298-362.
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olive oil as well as silk. In addition there was a 
traditional obligation to report to arms against the 
frontier, Moorish province of Granada. After the Reconquest 
there was still the obligation to pay this fonsadera in lieu 
of military service and to pay certain taxes or provide 
labour to work on the maintenance of the castles in the 
sehorio as well as on roads and bridges. Most importantly, a 
significant part of his revenue derived from transaction 
taxes, such as a tax on transit of cattle or goods,
collected from drovers passing through Cazorla. Cazorla was 
an important destination for cattle moving south from La 
Mancha and from other parts of Andalucla to feed on its lush 
summer pastures. This tax was named the portazgo or 
montazgo.
Indirect taxes, such as the alcabala and the portazgo, 
grew with the expansion of trade between regions. The 
portazgo was applied to merchants' goods and cattle coming 
from outside the region and was collected by the traditional
system of tax-farming. The cahadas, or royal roads, were
used by the cattle and sheep of La Mesta, the medieval 
guild, on their regular transhumance. These roads still
exist and are used by hikers. One of these roads originates 
from as far away as Cuenca ending in the upper waters of the 
Guadalquivir at Cazorla. But there is a network criss­
crossing through the mountains of Cazorla and Segura. The 
archives in Toledo give figures for 1514 to 1517 of the 
numbers of cattle moving into Cazorla for summer grazing and 
the resulting taxes raised. These figures, as so often, are
309
the result of litigation between the local authorities and
- 4gg
the Toledo archbishopric that needed to establish records. 
Additional rights from medieval times required payment to 
the Adelantado of a percentage of fines for administration 
of justice. The senor also had monopolies of salt-pans,
mines and windmills. Occasionally, like his emperor, he 
could call for an extraordinary servicio to meet unforeseen 
expenses and even wedding dowries for his daughters. The 
emperor also could call upon extraordinary servicios — in 
1500 Isabel had requested a servicio from the council of
Cazorla for the marriage of the infantas.
Carande discovered records in the Simancas archive of 
two early mercedes granted by the queen, dona Juana 
(Charles's mother), to Cobos when he was contador mayor for 
Granada.489 The first, in 1513, revived the caxbix, a Moorish 
tax, which granted Cobos exclusivity in collecting 
transhumance taxes in kind, based on the numbers of grazing 
animals using pasture-land near Granada. The second, in 
1514, shows correspondence from Cobos requesting the right 
to a tax on the packing and washing of fish at Malaga. Here
he seems to be promoting a tax, which had not previously
existed.490 These mercedes are interesting because they give 
an early indication of Cobos's creativity in finding new 
ways to raise money and to share in the results.
Archivo Catedral de Toledo, Obra y Fabrica, Ms 915, ff. 697r-699r.
489 Ramon Carande, ‘Dos mercedes de dona Juana a Francisco de los Cobos’, Moneda y  
Credito, 128, (1974), pp. 7-16.
490 AGS, PR, leg. 59-101,59-106.
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Most importantly, Cobos received a jnerced from Charles 
which allowed him to collect the alcabalas in Cazorla and 
other servicios for his own account. The alienation of the 
Crown's regalian rights was discussed in the previous 
chapter. These rights were often usurped or collection 
impeded by the Adelantado prohibiting the towns to make 
payment to the kings' collectors in his senorio. This was 
the case with Cazorla when under the Adelantado of Toledo, 
prior to Cobos.491
So the purchase of the Adel ant amiento of Cazorla by 
Cobos gave him full sehorial rights about whose nature we 
know; but the value in terms of annual income can only be 
guessed. It did, however, amount to a tax base from a 
prosperous community and gave him entry into the great 
nobility, which he had craved. We know from Keniston's work 
on the inventory in Cobos's mayorazgo — qualified by my 
comments above — that an estimate for the post of fundidor 
was 7,400,000 maravedies, approximately 40 per cent of his 
estimated annual income of 20,000,000 maravedies.492 The 
maravedi was the money of account used throughout Castile. 
Keniston estimates the annual alcabala income from Cazorla 
at 3,000,000 maravedies in 1546. He does this from the cash 
in Verdugo de Henao's inventory and a rough estimate of 
revenues from the harvest of wheat and barley. The annual 
value of the alcabalas would depend on crop prices and the 
annual harvest, so that this would be a volatile source of
491 AHN, Suprimidos, legs. 28254 and 28255.
492 Keniston, pp. 315-318 and pp. 421-422.
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income. But it seems a low figure given the evidence from 
the manuscripts quoted below. Thus Cazorla and the Indies' 
'rights' were approximately 50 percent of his income within 
the mayorazgo. But it does not include his income outside of 
the mayorazgo — the bienes libres — which would have 
included some of his juros and loans to the emperor.
A microfilm of a manuscript in the archive of Andalucla 
shows two juros granted to Cobos's wife, Maria, amounting to 
6,242,000 maravedies assigned to the alcabalas of the 
Adel ant amiento of Cazorla.493 As this is dated 1556, it may 
represent a settlement over the abrogation of Cobos's specie 
'rights' rather than the full value of the alcabalas. It is 
however curious that they were assigned on alcabalas that 
had supposedly been transferred to Cobos as part of the sale 
of Cazorla. There are further copies of manuscripts in this 
archive — microfilmed from the Camarasa archive in the 
Duchess of Medinaceli's Casa Pilatos — showing additional 
juros, approximating 11,000,000 maravedies, granted by 
Philip II to Maria on alcabalas from different villages 
within Cazorla.494 It appears that Philip continued to bestow 
privileges on Maria after Cobos's death, following both 
Cobos's request in his will (which can be read in Appendix 
Four) and Charles's letter to Philip asking him to take care 
of Cobos's family. These juros are also outside of the 
mayorazgo.
493 AGA, microfilm no. 487. 018-020, and 480.367-411.
494 Ibid, no. 489.018-022.
To establish more accurate figures would require much 
additional research among the notarial protocols in the 
towns of his sehorlo. The general archive of Andalucia in 
Seville has tried to collect some of these protocols of 
property sales and purchases by Cobos. An important one is 
the sale of the town and fortress of Sabiote to Cobos in 
1537 'with all its rights including alcabalas and tercias. '495 
This is accompanied by an order and escritura de poder from 
Charles to the corregidor of Sabiote to grant possession to 
Cobos. There is also a manuscript from the Dean of Malaga 
informing the council of Sabiote of the content of a bull 
from Pope Paul III confirming the sale of the town to Cobos, 
which had previously been granted by Clement VII. Pope 
Paul's bull of 1538 granted Cobos the patronato, which gave 
him the right to appoint clergy, do 'good works' and receive 
a share of the income from the benefices of the abbey of 
Sabiote.496 It also allowed him to establish a university and 
to found a monastery of friars in Ubeda. There are letters 
of privilege from both Charles and Philip selling villages 
to Cobos acquired from the Order of Calatrava and escrituras 
of the sale of houses and orchards to Cobos, such as the 
villages of Jimena, Canena and Recena.497 From the work of 
Modesto Ulloa on a statistical series showing the continuity 
of revenues for the nobility, we know that the above 
estimates of Cobos's annual income compare favourably to
495 Ibid, microfilm no. 463.093-104, 463.032-041, and 463.135-142.
496 Ibid, microfilm no. 463.171-187.
497 Ibid, microfilm no. 337.011-016.
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that of many of the great noble families at that time.498 In a 
lifetime Cobos had accumulated wealth that had taken these 
families generations to establish.
The principal sources for this chapter are the 
documents in the ducal archives of Medinaceli, many of which 
are in poor condition and have been microfilmed by the 
authorities and placed in the archive of Andalucia. This is 
entitled Archivo General de Andalucia, Sabiote y  otros 
senorios de la Casa de Camarasa en el Reino de Jaen. There 
are 63 rolls of microfilm including 67 bundles from the 
original manuscripts. The Medinaceli archive is composed of 
a collection of bundles of documents from different noble 
families, their senorial estates all brought together 
through family links and marriages to the Casa de 
Medinaceli. Each family is identified by a section of the 
Casa or Estado. In Cobos's case it is the section on the 
senorio de Sabiote, relating to property in the towns of 
Sabiote, Ubeda, Jimena, Recena and Torres. This section 
contains 70 boxes, the principal documents of the marquises 
of Camarasa relating to Cobos. The last Marquis of Camarasa, 
Ignacio Fernandez de Henestrosa y Gayoso de los Cobos, died 
in 1948 in Los Angeles without immediate descendants. His 
niece, Victoria Eugenia Fernandez de Cordoba y Fernandez de 
Henestrosa, Duquesa de Medinaceli, acquired the legacy title 
and in so doing added this to the abundant branches and
498 Modesto Ulloa, Las rentas de algunos sehores y  senorios Castellanos bajo los primeros 
Austrias (Montevideo, 1971), pp. 2-14.
314
leaves of that ducal house, with a thousand years of history 
and a veritable genealogical forest.
i
The last Camarasa wrote a history of his family, which 
is available in this archive.499 It is principally a genealogy 
to glorify his family and their ancient origin through their 
connections to the Lunas (Diego, Cobos's son, married a 
Luna) and Mendozas (Cobos's wife, Maria, was a Mendoza and 
later on the death of her brother, sixth countess of 
Rivadavia). The latter were so-called ricos hombres chosen 
by the kings to serve as early as the 800s. They served as 
counsellors, and teachers to princes and warriors throughout 
the centuries, changing sides in dynastic conflicts when 
advantageous to do so. The Salazar y Castro archive in the 
Real Academia de Historia contains details on the Mendozas 
and Lunas, whose famies were very important to Cobos as 
amongst the oldest nobilities in Castile.500
The Camarasa archive holds the last testament and the 
merced granted by the Catholic Kings to Ruy Diaz de Mendoza 
granting him the title of count of Castrojeriz. The various 
family branches came from the mountains of Cantabria and a 
Cobos was involved in the conquest of Ubeda. Argote de 
Molina, the genealogist, has written that Lope Rodriguez de 
los Cobos was one of the twelve founding families in Ubeda. 
The Marquis of Camarasa states in his book that Francisco de 
los Cobos, although of modest family, was of unquestionable
499 Marques de Camarasa. Casa de Camarasa: Apuntes para el historial de la Casa de 
Camarasa (San Sebastian, 1934).
500 RAH, Salazar y Castro, Casa de Luna, tomo I, f. 265.
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hidalguia (nobility), and rose by his own merits. Thus he 
stresses Cobos's impeccable bloodline and the family's 
continued service to kings. However, Cobos was an hidalgo, 
that is, not of the higher nobility. That would only be 
acquired by his son Diego, through the noble bloodline of 
his mother, Maria de Mendoza, with the emperor creating the 
title Marquis of Camarasa on his marriage. Letters of 
privilege of the period show a justification process for 
aspiring nobles which set out claims from genealogy, service 
to the crown, ancestors, royal mercedes, membership of a 
Military Order, marriage alliances, coats-of-arms, and 
family tombs and chapels. Cobos's drive for status involved 
all these elements up to and including his tomb in El 
Salvador. But in this he was very much a man of his time. A 
genealogy of Cobos and his family links is included as 
Appendix One.
The Archivo Historico NaCional in Madrid has a 
catalogue of all Spanish noble titles.501 Unfortunately, this 
only begins in the 1560s, so we only have a reasonably clear 
history of the Marquises of Camarasa from then. Similarly 
Matilla Tascon's notarial protocols for noble families show
502protocols of the Camarasas only from 1568.
Cobos's son, Diego, received the title of the first 
Marquis of Camarasa as a wedding present through a merced 
from the emperor in 1543. Diego took the coat-of-arms
501 AHN, Catalogo Alfabetico de los documentos referentes a tltulos del Reino y  
Grandezas de Espaha. Section consejos suprimidos, (Madrid), tomo I.
502 Antonio Matilla Tascon, Catalogo Documentos Notariales de Nobles (Madrid, 1987).
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quartered to include his father's five crowned lions — 
permitted by Charles V and licensed by a papal bull from 
Clement VII in 1523 — on the top left and bottom right. The 
other quarters contained the crescent moon of the Lunas, 
representing his wife's family. It would be interesting to 
consult the mayorazgo of the Rivadavia branch of the 
Mendozas. This was established in 1530 by Don Juan Hurtado 
de Mendoza and Dona Maria Sarmiento Pimental, the counts of 
Rivadavia in the Adelantamiento of Galicia. Cobos's wife 
inherited the title when a widow and on the death of her 
brother. Her marriage contract with Cobos in 1522 is 
included in these papers. These papers have not been 
consulted and they are to be found in the Archivo del 
Palacio de la villa de Ribadavia in Galicia in northwest 
Spain.503 The agreement on the dowry is also included in these 
papers.504 Furthermore, there is an inventory of Cobos's 
worldly goods at his marriage in 1522. It would be most 
useful to compare this with his inventory on death.505 This is 
work to be done, but access to the archive requires special 
permission.
Apart from documents on the founding of the mayorazgo 
and Cobos's testament, which has been discussed, there is
Archivo de Rivadavia, Contrato de casamiento otorgado por Don Juan de Mendoza y 
Dona Maria Sarmiento su mujer, Condes de Rivadavia de la una parte, y de la Sr. Don 
Francisco de los Cobos, Secretario de los Reyes, para casarse con Dona Maria de Mendoza 
Pimental. Leg. 2, num. 30 (Cobos’s marriage contract).
504 Ibid., Concierto entre el Comendador Mayor Francisco de los Cobos, Don Juan de 
Mendoza y Dona Maria Sarmiento sobre la dote y otras cosas. Leg. 2, ff. 21-28 (Dowry of 
Maria).
505 Ibid., Inventario de bienes de Cobos cuando se caso con Dona Maria Mendoza 
Pimental, 1522. Leg. 2, 27 (Inventory of Cobos at time of marriage).
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much in the Medinaceli archive on the administration of the 
estates of the different towns in the seforio of Cazorla and 
Sabiote (Jimena, Canena and Torres). There is a microfilmed 
copy in the AGA of a manuscript signed by Alonso de Baeza, 
the royal treasurer, acknowledging receipt on behalf of the 
emperor of 18,507,751 maravedies for the sale of Sabiote to 
Cobos, inclusive of alcabalas and terciasf dated 1537 .506 It 
is attached to a certification that the payment and balance 
are correct. There are many records in the Medinaceli 
bundles of rent collection and taxes, and sales and 
purchases of property, including olive groves, orchards, and 
land in Ubeda — the escrituras of sale. From notarial deeds 
in the town hall at Ubeda we know that Cobos was actively
" 507acquiring land and property in and around Ubeda from 1515. 
Most of the notarial records of purchases were transferred 
from the towns of Cobos's senorio to Ubeda. There are also 
records of the ordering of chaplaincies for the chapel of El 
Salvador in Ubeda and the endowments of religious 
foundations.
Some documents indicate Cobos's concern and attention 
to funding and administration of the foundations he 
bequested. There are required regular 'visits' of inspection 
by Maria and Vazquez de Molina to the chapel of El 
Salvador.508 This follows a system Cobos seems to have copied 
from the Military , Order of Calatrava from which he had
506 AGA, microfilm no. 463.106-133.
507 Archivo Municipal de Ubeda, Fondo de Protocolos Notariales, leg. 1515.06-30. 
Notario, Fernandez de la Puebla.
508 AGA, microfilm no. 479.349-407.
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purchased the villages of his senorio. They regularly sent 
two 'visitors' to their encomiendas to inspect 'all houses, 
lands, vines, diezmos and tributes due the Order from the
509villages of Torres, Canena, Jimena and Recena.' There are 
regulations on the appointments of the chaplains, including 
an investigation of their bloodline with witness testimonies 
on their ancestors.510 There are also miscellaneous documents 
on the statutes, ordinances and constitution of El Salvador 
as established by Cobos for the good governance of the 
chapel. These were consulted on microfilm in the AGA.511 
Finally, in the Camarasa archive, there is a manuscript
confirming previous bulls from Pope Clement VII and granting 
permission to establish a university in Ubeda and to found a
• 512monastery of friars.
The importance of El Salvador to Cobos was discussed in 
a previous chapter. In his will, attached as Appendix Four, 
he proudly states that 'I am the patron by apostolic
concession.' He provides for regular sung-masses and the 
stipulations for the care of El Salvador form a major part
of his last testament. It is of special significance that
his will requires monies for the completion of El Salvador 
and all its finery to come from his wealth outside of the 
mayorazgo — the so-called bienes libres — and if necessary 
the wealth within the mayorazgo.
509 AGA, microfilm no. 1509, 09.24.
510 AGA, microfilm, nos. 269.279-394.
511 Ibid. nos. 482.653-701, 483.008-125, 479.011-200, 459.016-063 and 479.220-280.
512 ACDM, Sabiote, leg. 4, pieza 3, 1542.
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Again, these documents all demonstrate Cobos's reach 
beyond the grave, with a continuance of good works after 
death, and attention to the effective administration of his 
bequest. From his first secretarial appointment in 1515 
Cobos began acquiring wealth and position, but from 1541 and 
the funding of his mayorazgo he began the dispositions for 
his heirs and his eternal soul. The emperor had first 
authorised a mayorazgo in 1529 but, like many people, Cobos 
postponed the final disposition. The clauses translated and 
included in Appendix Three show quite clearly that the 
emperor's earlier permission of 2 6 February 1529 encompassed 
all the royal privileges:
to include any gift or my royal merced from Castile or 
the Indies, which shall be inherited by Diego de los 
Cobos.
His second approval, dated in Ghent 10 March 1540 
[although the document in the Camarasa archive is dated 9 
November 1541], allows goods to be added to the mayorazgo:
To include my mercedes for posts held by Francisco de 
los Cobos ... and to be left to persons so designated as 
beneficiary, ... although they be of greater value than 
the goods you have at the granting of my permission, 
you may order in mayorazgo in life or death ... and 
remain for your elder son, Diego de los Cobos.
Thus it appears that Charles's secret political 
'Instruction' to his son of 1543 showed the pragmatic 
emperor prepared to disavow prior commitments when he needed 
to do so. Perhaps it also indicated an older, weaker Cobos 
who was of less use to his emperor and to his son, Philip, 
who was now surrounding himself with new men. As Karl
Brandi, quoted above, wrote: 'the political testaments are
the best source of our knowledge of Charles's character and
• 513 ,intentions.' The emperor's treatment of Cobos is an example 
of this acute observation.
513 Brandi, p. 486.
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Several historians — von Ranke, Moral-Fatio and Brandi, 
among others — have concluded from textual analysis that 
Charles's autobiography, written in Innsbruck, is genuine. 
Fernandez-Alvarez includes a copy as an appendix to his 
volumes on Charles's documents.514 It is a translation from 
the supposedly original French version made in 1620 in 
Madrid and written in the third person in the style of 
Caesar's Gallic Wars. An English translation was made in 
1862 from a Portuguese version, which was also said to be 
the only surviving copy. It deals with his travels, 
treaties, and military struggles with no mention of finance 
or the role of Cobos. If genuine, it would appear to 
indicate either where Charles's interests lay or may simply 
be a romanticised view of his life written in 1552 shortly 
before his retirement to the monastery of Yuste. It is 
probable that it was written as an adventure story along the 
lines of the romances Charles had read in his youth.
Charles's long contemporaneous letter to Philip II, 
dated 2 April 1553, shows a keen awareness of the priority 
of finance, as do all the earlier exchanges between him and 
Prince Philip, referred to in Chapter Five.515 His so-called 
'Political Testament' of 18 January 1548, written to a
514 CDCV, IV, pp. 485-567. ‘Historia Del Invencible Emperador Carlos Quinto, Rey de 
Espana, Compuesta Por SU Majestad Cesarea, Como Se Ve Por El Papel Que Va En El 
Siguiente Hoja.’
515 Ibid., Ill, pp. 577-592.
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mature Philip also instructs his son on the 'principal 
piedra deste edificio' (the foundation of this building) — 
and 'the need to find men for posts, not posts for men.'516 He 
was continually concerned about the qualities of the 
counsellors and he urged Philip to trust in the merits of 
Cobos and especially to rely on him in business matters. His 
'Secret Instruction' from Palamos of 1543 to Prince Philip 
with the extensive assessment of Cobos's worth is the
principal source in estimating the emperor's opinion of the
qualities and defects of his counsellors and the relative
importance of a variety of policy issues.
An assessment of Cobos must be imperfect due to the 
lack of manuscripts written in his hand. It is difficult to 
generalise from particular documents, which can only provide 
a partial assessment. But although thus qualifying these 
conclusions, we do get a qualitative idea of Cobos's central 
role by examining his actions: his rise to power through
manipulating the institutions he knew so well and an
understanding of how he handled his competitors for power 
and influence, while invariably identifying his interests 
and actions with those of the emperor. Surviving letters to 
Cobos reveal the world in which he moved. They demonstrate 
his role in managing a network of power partly through 
placing his own people and partly by manipulating his access 
to the gifts of honour and privilege.
516 BN, Ms 4013, Augsburg 1548.
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But the evidence also supports the conclusion that, 
contrary to Keniston's traditional interpretation followed 
by most historians, Cobos was not only concerned with his 
privileges and network of patronage. This thesis has shown 
that he was also involved in policy and debates, among other 
things, about jurisdictional differences within the empire. 
The importance of customary local justice and traditional 
fueros had been emphasised by the revolt of the comuneros at 
the beginning of Charles's reign. Afterwards, Charles and 
Cobos were always aware of the need to accept these 
differences both within Spain and throughout the empire in 
order to ensure the legitimacy of imperial rule. Control of 
the provinces was made easier by accepting these differences 
while imposing viceroys outside of Castile and corregidores 
within Castile to maintain loyalty to Charles and similar 
principles of government. Regional particularism and 
privileges were supported and further developed by Cobos in 
his dealings with the Cortes of Castile. Paradoxically, such 
devolution gave Cobos more power of patronage through his 
arrangement with the Cortes for the collection of the 
servlcio. Decentralisation of economic power often can 
control the prevalence of rent-seeking by limiting the 
economic role of the state. However, as described in 
Chapters Four and Five, Cobos was able to co-opt the towns 
by enabling them to participate in rent-seeking.
The need for the political support of the towns, after 
the revolt of the comuneros, determined Cobos's policies of 
inclusiveness — co-opting them through the encabezamiento.
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The bankers preferred the credit of the towns, and thus this 
political backing was translated into financial support by 
the assignment of the servicios to the bankers' aslentos. It 
has been shown how this was done through the Cortes' rights 
of petition, by analysing the flow of petitions from the 
meetings in the Cortes and the resulting increase in 
servicios. Cobos reconciled the chronic financial needs of 
Charles with the ambitions of the urban hidalgos to share in 
wealth and prestige by opening the floodgates to privilege 
and gift-giving.
While the thesis concludes that Cobos was nothing less 
than the principal architect of Castile's government, he had 
a role beyond secretarial work at court. He was not just a 
master of the administrative machinery of Castile. The study 
of letters from Diego Hurtado de Mendoza, from Venice and 
Rome, and Lope Hurtado de Mendoza from Lisbon, as well as 
Juan de Valdes from Naples and Francisco de Borja from 
Barcelona results in a much wider portrayal of Cobos than 
hitherto. These letters show an involvement in imperial 
policy and an interest in the cultural and literary views of 
these men, all of whom were classical scholars and 
bibliophiles.
This thesis began with several statements of purpose. 
The institutions with which Cobos's associated himself in 
the process of his ascent were examined, in order to discern 
his ambitions, motivation and methods of achieving his aims, 
in the hope also of revealing his persona. Power and control 
lay in manipulating the institutions and networks of
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patronage. He was particularly skilled at this, but his 
genius also lay in the manner in which he extended this 
patronage to the towns and allied them to his emperor after 
the revolt of the comuneros. The available sources 
demonstrate his ambitions and skills of manipulation to 
achieve and maintain his post as the most powerful of 
Charles's secretaries. Although much prior research has been 
done on the essentially medieval institutions — the Military 
Orders, the sehorlos, and the entailment of mayorazgos — 
they provide essential context in understanding their social 
and political importance to Cobos's rise. Thus they have 
been extensively covered by this thesis.
The significance to Cobos of the Adelantamiento of 
Cazorla has been shown through the conflict with Siliceo — 
the archbishop of Toledo — perhaps the most determined 
challenge to Cobos's authority and influence with the 
emperor. The examination of manuscripts in the cathedral 
archive of Toledo has provided evidence of Cazorla's 
importance. This may well have been the central objective of 
Cobos's life: the founding and endowment of a family dynasty 
that would give him high social position among his peers, 
independent of the emperor's favours. But Cazorla was also 
part of Charles's battle to disentitle Church property, and 
Siliceo fully understood the danger to the Church of losing 
such an emblematic property. Cobos, Tavera and the emperor 
had pursued a policy of large-scale ecclesiastical 
disentitlement to finance imperial projects. As part of this 
process Cobos had received the emperor's royal cedula and a
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papal bull recognising his perpetual family-right to 
Cazorla. But the persistent Siliceo was able to resurrect 
the Church's ancient privilege and the battle was fought 
when Cobos's health was in decline. By referring to His 
Holiness's approval and confirmation, Cobos's last will and 
testament of 8 May 1547 — an abstract is attached as an 
appendix — clearly highlights his determination, or perhaps 
anxiety, to maintain the perpetual nature of the Cazorla 
inheritance.
But the most significant contribution of this research 
is to place Cobos in a new light, which gives him much 
greater importance than has so far been appreciated. He was 
at the very centre of credit and finance, the essential 
tools for Charles's dynastic objectives. The quantity and 
depth of archival material relating to Cobos and finance 
provides sufficient evidence to conclude that Cobos was 
nothing less than the key to supplying the means for Charles 
to pursue his ambitious policies of dynastic expansion and 
conflict. Cobos broadened the fiscal base and maintained 
bankers' trust. Charles, as his various 'Instructions' have 
shown, was fully aware of Cobos's skill. Money and finance 
were at the centre of the emperor's belief in Cobos and 
therefore the means by which Cobos transformed trust and 
confidence into political power. No one was more powerful 
than Cobos in this vital area.
From the outset, the emperor realised that his royal 
'domain' revenues were insufficient to support his 
ambitions. Cobos thus skillfully increased and diversified
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Castile's 'extraordinary' revenues. He did this principally 
through a pact with the Cortes to augment the servicios, 
which initially gave the emperor the essential stability of 
financial flows to fund his enterprises. As has been shown, 
this was achieved by allowing the Cortes to raise the 
alcabala tax through its own composition or encabezamiento, 
replacing the traditional method of levying the alcabala. 
Thus Charles summoned fifteen Cortes during his reign and 
was usually granted an increase on the previous servicio. 
The Cortes had no incentive to question Charles and Cobos's 
fiscal policy of unlimited expenditure. The elites of the 
Cortes were in effect the 'special interests' of their time. 
They were closely connected to Spanish banking and 
mercantile interests whose loans the servicios had to pay. 
The circle of vested interests was complete.
By the late 1530s virtually all of the servicios were 
assigned to pay outstanding bankers' asientos (contracts). 
As the burden of debt intensified, Cobos resorted to 
borrowing against future years' servicios (this is present- 
day practice for most U.S. municipal bond issues, through 
the issuance of tax-anticipatory bonds). Manuscripts in 
Simancas provide evidence to show that Cobos was actively 
involved in re-writing the conditions of the asientos, as, 
increasingly, their terms could not be met. This was an 
effective default and indicated to the lenders a serious 
credit or solvency problem. Bankers therefore shortened the 
maturities on new loans, invariably a sign of worsening 
credit. Charles's declaration, 'that which is agreed with
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the bankers be strictly fulfilled ... in order that my credit 
does not suffer,' was intended to create faith in the royal 
word, but did not stop a tightening in bankers' terms.
Nevertheless, Cobos convinced the bankers to continue to 
lend and in this he was helped by the emergence of a new 
source of wealth — silver from the New World. Creditors
therefore still believed that they would be repaid, this 
time from anticipating the arrival of the silver fleets.
Silver represented a new currency entering the financial 
system, equivalent to a central bank's printing-press.
Thus the emerging regularity of silver fleet 
confiscations from the mid-1530s was disastrous for the 
emperor's credit. Cobos and Philip warned Charles, as has
been shown, but imperial policies were irreversible in the
• 517 • •context of Charles's aims. Events, as always, would impinge 
on any attempts to restrain expansive policies. As Charles 
wrote in a letter to Prince Philip: 'there were ineluctable
• • • 518needs and obligations and a crowding m  of events. ' Cobos 
postponed the day of reckoning by his constant shuffling of 
the cards of debt, and by enforced loans (socorros to His 
Majesty) from merchants and the nobility. He also increased 
the alienation of royal patrimony and revenues — 
particularly the alcabala. But perhaps this was a necessary 
consequence of the emperor's voracious ambitions, rather 
than a despoiling of the 'family silver' by Cobos. He died 
in 1547, some ten years before state bankruptcy. But it is
517 Carande, III, pp. 212-214.
518 CDCV, II, pp. 336-343.
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highly unlikely that he could have avoided this or modified 
the emperor's dynastic policies and world-view on the need 
to defend the unity of Christendom, notwithstanding the 
heavy cost for Castilian credit. In this sense Cobos's role 
was to fix the problem and not to question imperial policy.
We can therefore also judge the importance of Cobos's 
actions in the context of Charles's struggles. His period 
encompassed enormous challenges, among which were: the
threat of the Ottoman Turk; the continuous struggle with 
France's Valois kings; papal conflict; the piracy of 
Barbarossa; the constant threat of insurrection from Spain's 
Muslim population; and, not least, the Lutheran heresy. 
Cobos's tragedy was that his actions were ultimately futile 
in the context of this enormous imperial agenda. His 
personal agenda was also to be disappointed: Siliceo
thwarted his desire for a perpetual entailed estate for his 
descendants, his wife Maria lost the one-per-cent 'derecho 
de Cobos', and his 'good works' depleted his mayorazgo. 
Finally, the title Camarasa, which he had obtained for his 
son, disappeared and was absorbed into the older noble 
family of Medinaceli. His policies and dealings with the 
Cortes and the bankers kept Charles and the empire in funds, 
but after his death insolvency quickly followed.
Thus he left no permanent legacy, neither personal nor 
in his role as supreme secretary to Charles V. As Charles 
wrote in his 'Instruction' to Philip of May 1543: 'Do not
blame Cobos for extravagance, the fault was not his but that 
of the political situation; if only Cobos had the chance he
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would admirably execute reforms. '519 This perhaps explains the 
long neglect in recognising his centrality — which this 
thesis demonstrates — to his emperor/s ambitions. He did not 
reform institutions, but used them to fulfill his emperor's 
and his own ambitions. He used the continuity of 
institutions and their embedded rewards as his power base. 
There is thus no strategic change or body of reforms that 
historians can point to as being of Cobos's creation. Change 
is easier for historians to try to identify or evaluate the 
consequences — especially the promotion of a policy of 
reform that can focus attention on an historical character. 
But reforms had been suggested by Gatinarra and rejected by 
Charles. Cobos' s strength lay in the more subtle use and 
adaptation" of existing structures. As a result of this 
research we can now more clearly see him as a supreme 
exponent of the art of managing the system and pleasing his 
emperor, which made him Charles's most powerful and longest- 
serving secretary.
It is unclear whether Cobos ended up disappointed in 
his achievements, like his emperor. Did he know of Charles's 
intentions to revoke the Cobos 'derecho' as assayer of New 
World specie if the pope confirmed Cazorla as a perpetual 
grant to his son and heir? Charles had specifically approved 
the inclusion of all his mercedes in Cobos's mayorazgo, so 
Cobos may have felt that his wealth was safe. But Cobos's 
actions throughout his life make it likely that he would
519 CDCV, II, pp. 110-111.
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have taken precautions, as he did in his last will and 
testament. He had seen how Charles treated other secretaries 
and how his promises to fulfill credit obligations had been 
broken.
On the interpretation of this thesis, the provisions in 
Cobos's last will and testament of May 1547 give us the best 
insight into his intentions on preserving his memory and 
imposing obligations on his wife and children. The chapel of 
El Salvador in tJbeda was to be his memorial and, according 
to his testament, had to be completed and suitably 
maintained. Although he lost his most valuable perpetual 
gifts from his emperor, he was at least successful in 
guaranteeing one lasting memory: the chapel at Ubeda. This 
important manuscript source, i.e. his last will and 
testament, probably because of its poor condition and 
unusually difficult palaeography, has until now been 
neglected.
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The Cobos Family Tree
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Laws Relating to the E n c a b e z a m ie n to .  
Folio LVIII , Libro VI, titulo III. 
Ley I
Como quiera que sea visto por experiencia subir las 
rentas, se dan por encabezamiento al reyno por diez anos en 
cierto precio. Por que nuestra intencion a sido de quitar 
vexaciones de arrendatarios quisimos que se recibiessen 
encabezamientos de qualquier ciudades ... que quisieren 
encabezarse. Por hazen bien y merced a estos reynos, avemos 
por bien de las dar encabezamiento todas las rentas de 
alcavalas y tercias del, por diez anos venideros desde 1535, 
en el precio que nos llebamos y gozamos de ellas este ano de 
1534, descontados todos los prometidos y quartas partes que 
en ellos se ganan ...
El reyno y sus procuradores den orden como todas las 
rentas se encabezen, cada una en el precio que se deba 
encabezar, en el qual encabezamiento no a de entrar en 
almojarifazgo ni servicio, y montazgo ni puestos de los tres 
Obispados, ni almadrabas, ni mineros, ni la renta de seda 
del reyno de Granada, que no se suelen encabezar a pueblos.
Avemos por bien que los pueblos que particularmente se 
vinieron a encabezar, se les de por encabezamiento sus 
rentas en precios moderados, de manera que reciban 
gratificacion como ahora ven, que se haze con los que se an
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encabezado. Y desde ahora mandamos a nuestros Contadores 
Mayores que ansi lo han.
Pragmatica de SM lxxxvi. Madrid 1534.
Ley II
Que el dicho encabezamiento dura por otros diez anos 
mas, desde 1547 hasta 1556. Y dello dimos nuestra cedula 
para los nuestros Contadores Mayores ... las Cortes a su cargo 
por encabezamiento las rentas del reyno por diez anos en 
cierto precio y con ciertas condiciones ... y a estas Cortes 
nos otorgaron de servicios extraordinarios, ciento y 
cincuenta cuentos de maravadies para las grandes y 
importantes necesidades ... como hacer bien y merced a los 
reynos les concedimos y otorgamos de les prorrogar y alargar 
el dicho encabezamiento por los diez anos y obligandose por 
los maravedies que montase
Pragmatica de S.M. Valladolid, 1547.
Translation 
Law I
As we wish from experience to raise revenues, it is 
granted to the kingdom for ten years to raise revenues by 
encabezamiento at a certain price. Because our intention has 
been to remove the vexations of tax-farming we wish that 
encabezamientos be received from whichever city that wishes 
to pay by encabezamiento. To do right and grant a merced to 
these kingdoms, we have granted an encabezamiento of all the
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revenues of alcabalas and tercias for the ten years from 
1535, at the price established in 1534, deducting all 
promises and commitments from the amount ..
The kingdom and its procurators will determine how 
taxes will be distributed and the amounts of encabezamiento. 
To be excluded from the encabezamiento will be the
almojarifazgo, the montazgo, and posts of the three Bishops, 
and almadrabas and mining rights, as well as taxes from silk
from the kingdom of Granada, that by custom do not levy
encabezamiento from their peoples.'
We wish to ensure that the peoples who are taxed by
encabezamiento do so at reasonable prices, so that they are 
contented. And from now we send to our Contadores Mayores as 
follows:
Pragmatica de Su Majestad lxxxvi. Madrid 1534.
Law 11
The said encabezamiento will last for ten years more 
from 1547 to 1556. And for this we issue our cedula for our 
Contadores Mayores ... the Cortes are responsible for the 
encabezamiento of the taxes of the realms for ten years at a 
fixed price and set conditions ... and from these Cortes we 
are granted an extraordinary servicio of one hundred and 
fifty cuentos of maravadies (one hundred and fifty millions) 
for our large and important needs ... to do well and grant a 
merced to the realms we concede and grant to them an
337
extension of the said encabezamiento for ten years and a 
commitment to raise the maravadies.
Pragmatica de Su Majestad Valladolid, 1547.
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Translation of Founding of M a y o ra zg o
(Abstract from original manuscript in palaeography of 
the period, taken from the Archivo Ducal de Medinacel±r 
Seville, cajon 3, leg. num. 1).
Extract from original as above, dated Sabiote 17 March 
1587. Regarding the founding of the mayorazgo of Francisco 
de los Cobos and Maria de Mendoza and confirmation of the 
emperor's permission.
This extract was ordered by a witness to the will of 
Leonor de Castro, Countess of Rivadavia. There follows a 
clause dealing with manner of possession of goods in the 
mayorazgo and payment of debts of husband and wife.
Usual invocation of Holy Trinity and Virgin Mary. Then: 
'as all men naturally wish to perpetuate and preserve their 
legacy ... Charles I grants a license to Francisco de los 
Cobos and his wife Maria de Mendoza in favour of their 
eldest son Diego de los Cobos to establish a mayorazgo of 
their possessions.'
'Firstly, as you and your wife wish to be remembered 
and your descendants to be honoured and to better serve the 
Crown ... we license and give you permission either during 
your lives or at death by testament or codicil or any other 
disposition in life or as a last wish to establish a 
mayorazgo of all the towns and places and fortresses and 
vassals and your houses and juros, for life or perpetually,
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rents, mineral and salt rights, and whatever other goods you 
have now or in the future. To include any gift or my royal 
merced from Castile or the Indies which shall be inherited 
by Diego de los Cobos, knight of the Order of Santiago and 
your eldest son and primogenitor and your legitimate ■ or 
natural descendants ... or in defect others whom you wish and 
provide for.
These goods will be inalienable, non-prescriptive and 
indivisible and for no cause can they be given away, reduced 
or abridged or be removed from the mayorazgo for dowry, nor 
for ransom of captives nor for any other reason.
We also give licence for you to dispose of other goods 
that remain to you outside of said mayorazgo (bienes 
litres), with permission to give to your daughter Maria 4 
million maravedies or more and to any children from the 
marriage 2 million maravedies each.
And you can impose whatever limiting clauses you wish 
affecting your children in the mayorazgo.
And we command that everything ordered above will be 
complied with under this licence of royal approval. Even if 
your children and grandchildren might feel injured the terms 
cannot be revoked or derogated.
Given in Toledo 26 February 1529. Yo el Rey.
Don Carlos, followed by the intitulacion (titles). 
Having granted a mayorazgo to Francisco de los Cobos and 
Doha Maria his wife. I give permission to substitute or add
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goods to or change said mayorazgo of 26 February 1529 up to 
date of death.
And those goods added after death,, tributes, juros and 
other revenues can be placed in the mayorazgo. To include my 
mercedes for posts held by Francisco de los Cobos. Whoever 
of you remain alive after the death of the other can place 
in the mayorazgo the goods and privileges so acquired and 
leave to the person you both designated as beneficiary. 
Additionally, as you wished and supplicated to impose 
conditions and substitutions and impediments on the goods 
you leave for your beneficiaries, this you may do.
And as you wish from the above mentioned reference you 
may give as a dowry 4 million maravedies to your daughter 
Maria Sarmiento and 2 million to each child of the marriage. 
All other goods to go into the mayorazgo for Diego de los 
Cobos. Neither said Doha Maria Sarmiento nor any other of 
your descendants to have any rights or recourse against your 
goods in mayorazgo. And because of this, and with Our 
licence and knowledge you have agreed to marry the said Dona 
Maria, your daughter, to Don Gonzalo Hernandez de Cordova, 
Duke of Sesa and you and your wife have decided on a dowry 
of the said 4 million maravedies. In agreement with the 
powers I have given you, you may give an additional 10 
million maravedies.
And we wish and order for all time that said Doha Maria 
Sarmiento, and her descendants, cannot claim against your 
mayorazgo more than the 10 million maravedies that you have 
promised in the dowry.
I will grant by merced a juro of 125,000 maravedies for 
life to help with her marriage. I continue to have great 
respect for the considerable and significant loyal service 
of the comendador mayor Don Francisco de los Cobos and wish 
that in your person and lineage and house there be a 
perpetual memory. For this end and effect all your towns, 
vassals, and fortresses with their jurisdictions and 
revenues and taxes and rights therefrom that you presently 
have and will have in the future and whatever goods and 
rights, juros and revenues of any kind and amount although 
they be of greater value than the goods you have at the 
granting of my permission you may order in mayorazgo in life 
or death. And that all are always together, united and 
inseparable so that after your days they remain together 
within the said mayorazgo for your elder son Don Diego de 
los Cobos.
Given in Ghent 10 March 1540. Yo el Rey
Appendix Four
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Last Will and Testament 
Translation of an Abstract from a 
Transcription of the Testament of Francisco de los 
Cobos.
(From Archivo Ducal de Medinacell, Seville, Section 
Sabiote, leg. 1, pieza 17).
In Ubeda, 8 May 1547 in presence of the lieutenant 
corregidor, a royal escribano and witnesses. Also present 
Diego de los Cobos, Marques de Camarasa Adelantado de 
Cazorla and inheritor of Francisco de los Cobos, Comendador 
Mayor de Leon and secretary to His Majesties. And Duque de 
Sesa with wife, Cobos's daughter, Maria Sarmiento.
Form of authority for escribano to read the testament 
and naming of witnesses. Hernando Verdugo de Henao, royal 
escribano presented closed and sealed testament, sealed with 
Cobos's coat-of-arms. Showed to all present to verify and 
recognise signatures. Swearing that Cobos was dead and his 
body had been seen by Diego Caballos, doctor to His Majesty. 
Lieutenant corregidor took oath from Verdugo de Henao that 
contents of testament was that written by Cobos in presence 
of Verdugo de Henao. That Cobos was of sound mind and that 
testament had been closed, sealed and signed by seven 
witnesses. Each witness to duly swear their signatures and 
that of Cobos were those on the testament. They swore they
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had seen Cobos sign and each of the witnesses likewise swore 
they had seen the document closed and sealed.
Then the lieutenant corregidor opened the testament in 
presence of the royal escribano, Verdugo de Henao, and the 
witnesses and read the document:
Testament 4 May 1547
In Ubeda, 4 May 1547, before the royal escribano 
(Verdugo de Henao) and royal notary public and witnesses, 
Francisco de los Cobos, Comendador Mayor de Leon and 
counsellor to His Majesty and Contador Mayor de Castilla, 
being sick in bed and in good mind presented an escritura, 
signed, closed and sealed, which was stated to be his
testament. Revoking all other testaments.
Usual religious invocation of the Trinity and the 
Virgin Mary for first paragraph. Followed by Cobos's full 
titles. Don Francisco de los Cobos, Comendador Mayor de Leon 
del Consejo de Estado de sus majestades y su contador mayor 
de Castilla, senor de las villas de Sabiote, Torres y
Canena. This is my testament and last wish as follows:
Commend my soul etc and make my confession and pray for
forgiveness for my sins.
First states a wish to be lain in El Salvador before 
the main altar when building completed. ' I am the patron by 
apostolic concession.' As a temporary resting place can be 
lain in chapel of Santo Tomas also in Ubeda and later 
transferred to El Salvador. Then, there is great detail
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about friars and clerics to give masses and offerings in El 
Salvador on day of burial. A sung-requiem should be given by 
the chaplains of El Salvador attended by priests' servers 
and friars from the monasteries of S. Domingo and S. 
Francisco. Mass to be given for his soul and that of others. 
Offer a thousand masses for his soul and priests to give 
twelve masses for the twelve apostles, and another twelve 
for St. James (of Santiago Compostela) at his altar in the 
church of Compostela, another twelve for the angels and 
archangels, and for St. Michael and the martyrs and twenty 
for the Sacred birth of the Virgin, and twenty for the 
ascension of Our Saviour and for all masses to give 
offerings as judged by my executors.
He leaves provision for twelve chaplains for El 
Salvador and to sanctify the chapel he provides for statutes 
for its care and conservation. He requires Maria and his 
son, Diego, to act as patrons as set out in the articles of 
the statutes for El Salvador. But especially Maria to take 
care of the work on the chapel in the form provided for. 
Diego as a dutiful son to ensure provision of money for 
perpetual conservation of the chapel as provided for in its 
statutes. He has ordered all this 'in service of God and for 
the public good and help of poor people. ' As an expression 
of the virtues of his son and himself.
Then testament discusses El Salvador and arrangements 
for completion. If funds should be insufficient to complete 
from the incomes granted me by His Holiness, 'I wish and 
order that payment be made from my worldly goods' [i.e.
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bienes litres outside the mayorazgo]; if still insufficient 
then payment from his mayorazgo to finish the work to 
complete perfection. Gives details regarding doorway, 
retablos, ironwork, arches of the sacristy, choir stalls, 
bells, and pillars and towers, missives, organs, books of 
plain song, and everything necessary to make the chapel 
perfect to perform divine services. This is all set out in 
the chapel's statutes. Great care should be taken to fulfill 
his wishes and to complete the chapel with the greatest 
perfection. He requests and orders his wife, Maria de 
Mendoza, children and servants not to wear mourning for him. 
He asks to send to named monasteries and churches 10 ducats 
so that the friars can pray for his soul.
He asks for his Military Order robes to be returned to 
the Order. To pay all his lessor debts (amount defined) 
against a sworn statement. If greater, the amount to be
verified by his executors. Also asks Maria to ensure El
Salvador is well provided with tapestries, silver and 
reliquaries. The incomes and benefits His Holiness has 
provided as part of the benefice of El Salvador should go to 
the servants of the chapel.
To take care of the funds Maria and he provided by
escritura before Hernando Verdugo de Henao on 8 December 
1546.
His sisters, Leonor and Isabel, to be housed in Ubeda 
and Diego and Marla to take care of them.
'Our Holiness Pope Paul III, presently head of the 
Church, granted the emperor as patron of the Church of
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Toledo approval and confirmation of the adelantamiento of 
Cazorla which had originally been agreed by Cardenal Juan 
Tavera.
Don Diego de los Cobos, my son, and all my descendants 
and his, male and female, to for ever have the dignity and 
position of the said adelantamiento to be succeeded in 
perpetuity according to the order and form of the mayorazgo 
made by my wife and myself. These descendants to pay every 
year on San Ildefonso day to the archbishop of Toledo 300 
ducats and to swear fidelity and allegiance to the 
archbishop and to give a fine horse of at least 100 ducats 
in value. By the escrituras and apostolic bulls given by His
Holiness and in the escrituras of His Majesty, Diego de los
Cobos, Marques de Camarasa and Adelantado de Cazorla, my 
son, and his descendants will succeed the mayorazgo as
stated and the said adelantamiento, and will reverently and 
faithfully respect the archbishopric of Toledo, and be 
obedient and devoted to His Apostolic Holiness and the Roman 
Church and His Majesty and his successors.' ..
'And I have cedulas from His Majesty in which he
requires me to renounce the office I hold as ' fundidor, 
marcador, y ensayador of all the Americas and the titles of 
corregidor of Valladolid, and of chief justice of Ubeda, and 
contador of Granada. I therefore renounce these positions 
and pass all to my son Diego de los Cobos to enjoy from the 
day of my death ... And to take care of Maria de Mendoza. '
Maria for her life to have the usufruct of the 
' derechos' of the offices of the Indies, [the 1 per cent
/levy on precious metals].and to benefit from these revenues 
and also from the growth in our mayorazgo.
As to the matrimonial contract (capitulos matrimoniales 
de casamiento) of my son with Dona Francisco Luisa de Luna, 
3 February 1543, it was agreed that Maria, my wife, and I 
would give to our son, the marques and adelantado, 15,000 
ducats of gold from our mayorazgo, dated 9 November 1541, as
agreed in the wedding contract. I order that on my death
this payment be made.
Alonso de Idiaquez, secretary of His Majesty owes me 
money from revenues collected on my behalf from the office 
of secretary of Naples. I order that no demand is made for 
these revenues.
And as agreed in the wedding contract of my son and 
from our mayorazgo, the marques and marquesa can sell all 
goods, furniture, jewels, gold and silver plate and 
tapestries to provide for the payment of bequests. Goods are 
valued at 4,000 ducats. Maria and I made the mayorazgo of
our goods and an escritura of them before Fernando Guerrero
secretary of the Council of the Orders. This was approved 
and confirmed by their Majesties. The letter of privilege 
for the mayorazgo is included in the escritura of the 
mayorazgo and in the marriage agreement of our son and Doha 
Francisco Luisa de Luna, marquesa.
De Camarasa and his wife have ratified and approved the 
escritura of the mayorazgo and we require all the content of 
the mayorazgo and its clauses should be maintained 
perpetually. I ask my wife to have a special care that all I
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request be followed, especially regarding El Salvador and 
its chapel and that the conditions are fulfilled for its 
perpetual endowment. And that my son always serves and 
reveres Maria de Mendoza, my wife and his mother.
I also ask the illustrious senores Duque de Alba and 
Monsieur de Granvela and the Marques de Mondejar for whom I 
have always had great love and friendship to show favour and 
care for my wife and children. I humbly beseech His Majesty 
the emperor, for the great favours he has always shown me, 
to show favour to my wife and children. I also ask the
prince to do likewise.
I leave for my heirs, Diego de los Cobos, marques and
adelantador and his descendants, and in defect of them, of
our daughter, Dona Maria Sarmiento, Duquesa de Sesa y 
Condesa de Cabra, and her descendants, the goods and 
revenues contained in the escritura of mayorazgo made by my 
wife and myself. My daughter to whom we granted a dowry (he 
names the amounts, the expenses, and including gifts of a 
juro from His Majesty) and continued help with household 
expenses up to the present. As well as gifts of gold and
jewels and horses, and expensive clothes. The legal 
requirements of the realm have been satisfied, and they will 
not share further, other than stipulated in the mayorazgo. 
It was further agreed by terms of the marriage contract that 
if Maria died without issue part of the dowry would revert 
to the mayorazgo. But because of his love it is his wish to 
grant her another 15,000 ducats which will add to the 
already large sums granted (he gives a detailed accounting)
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including the acreage for cereals given to the Duque de 
Sesa, her husband, which he values from the prices of wheat 
and barley dated from the wedding settlement until the 
present time. The 15,000 ducats will be a juro assigned to 
the adelantamiento of Cazorla. There will be no right of 
dispute on this settlement against the mayorazgo. He lists 
other gifts. The duguesa will only have the rights from the 
mayorazgo as specified in the clauses of the wedding dowry. 
She should be content and not challenge the distribution of 
the goods in the mayorazgo.
My wife and I established the mayorazgo for the marques 
and adelantado our son who should care for his mother and 
follow everything that concerns her. And to fulfill and 
complete my testament I name as executors my wife, Maria de 
Mendoza, Duque de Alba and Marques de Mudejar and as they 
will be unfamiliar with the detail I also name Alvaro de 
Mendoza, chaplain of the chapel of the Reyes in Toledo and 
Juan Vazquez de Molina my nephew and Alonso de Idiaquez and 
Juan de Samano secretaries to His Majesty and Hernando 
Ortega, Dean of Malaga, and Francisco de Almaguen, contador 
of His Majesty. To these I give all my completed powers so 
they can execute the. content of my testament according to my 
wishes. And as all will not be able to act together, my wife 
Maria, with others she names from the executors, will act on 
the testament.
I certify this is my only valid testament that I now 
make and order, superceeding all others and written on 
eleven sheets.
Cobos Comendador Mayor.
Bibliography
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Key to Abbreviations 
Archives and Libraries:
ACDM Archivo de la Casa Ducal de Medinaceli, Seville 
ACT Archivo Catedral de Toledo 
AGA Archivo General de Andalucia, Seville
AGI Archivo General de las Indias, Seville
AGS Archivo General de Simancas, Valladolid
CG Contaduria General
CJH Consejo y Juntas de Hacienda, Secretarias de 
Hacienda
CMH Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda [pre-dated 
Consejo de Hacienda of 1523]
DC Diversos Castilla 
E Secretariate Estado 
EMR Escribania Mayor de Rentas 
GA Guerra Antigua 
MP Mercedes y Privilegios 
PR Patronato Real
QC Quitaciones de Corte
AHN Archivo Historico Nacional, Madrid 
AMU Archivo Municipal de Ubeda 
BN Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid
JCBL John Carter Brown Library, Providence, R. I.
RAH, S y C Real Academia de la Historia, Salazar y Castro, 
Madrid
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Zabalburu Archivo Privado de la Biblioteca de Francisco
Zabalburu, Madrid
Other Abbreviations:
BAE Biblioteca de Autores Espanoles
CECA Los Codigos Espanoles Concordados y Anotados, 12
vols
Codoin Coleccion de Documentos Ineditos para la
Historia de Espana, 112 vols (Madrid, 1842-
1915)
leg. legajo (in Spanish archives, a bundle of papers
loosely tied together with a ribbon)
Archivo General de Simancas
The great national archive of Simancas is the first 
port of call for anyone studying this period. Some sections
have printed catalogues but in general one has to rely on
older manuscript inventories that give little idea of the 
contents of individual legajos. This is largely the case for 
the papers of the secretaries of state, the Secretaria de 
Estado (E). The legajo numbers consulted for this section
are listed below.
The papers of the Council of Finance (Consejo y Juntas 
de Hacienda) have been analysed and grouped in an inventory 
of legajos organised by a previous archivist at Simancas — 
Margarita Cuartas Rivero. This was of invaluable help for 
the chapters on finance. Her work relates to the Consejo y 
Juntas de Hacienda from 1523 and its precursor the 
Contaduria Mayor de Hacienda for an earlier period. The
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inventory of legajos from both Secretarias, includes a vast 
body of material: alcabalas and tercias from
encabezamientos; asientos; bulas de cruzadas; servicios 
voted in Cortes; sales of . official posts and of 
jurisdictions of senorios. The CJH is divided into 
Expedientes de Hacienda, Escribania de Rentas, Contaduria 
General and Contaduria Mayor de Cuentas. All of these were 
of particular value and relevance to this thesis.
The following were also inspected: the Mercedes and
Privilegios section (listing royal favours by name and 
date); the Patronato Real (royal revenues and estates); and 
the Quitaciones de Corte (listing by name and date royal 
appointments). The principal Simancas manuscripts consulted 
are included in the bibliography below.
Archivo de la Casa Ducal de Medinaceli
The Sabiote section of the Casa Ducal de Medinaceli 
archive in Seville has been most valuable, particularly for 
Chapter Six, containing as it does Cobos's mayorazgo and his 
last will and testament, among other helpful papers.
Archivo Catedral de Toledo
This archive was especially helpful in following the
feud between Cobos and Cardinal Siliceo, the subject of much
of Chapter Three.
Archivo de los Condes de Rivadia, Galicia
This archive was referred to in Chapter Six, but was
not visited, as it required special permission. The
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archivist in the Medinaceli archives drew attention to the 
papers in the archive. It is a possible fruitful area for 
further research.
Archivo General de Andalucia
This archive is of value as it contains microfilm of 
the documents from the Casa Ducal de Medinaceli private 
archive.
Archivo Historico Nacional
Some of the old bundles on the Military Orders were 
sampled to establish the series of proofs for entry into 
each Order and to search (without success) for any inquiry 
into Cobos's bloodline. There is a guide to the different 
Orders by L. Javierre Mur, Guia de la Seccion de Ordenes 
Militares (Madrid, n.d.). The Seccion de Consejos 
Suprimidos, was also consulted. There there is an 
interesting legajo on the revenues raised at Cazorla, 1515- 
18. This is slightly earlier than Cobos's stewardship, but 
gives an idea of the potential wealth. There is also a 
printed catalogue of the Order of Grandees in Spain: 
Catalogo Alfabetico de los documentos referentes a titulos 
del Reino y Grandezas de Espana.
Biblioteca Nacional, Madrid
Apart from its huge secondary printed sources (books 
and journals), the Biblioteca Nacional manuscript room 
(Cervantes) has an excellent catalogue (Inventario General 
de Manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional (Madrid, 1953) to
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primary sources printed versions were consulted of the 
manuscripts, such as the inestimable 5-volume collection of 
letters and writings to and from Charles V, edited by Manuel 
Fernandez Alvarez (Salamanca, 2003). The 2 volumes of Juan 
M. March (Madrid, 1944) on the childhood of Philip II, with 
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133 (Cobos's purchase of Sabiote); no. 479.349-407; no. 
1509.24; nos. 269.279-394; nos. 482.653-701, 483.008-125,
479.011-200, 459.016-063 and 479.220-280.
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Seccion Indiferente General, leg. 1801 (Verdugo de 
Henao's mission for Cobos); leg. 1802 (revocation of Cobos 
'derechos', 1552); Patronato, leg. 170, no. 51, 171
(emperor's transfer of 'derecho' to Diego, 1548); Justicia, 
1020, no. 1, pieza 5 (extension of Cobos's 'derecho' to all 
Americas); Lima, leg. 566, lib. 4, f. 88 (Cobos to emperor 
asking for restitution of lost specie revenues); Lima, leg. 
25 (Ibid.); Lima, leg. 136-1, 6, lib. 9, f. 186 (record of
silver seizures).
Archivo General de Simancas
CG, legs. 281-284, 251-362 and 899-904 (sales of
emperor's alcabalas and named individuals buying alcabalas,
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sale).
CJH leg. 7, ff. 169-170 (treasurer's report to emperor 
on expenses); CJH, leg. 9, ff. 138-147 (Vozmediano's 
complaints to emperor re Cobos and letters from various to 
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E leg. 12, f. 3 (Cobos to emperor re Council of Finance); E 
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burden); E leg. 25, ff. 194, 195, 199 (Tavera to emperor re 
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leg. 41, f. 76 (emperor promises Cortes not to alienate
royal property); E leg. 50, f. 48; E leg. 167, 169, 289
(Virrey de Cataluna to emperor, 1539-1542); E leg. 279
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rubric); E leg. 14, ff. 59-91 and f. 228, E leg. 15, f. 20 
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and E leg. 14, ff. 85-86 (Mines in Murcia, Lorca and 
Cazorla); E leg. 21, f. 247-249.
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360
1539-43); Osuna, Ms 3406 (Marques de Mondejar, Conde de 
Tendilla, 7 July 1515, letter from Tendilla to agent Ortiz).
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